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„Wir zwei, lieber Freund, sind Sonne und Mond, sind Meer und Land. Unser Ziel ist 
nicht, ineinander überzugehen, sondern einander zu erkennen und einer im andern das 
sehen und ehren zu lernen, was er ist: des andern Gegenstück und Ergänzung.“ 
[“We are sun and moon, dear friend; we are sea and land. It is not our purpose to 
become each other; it is to recognize each other, to learn to see the other and honor him 
for what he is: each the other's opposite and complement.”] 










For humans as social beings, it is important to belong to groups to satisfy basic 
needs as the need for safety, reproduction, and finally survival (Baumeister & Leary, 
1995; Brewer, 1991). A quarter of a century ago, Social Identity Theory (SIT, Tajfel & 
Turner, 1986) and especially Self-Categorization Theory (SCT, Turner, Hogg, Oakes, 
Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) introduced the idea that the group and the individual are 
intrinsically connected, implying that the group can become part of the self to a certain 
degree. This way, one cannot study people’s self-concepts without also taking into 
account their social group. One of SCT’s hypotheses is that salience of a comparative 
dimension on the ingroup-outgroup level will increase the perception of similarity with 
ingroup members. This process is called self-stereotyping and is defined as a 
depersonalization of the individual's self-perception. This means that the individual will 
fall back on stereotypes which describe the character of the ingroup membership, and 
will attribute ingroup stereotypic traits to the self. 
In the field of social cognition, also the opposite mechanism has drawn much 
attention: the attribution of characteristics of the self (preferences, attitudes, traits, or 
experiences) to another person or the ingroup. It is called social projection (Allport, 
1924; e.g., Krueger & Clement, 1996), self-anchoring (e.g., Cadinu & Rothbart, 1996), or 
false consensus (e.g., Ross, Greene, & House, 1977), respectively. This process has, for the 
most part, been considered to be a cognitive phenomenon (e.g., Ames, 2004a, 2004b; 
Krueger & Clement, 1996). In contrast to cognition-based models of social projection, 
motivational accounts of social projection have received far less attention. Nevertheless, 
there is some empirical evidence for a motivational approach to social projection 
(Machunsky, Toma, Yzerbyt, & Corneille, 2014). It has been found that social projection 
serves a need for connectedness to others, a need for communion (Arndt, Greenberg, 
Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Schimel, 1999; Locke, Craig, Baik, & Gohil, 2012; Pyszczynski et 
al., 1996) implying that social projection may also serve as a means to regulate social 
distance. Recent research focuses on the idea that all factors causing a person to 
approach another person on a spatial dimension can also lead to an increase of social 
projection (Machunsky et al., 2014). 
The determinants and antecedents of social projection and self-stereotyping have 




more likely to arise (Otten & Epstude, 2006). This discussion resulted in a chasm among 
researchers regarding the direction of overlapping mental representations of the self 
and the ingroup. Some researchers advocate social projection to be the predominant 
process and self-stereotyping to be only the exception from the rule (Krueger, 2007; 
Otten & Epstude, 2006). Others instead argument that self-stereotyping will commonly 
arise under certain circumstances (Latrofa, Vaes, Cadinu, & Carnaghi, 2010; Latrofa, 
2008).  
I propose that the predominance of the respective process depends on the context, 
more precisely on the currently active socio-cognitive mindset. This involves a 
corresponding type of self-construal and is triggered by certain situational cues. The 
goal of this dissertation is to examine possible conditions causing either social 
projection or self-stereotyping to occur, with a special focus on experimentally induced 
effects of primed independent or interdependent socio-cognitive mindsets (Singelis, 
1994). 
In the first chapter, models of social projection and implications from SCT (Turner et 
al., 1987) are reviewed and possible factors influencing the predominance of social 
projection or self-stereotyping are introduced. Chapter 2 proposes a model of socio-
cognitive mindsets’ effects on the occurrence and strength of social projection and self-
stereotyping, incorporating the suggested factors. The main hypotheses of this 
dissertation are presented and an overview of the conducted experiments is given.  
The empirical section of this thesis is divided into two parts. In the first part 
(Chapter 3), I report Experiments 1 through 3 in which the expected effects of different 
types of self-construal on social projection and self-stereotyping was to be established. It 
was predicted that a shift in a person’s focus toward the own person should lead to more 
social projection. Vice versa, self-stereotyping should be the stronger process if a 
person’s current focus is directed outwards and toward his or her ingroup. The second 
part of the empirical section (Chapter 4) focuses on alternative explanations for the first 
three experiments results’, incorporating implications derived from Optimal 
Distinctiveness Theory (Brewer, 1991). Chapter 5 summarizes and discusses the results. 
Limitations of the presented experiments and implications for future research are 
considered. 
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1 Theoretical Background  
An overview of the two phenomena of social projection and self-stereotyping is 
given. Moderating variables of both social projection and self-stereotyping will be 
presented and discussed. 
1.1 Social and Personal Identity: The Self and the Ingroup 
1.1.1 Social projection 
The term “social projection” was originally coined by Allport (1924), one of the 
founders of experimental social psychology. He described it as the attitude and 
imagining involved in the reference of self-reactions to other people. Since then, 
research on social projection has placed emphasis on the false consensus effect (Mullen, 
Driskell, & Smith, 1989), showing that individuals who possess a certain characteristic 
(e.g., optimism), typically assess its prevalence in the population to be higher than 
individuals who do not possess the respective characteristic do (Ross et al., 1977). These 
effects have been reported in the domains of behaviors, traits, preferences, beliefs, and 
personal problems (Marks & Miller, 1987). The social-psychological construct of social 
projection1 is nowadays referred to as the tendency to estimate characteristics, thoughts 
and behaviors of others to be similar to one’s own (e.g., Ames, 2004a, 2004b; Krueger, 
1998; Krueger & Stanke, 2001). This way, the projection of information about the self 
onto others can be used as a guideline to make judgments about another person or a 
group (e.g., Cadinu & Rothbart, 1996; Cho & Knowles, 2013). This process has been 
shown to be a robust phenomenon with a medium effect size in an early meta-analytic 
review (Mullen et al., 1985).  
The more similar a person perceives him or herself to be to another person or group, 
the stronger the social projection which can be observed (Ames, 2004a; Ames, Weber, & 
Zou, 2012). Following Ames' (2004a) similarity contingency model, social projection is 
based on a process of inductive reasoning. Depending on the degree of perceived 
similarity to a target person or group either social projection occurs or existing 
                                                        
1 As mentioned before, also the designations self-anchoring (e.g., Cadinu and Rothbart, 1996) and false 
consensus (e.g., Ross et al., 1977) are customary. Throughout this dissertation, the term social projection 
will be used. 
4 Social and Personal Identity: The Self and the Ingroup 
 
 
stereotypes are activated to identify missing information on the social context. Social 
projection, in turn, may cause the degree of perceived similarity to increase. 
In Clement and Krueger’s view (2002), the effect of social projection is moderated by 
social categorization. Social categorization is the subdivision of the social context in two 
groups along certain characteristics—one is the ingroup, to which a person feels a sense 
of belonging, and an outgroup, which the person does not belong to (Kessler & 
Mummendey, 2007). Accordingly, social projection takes place particularly with respect 
to the ingroup, and can be observed only to a smaller degree or even not at all with 
respect to the outgroup if the social division into these two groups is salient (Bramel, 
1963; Robbins & Krueger, 2005; Ward, 1967). This effect has been shown to be present 
also when employing minimal groups (e.g., Cadinu & Rothbart, 1996; Clement 
& Krueger, 2002; Krueger & Clement, 1996; Robbins & Krueger, 2005). For example, 
Otten and Wentura (2001) were able to show that a larger degree of perceived similarity 
may be observed with respect to a number of personality traits between the self and the 
ingroup compared to an outgroup. Some researchers interpret the effect of social 
categorization on social projection as social projection being a heuristic inductive 
inference process (Krueger & Clement, 1996; Krueger, Acevedo, & Robbins, 2005). 
According to this view, the self forms a small N = 1 sample, only if one is asked to make a 
judgment concerning the ingroup, not the outgroup. This course of action is not 
unreasonable, taking into account prior research according to which a reference to 
information about the self leads to normatively correct judgments (Dawes, 1989; Hoch, 
1987). This notion also defies earlier interpretations of social projection to be a mere 
bias or an error (e.g., Ross et al., 1977). 
It has been found that social projection serves a need for connectedness, a need for 
communion (Arndt et al., 1999; Locke et al., 2012; Pyszczynski et al., 1996), implying 
that social projection may also serve as a means to regulate social distance. In the recent 
past, research interests have expanded to include motivational aspects. Machunsky and 
colleagues (Machunsky et al., 2014) suggest that social projection can be conceptualized 
as an approach motion on the social dimension of psychological distance. Although 
approach and avoidance behavior is usually connected with the spatial dimension of 
psychological distance (Lewin, 1951), some authors have discussed the option that 
psychological distance may also be regulated on the social as well as on the temporal 
dimension (Seibt, Neumann, Nussinson, & Strack, 2008). Some authors have claimed 
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that similarity between the self and a social target may be considered as a form of 
“social" closeness (e.g., Heider, 2013; Tesser & Campbell, 1980), an assumption which 
has been implicated also in Construal Level Theory (see Trope, 2004; Liviatan, Trope, & 
Liberman, 2008). Following Machunsky and colleagues (2014), engaging in social 
projection leads to an increase in perceived similarity of self and target, which in turn 
results in a decrease of social distance. Accordingly, it may be possible that factors which 
cause a person to approach another person on a spatial dimension could lead to an 
increase of social projection by triggering an approach on the social dimension. In one of 
their studies, Machunsky and colleagues (2014) observed that targets with friendly 
facial expressions trigger more social projection than targets with a rather unfriendly 
expression. Also, targets which have been paired with a positive word in an evaluative 
conditioning paradigm are ascribed properties of the self to a larger extent than targets 
which have been paired with a negative word. 
1.1.2 Self Categorization Theory and its implications 
In contrast to the projection of one’s own characteristics, thoughts, or feelings to 
other people or groups, via self-stereotyping, information on the ingroup is attributed to 
the self. Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) formalized the idea that the 
group and the individual are intrinsically connected and that group membership is an 
important source of a positive (social) identity. Self Categorization Theory (SCT; Turner 
et al., 1987) extended this notion. Here, the process of self-stereotyping is described as 
an approximation of the self-concept to an ingroup prototype. SCT distinguishes 
between a personal and a social self and provides a framework on how people create a 
connection between the self and the ingroup. Unlike the personal self that reflects the 
individual characteristics of the person, the social self is defined by group 
characteristics. Hence, without also taking into account a person’s social group, one 
cannot study his or her self-concept adequately. An activation of the social self, 
accordingly, via a process of depersonalization, causes a person to increasingly define 
him or herself in accordance with the ingroup and their prototypical characteristics and 
behaviors (Turner et al., 1987): the individual will fall back on stereotypes, which 
describe the character of its ingroup membership, and will attribute ingroup stereotypic 
traits to the self.  
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According to SCT, an increase in the salience of social categories will increase the 
perception of similarity with ingroup members and hence the tendency for self-
stereotyping (van Hogg & Turner, 1987). Similarly, other studies have shown self-
stereotyping to be more pronounced when a social identity is salient as compared with 
instances when a personal identity is salient (Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1991; Onorato & Turner, 
2004). This way, social identification affects social perceptions, feelings, and behaviors. 
Persons who identify strongly with their ingroup reflect on themselves in terms of their 
membership in a certain group, and may even act on behalf of the respective group (e.g., 
Spears, Doosje, & Ellemers, 1997; van Zomeren, Leach, & Spears, 2012). Degrees of 
identification with a certain group correspond in large parts with its valence. As such, it 
has been shown that university students are more eager to wear t-shirts with their 
university’s emblem after their school’s football team had won a game rather than after 
they lost (Cialdini et al., 1976). Similarly, people who displayed election posters in front 
of their houses were more willing to keep them visible after the elections if their party 
had won the elections (Boen & Vanbeselaere, 2002). 
Based on a literature review, Krueger (2007) emphasizes additional factors to the 
salience of social categories and social identity influencing the tendency to self-
stereotype. First, self-stereotyping tendencies are to be enhanced if the individual self is 
threatened. Pickett, Bonner, and Coleman (2002) showed that self-stereotyping is a 
response exhibited by individuals whose standing within the ingroup has been 
undermined. To test these ideas, they asked honors students to fill out a self-concept 
inventory. While some participants were given the bogus feedback that their personal 
score differed from the average score obtained by honors students, other students were 
told that their scores were average. Participants whose score placed them on the 
periphery of the ingroup were more likely to afterwards rate stereotypical traits as 
being more descriptive of the self than were participants whose ingroup status was 
secure. 
 Furthermore, according to Krueger’s literature review (2007), the attributes in 
question have to be of relevance, meaning, and they have to be evaluatively charged. 
Biernat, Vescio, and Green (1996) referred to this observation as “selective self-
stereotyping“. They speculated that self-stereotyping might be limited to positive 
attributes and suggested negative self-stereotyping to be paradoxical because the 
“acceptance of negative stereotypes work[s] against the general goal of self-
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enhancement” (p. 1194). Nonetheless, the rejection of negative stereotypes equates to a 
denial of an important part of the social identity (Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1991). Later research 
demonstrated that low-status group members attribute both positive and negative 
group stereotypes to the self (Latrofa, Vaes, Pastore, & Cadinu, 2009). In this study, 
following the rejection-identification model (Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999), 
Latrofa and colleagues (2009) show that self-stereotyping serves to maintain 
psychological well-being among participants belonging to a stigmatized group. By 
identifying with and self-stereotyping from the devalued ingroup, they restore their 
need to feel accepted (see section 1.2.1.2). Further research also demonstrated negative 
self-stereotyping to be present when implicit measures are employed (Lun, Sinclair, & 
Cogburn, 2009). 
Though SCT lists social identification as one of the antecedents or conditions of self-
stereotyping, also the inversed process has been proposed. Van Veelen, Otten, Cadinu, 
and Hansen (2015) propose that instances of self-stereotyping or social projection may 
enhance identification with the respective group. According to their Integrative Model of 
Social Identification, the cognitive basis for social identification lies within both the 
social and the personal self. Following this reasoning, they integrated self-anchoring and 
self-stereotyping in one theoretical model and demonstrated that both processes form 
two distinct and complementary pathways to explain identification with groups. This 
way, they assume social projection along with self-stereotyping to form a reciprocal link 
of mutual enhancement with social identification.  
1.1.3 The issue of directionality 
Among researchers from the field of social projection as well as of self-stereotyping, 
the question under which conditions which process is more likely to arise has been topic 
of discussion (e.g., Krueger, 2007; Otten & Epstude, 2006; van Veelen et al., 2015). Some 
researchers advocate social projection to be the predominant process and self-
stereotyping to be only the exception from the rule (Krueger, 2007; Otten & Epstude, 
2006). According to this viewpoint, the personal self serves as the default to make 
judgments and predictions about others in domains relevant to the self. This tendency is 
said to be stable and is not easily overridden by any inference based on stereotypes 
(DiDonato, Ullrich, & Krueger, 2011; Krueger, 2007). One’s personal identity is seen as 
the most immediate—and also most economical—source of information, as it is the 
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locus of experience. This way, for social projection, there is said to always exist a direct 
link between a person’s personal perception and a social cue. Since self-stereotyping 
always requires further information about basic representations in the social context, 
inferences based on knowledge about the self therefore are likely to overrule generic 
knowledge. In studies supporting this view of social projection being the predominant 
process, it has been shown that self-ratings are not only made faster (Cadinu & Amicis, 
1999; Clement & Krueger, 2000), but also more accurately and consistingly over time 
(Krueger & Stanke, 2001). Furthermore, Cadinu and Rothbart (1996) demonstrated 
inferences from self to ingroup being stronger compared with inferences from ingroup 
to self (for an overview, see Krueger, 2007). 
Other researchers instead argument that self-stereotyping indeed will commonly 
arise under certain circumstances (Latrofa, 2008; Latrofa et al., 2010). According to 
Karniol (2003), a process of inference from the self to others is hard to reconcile with 
the notion that the self is a unique entity, since an entity that is categorized as being 
distinct cannot serve to infer similarity (e.g., Brewer, 1993). As stated above, SCT 
emphasizes that a person’s relation to his or her ingroup is built on the perception of the 
self as being but one interchangeable exemplar of a group’s prototype. Following this 
notion and the principle of depersonalization, self-ingroup overlap cannot exclusively be 
based on the personal self via social projection (e.g., Onorato & Turner, 2004; Simon, 
Hastedt, & Aufderheide, 1997; Turner et al., 1987). Studies supporting the view of self-
stereotyping being the predominant process have shown that the associative strength 
between the self and the ingroup is larger when judgments about the self are based on 
prototypical information about the ingroup than when judgments about the ingroup are 
based on self-information (e.g., Biernat, Manis, & Kobrynowicz, 1997; Deschamps & 
Devos, 1998).  
Concluding, theoretical and empirical support for either self-stereotyping or social 
projection as the default process is mixed. As described above, empirical evidence exists 
for the higher cognitive accessibility of the personal self relative to the social self in 
terms of faster response times. A fallback on information about the self, this way, may be 
seen as economical (Krueger & Stanke, 2001). However, the higher cognitive 
accessibility of the personal self at an implicit level does not per se provide sufficient 
evidence for the predominance of self-anchoring. In contrast, prior research employing 
explicit measures showed levels of social projection to be just as high as levels of self-





stereotyping, lower than self-stereotyping, or also higher (e.g., Latrofa et al., 2010; Otten 
& Epstude, 2006; van Veelen, Otten, & Hansen, 2011). In addition, empirical evidence 
showing a higher prevalence of self-anchoring compared to self-stereotyping in large 
parts stems from research employing minimal group contexts. These findings are not 
surprising considering the basic purpose of the minimal group paradigm being 
developed and employed to exclude "objective" influences from the situation (Tajfel, 
1970). In this paradigm, people cannot rely on a social context to make social inferences.  
To this point, advocates of neither side have been able to demonstrate convincingly 
that one process is more relevant than the other, nor have they been able to explain why 
at some times self-stereotyping and at other times social projection is more prevalent. 
Van Veelen and colleagues (2015) argument the reason for this is because there simply 
is not one most fundamental or default process (see also Ames, 2004a, 2004b; Cho 
& Knowles, 2013). Instead, they propose that self-stereotyping and social projection 
complement each other and, hence, exist in parallel inferring self-ingroup overlap. Their 
proposition is very much in line with this author’s hypotheses. 
1.2 Proposed Contexts and Constructs of Relevance for Social Projection or 
Self-Stereotyping 
Following a review of existing literature on the connections of several factors with 
and their influence on the occurrence of either social projection or self-stereotyping, I 
compared commonalities underlying these factors. I started with a review article of 
Kraus and colleagues (Kraus, Piff, Mendoza-Denton, Rheinschmidt, & Keltner, 2012) 
where they discussed how one’s membership in a social class may shape psychological 
processes and indirectly influence behavior. Over time, I found more and more evidence 
supporting my assumption which constitutes this dissertation’s foundation: that self-
construal as a fundamental factor influencing the construction of personal experience 
and behavior determines the direction of inferential socio-cognitive processes. In the 
following section, I will present support derived from literature on social status and 
research from the perspective of intercultural psychology. 




1.2.1 Social status 
1.2.1.1 Social class 
Already in the fourth century BC, the Greek philosopher Aristotle mentioned social 
classes as a means of categorizing society along certain characteristics (Bendix, 1970). In 
mid-nineteenth century, Karl Marx raised the concept of social classes to one of 
sociology’s basic categories (Geißler & Meyer, 2006). According to Geißler and Meyer 
(2006), the terms social stratum and social class encompass people in similar socio-
economic positions. These are derived from similar life experiences, opportunities, and 
risks, and show similar personality traits, such as attitudes, values, needs, mentalities, 
and life style. Although social class and socio-economic status (SES) are often conflated 
with one another, they can be distinguished as separate constructs with regard to their 
stability and malleability. SES refers to a person’s current social and economic situation, 
and consequently, is relatively mutable, providing the person in respect is in a position 
for economic advancement. In contrast, social class refers to one’s socio-cultural 
background and is more stable, typically remaining static across generations (Ostrove & 
Cole, 2003; Rubin et al., 2014). The influence of social class has been topic of numerous 
research projects, showing that it has an impact on multiple domains, such as language 
(e.g., Bernstein, 1971), health (e.g., Gallo & Matthews, 2003), subjective well-being (e.g., 
Diener, Ng, Harter, & Arora, 2010), but also cognitive performance (e.g., Choi, Nisbett, & 
Norenzayan, 1999; Ji, Zhang, & Nisbett, 2004).  
Kraus and colleagues (2012) offer a theory of how social class may shape basic 
psychological processes: Basically, an individual’s social class is a context which is 
anchored in the material foundation of social life (wealth, education, and work) as well 
as in a person’s distinct construal of his or her class rank. This way, social class is a core 
aspect of how someone thinks of the self and how someone relates to the social world 
(see also Piff, Kraus, Côté, Cheng, & Keltner, 2010; Stellar, Manzo, Kraus, & Keltner, 
2012). Kraus and colleagues (2012) argue that, through shared experiences, individuals 
in specific social classes develop a system of knowledge, action tendencies, and affects 
that determine thoughts, feelings, and relationships with others. Diminished resources 
and lower rank enhance lower-class individuals’ contextualist tendencies. As a result, 
they focus on external social forces and other persons who influence their life. These 
contextual influences can either be real, structural influences (e.g., social inequality; 





inadequate social services, such as health care) but also mere expectations of external 
influences on action (e.g., expectations for class-based discrimination). For example, 
according to Kraus and colleagues (2012), lower-class individuals will be more vigilant 
to threat, will experience a reduced sense of control, and will develop more communal 
self-concepts relative to upper-class individuals. This way, the perception of such 
contextualist influential factors will create “a system of knowledge that favors 
explanations of behavior that involve forces outside of individual control, increased 
attention to others’ thoughts and actions, and increased situational influences on action” 
(p. 549). 
The opposite is claimed to be the case for upper-class individuals. Here, upper-class 
contexts are stated to prioritize the individualized self. In comparison to lower-class 
individuals, upper-class individuals pursue these goals and interests relatively free of 
concerns about their material costs. By being salient in everyday life’s thoughts and 
actions, the availability of resources and an elevated rank create a context which 
emphasizes economic and personal freedom and gives rise to an individualistic mindset 
that leads to an individualistic orientation towards the environment. The person will 
focus more strongly on his or her own goals, emotions, and motivations. In dependence 
on the philosophical idea of solipsism, Kraus and colleagues (2012) called the 
accompanying social cognitive tendencies solipsistic, as solipsism “centers on the notion 
that one’s own mind is a fundamental source of knowledge about the social world and is 
the primary influence on people’s everyday thoughts and actions” (p. 550; see also 
Russell, 1914). 
It was hypothesized that lower-class individuals—given their contextualist focus—
will show heightened empathic accuracy relative to upper-class individuals and that 
they should develop a self-concept defined in terms of interconnectedness and 
interdependence with other people. Vice versa, they expected upper-class individuals—
given their solipsistic tendencies—“to make judgments about other individuals’ 
emotions based on their own current feelings, rather than on the behavior of other 
individuals” (Kraus et al., 2012, p. 555). These propositions first gave rise to this 
author’s hypotheses (see below). 




1.2.1.2 Minority-majority group contexts 
Another major line of research focuses on the concept of gender roles in connection 
with minority-majority group contexts. In a series of studies, Latrofa and colleagues 
(Latrofa et al., 2010) examined the process of self-stereotyping focusing on relative 
ingroup status and using gender groups. They found relative ingroup status of one’s 
social group to be a key variable and inferred that low-status group members—
consistent with a heightened salience of their group membership (see also Hogg & 
Turner, 1987) and their tendency to identify more strongly with their own group (see 
also Krueger, 2007)—more easily engage in a process of self-stereotyping than high-
status group members. In addition, they found evidence that members of a low-status 
group self-stereotyped not only by ascribing positive stereotypical features of the 
ingroup to themselves, but they also internalized negative stereotypical characteristics 
to the same extent. They explained this by referring to previous research (Latrofa et al., 
2009) according to which disadvantaged group members who were aware of their 
discrimination and who engaged in self-stereotyping on both positive and negative traits 
also reported feeling better. According to Latrofa and colleagues (2010), this finding 
suggests that self-stereotyping could affirm one’s threatened social identity in all of its 
facets, that is, the fact of belonging to and finding shelter in a certain social group 
becomes more important than maintaining a purely positive image of the self. For high-
status group members, results in their study (Latrofa et al., 2010) showed that the 
observed self-ingroup overlap was due to an induction-to-the-ingroup process of 
personal characteristics (i.e., social projection) which they considered to be the result of 
an “egocentric cognitive strategy” (p. 919; see also Cadinu & Rothbart, 1996; Krueger, 
2003). Similarly, already Lorenzi-Cioldi (1991, 2006) argued that the consideration of 
gender differences in terms of status differences offers a prediction that men will be 
motivated to augment their personal identity to emphasize their personal tribute to the 
high status of their group. Vice versa, he proposed that women might enhance their 
social identity to defend themselves from perceived threat against their low-status 
group or their individual selves. 
In their Identity-threat Model of Stigma, Major and O’Brien (2005) outline factors 
affecting people’s appraisals of potentially threatening situations. The model postulates 
that three parameters shape appraisals of the significance of stigma-relevant situations 





for well-being: (1) collective representations of one’s stigma status which refers to the 
awareness—possessed by stigmatized as well as non-stigmatized group members—of 
the existence of a cultural stereotype which is related to a specific stigmatized social 
group. These collective stereotypes should be perceived by stigmatized group members 
as a threat to their social identity, but should be of no relevance to the identities of non-
stigmatized group members. As a result, the same (2) situational cues should affect or 
should be perceived by stigmatized and non-stigmatized individuals differently: as 
threatening by stigmatized and non-threatening by non-stigmatized individuals. 
Furthermore, Major and O’Brien (2005) take into account (3) personal beliefs and 
motives. 
Focusing on the first two of this model’s initial parameters, Latrofa and colleagues 
(Latrofa, Vaes, & Cadinu, 2012) conducted a series of studies. The collective 
representation they concentrated on, again, was a societal consensus about gender 
stereotypes, as Western cultures are profoundly influenced by the existence of strong 
gender stereotypes that historically treat women as a low-status group and put men in 
the position of the high-status group (e.g., Fiske & Stevens, 1993). As a situational 
threatening cue, they presented participants with a scientific article in which the content 
was experimentally manipulated. To one half of the participants, this article stated that 
certain personality characteristics relating to their gender ingroup are more likely to 
lead to failure in life; in contrast, the other half of participants was informed that the 
same characteristics bring forth success. The general idea behind this series of research 
is that the link between the representation of the self and the ingroup may be different 
for members of low and high-status groups as a function of a threatened versus a 
favorable group identity. Being part of a minority or stigmatized rather than a majority 
group may bring threatened group members to protect their self-perception by 
increasing their similarity with the ingroup. Accordingly, they expected low-status group 
members to use an assimilative strategy, while high-status group members should tend 
to individuate when their group identity is under threat. Again, results supported their 
hypotheses: They concluded that the threatening situational cue exacerbated the 
females’ culturally induced tendency to self-stereotype, suggesting that it is the 
perception of threat associated to their gender ingroup that caused them to self-
stereotype. In contrast, they found male participants never to show a self-stereotyping 




process, in neither the condition threatening to their group identity nor the one not 
threatening it. This finding is consistent with men’s supposed tendency to perceive their 
gender ingroup as unthreatening. 
Similar results have been obtained by multiple other researchers who were able to 
demonstrate that self-stereotyping occurs across several minority contexts, either 
numerical minorities, minorities based on social status (e.g., homosexuals vs. 
heterosexuals, or Southern Italians vs. Nothern Italians), or both (e.g., Cadinu, Latrofa, & 
Carnaghi, 2012; Chiu et al., 1998; Fasoli et al., 2018; Pickett et al., 2002; Simon & 
Hamilton, 1994; Spears et al., 1997). By increasing the salience of participants’ 
membership in a low-status group, self-stereotyping of stereotypical attributes could be 
triggered. In all of these cases, minority or low-status ingroup members were found to 
self-stereotype more strongly than majority or high-status members. Accordingly, self-
stereotyping may serve to maintain psychological comfort among stigmatized group 
members. Since the membership in a stigmatized group often entails personal 
experiences of discrimination, in this context also Krueger’s (2007) prerequisite for self-
stereotyping of an experience of personal threat is met. 
1.2.2 Cross-cultural differences 
Parallel effects concerning the focus of social-cognitive processing on either the 
social environment or on the individual self have been found in the field of cultural 
psychology. Some cultures focus preferably on the social environment and others 
focusing preferably on the individual self (e.g., Choi et al., 1999; Cross, Hardin, & Gercek-
Swing, 2011). Within empirical psychology, research on the self as a cultural product 
and process is now almost three decades old (e.g., Fiske, Kitayama, Markus, & Nisbett, 
1998; Kitayama, Markus, Tummala, Kurokawa, & Kato, 1990; Markus & Kitayama, 1991). 
According to Markus and Kitayama (2010), by now, research on cross-cultural 
psychology has gathered a broad understanding “why the nail that sticks out is likely to 
be hammered down in Japan whereas the squeaky wheel attracts grease and attention in 
the United States” (p. 420). In Western cultures like in Northern America, an 
individualistic focus has been shown to be predominant while in East Asian cultures 
(like Japan and China) the focus seems to lie on a more collectivistic processing (e.g., 
Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Oyserman & Lee, 2008). In more recent research, cultural 





comparisons are no longer focused on research comparing people in North American 
and East Asian contexts, but now include more complex distinctions across a variety of 
other significant local and social distinctions (e.g., Holloway, Waldrip, & Ickes, 2009; 
Kitayama, Park, Sevincer, Karasawa, & Uskul, 2009). 
According to Oyserman and colleagues (Oyserman, Sorensen, Reber, & Chen, 2009), 
individualism and collectivism, specifically, are associated with “differences in content of 
self-concept, ways of engaging others, and cognitive style” (p. 218). The individualistic 
view puts the focus on the individual and states that societies exist to promote the well-
being of individuals. Within collectivistic cultures, the focus is on the group. According to 
this view, individuals are expected to fit into society, to serve the common good and are 
seen as fundamentally connected through relationships. However, Oyserman and 
colleagues (2009) do not consider culture as producing fixed and almost unchangeable 
ways of thinking and of arranging one’s social world. Instead, in accordance with the 
view of culture as situated cognition, they propose that societies merely differ in the 
likelihood that an individualistic or collectivistic mindset will be cued at a particular 
moment and that cultures differ with respect to the chronically accessible mindset. The 
respective environments of members of a certain culture, this way, can be seen as an 
almost omnipresent priming of individualism or collectivism.  
Oyserman and colleagues repeatedly demonstrated how cultural priming can 
activate mindsets observed in collectivistic cultures like East Asian cultures or in 
individualistic cultures like the USA (for an overview, see Oyserman & Lee, 2008). In 
eight experiments (Oyserman et al., 2009), they used priming methods to manipulate 
the temporary accessibility of individualism and collectivism. Here, the Pronoun Circling 
Task was used as a prime: Participants were given a paragraph of text and were asked to 
circle all pronouns they found. Depending on the condition, they either had to circle 
singular pronouns (individualistic mindset prime: I, me, myself etc.) or plural pronouns 
(collectivistic mindset prime: we, us, ourselves etc.). Dependent variables were manifold 
(e.g. ability to recall spatial arrangements of objects, deciding whether a defined target 
figure was present or absent, performance in the stroop task, or in a dichotic listening 
task). They found that both accuracy and speed improve when the presently cued 
mindset is congruent with the task at hand and that this mindset is likely to be used even 
when it is incongruent with the respective task. For example, priming a collectivistic 




mindset enhanced accuracy of recall for the spatial arrangement of previously presented 
objects. Authors assumed that this priming improved context-bound processing, 
presumably because it focused attention on the connection among items and the 
relationship between objects and their surroundings. Conversely, priming an 
individualistic mindset reduced response latencies in the stroop task. This task involves 
ignoring one source of information while focusing on another source—a process that is 
congruent with an individualistic mindset which is assumed to facilitate disjoined 
processing. The studies’ results were independent of the participants’ cultures which 
were systematically varied from study to study to include both cultures in the East 
(Hong Kong and Korea) and the West (Norway and USA), as well as different American 
ethnic groups (African, Asian or European Americans). 
1.2.3 Conclusion 
It has been shown that social status may shape basic psychological processes, as it 
constitutes a core aspect of how someone thinks of the self and also how someone 
relates to the social world (Kraus et al., 2012). Kraus and colleagues (2012) 
hypothesized that lower-class individuals—with a more pronounced focus on external 
social forces and other persons who influence the individual’s life—will show 
heightened empathic accuracy compared to upper-class individuals and that they should 
develop a self-concept defined in terms of interconnectedness. In contrast, upper-class 
individuals—given their individualistic orientation towards the environment which 
reflects in a stronger focus on their respective goals, emotions, and motivations—are 
expected to make judgments about other individuals’ emotions based on their own 
current feelings. 
Similar and more extensive observations have been made with respect toward 
minority-majority group contexts, taking gender groups into account (Latrofa et al., 
2010; Latrofa et al., 2012). It was found that low-status group members not only 
identified more strongly with their own group than high-status group members, but also 
showed an increased tendency to self-stereotype. According to Latrofa and colleagues, 
threatened group members protect their self-perception by increasing their similarity 
with the ingroup. Conversely, for high-status group members, they found a more 
pronounced tendency for social projection than for low-status group members what 





they considered to be the result of an egocentric cognitive strategy for high-status group 
members (see also Cadinu & Rothbart, 1996; Krueger, 2003). Also in other minority 
contexts, such as numerical minorities, minorities based on social status, or both, other 
researchers were able to demonstrate that minority, low-status, or disadvantaged 
individuals self-stereotyped more strongly than majority or high-status individuals (e.g., 
Cadinu et al., 2012; Chiu et al., 1998; Pickett et al., 2002; Simon & Hamilton, 1994; Spears 
et al., 1997). 
Focusing on cultural psychology, it has been shown that in some cultures an 
individualistic focus tends to be predominant (mostly in Western cultures, like in 
Northern America) while in other cultures the focus lies on a more collectivistic 
processing (mostly in East Asian cultures, like Japan and China; e.g., Choi et al., 1999; 
Cross et al., 2011; Kitayama et al., 1990; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Oyserman & Lee, 
2008). Distinctive individualistic cultures put the individual before the group and state 
that societies exist to promote the well-being of individuals. Contrarily, collectivistic 
cultures put the focus on the group and individuals are expected to fit into society to 
serve the common good. Although mostly not considered as producing fixed and almost 
unchangeable ways of thinking and of arranging one’s social world, culture may be 
interpreted as an omnipresent priming of individualism or collectivism (Oyserman et al., 
2009).  
Taken together, there appear to be several possible global factors which may cause a 
shift in the individual’s focus on either the person or the ingroup: (1) a person’s social 
status, either determined by social class, socio-economic status, or by the minority-
majority context relevant for the ingroup, or (2) the culture, from which a person 
originates, where the person lives, and where he or she is confronted with relevant 
everyday stimuli.  
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2 Socio-cognitive Mindsets 
In a literature review, Markus and Kitayama (2010) discuss the meaning and mutual 
relevance of “self” and “culture”. They state that “in an ongoing cycle of mutual 
constitution, people are socio-culturally shaped shapers of their environments” (p. 421). 
The self is always situated and therefore always reflects its contexts in significant ways, 
as does the context reflect the self. Here, the term “culture” in a broader sense is not 
limited to cultural contexts across countries or hemispheres (see also Snibbe & Markus, 
2005). Similarly, I presume the definition of culture to extend to all areas presented 
above. I expect it to not be constraint to only the mere aspect of cross-cultural 
psychology, but also to be applicable to intra-societal systems as well: to social systems, 
social strata, or minority-majority group contexts. In general, I assume a definition of 
culture which more commonly refers to norms and values which in turn form and 
induce behavior. As described above, one way of distinguishing between cultures is by 
the set of patterns which prescribe the normatively appropriate relations between self 
and others individuals (see section 1.2.2). These two different sets will be referred to as 
an independent or an interdependent mindset or self-construal, respectively (Singelis, 
1994). 
According to Kraus and colleagues (2012, see section 1.2.1.1), social class is a core 
aspect of how someone thinks of the self and also how someone relates to the social 
world, distinguishing between individualistic (or independent) and contextualist (or 
interdependent) tendencies. They state that an individualistic mindset led to an 
orientation towards the environment with a person focusing more strongly on his or her 
own goals, emotions, and motivations. In contrast, contextualist tendencies are 
characterized by a focus on external social forces and other persons who influence the 
individual’s life. Following their considerations, I expect basic socio-cognitive mindsets 
to be of consequence for social cognition in a way that they represent the individual’s 
current focus from which he or she will construe the social world. The currently active 
mode of self-construal constitutes a fundamental factor which influences the 
construction of personal experience and behavior. This way, I argue that it determines 
the direction of inferential socio-cognitive processes. That is, I assume that an 
independent mindset with its distinctive focus on the individual will cause a person to 
interpret its world from the individual’s point of view. From this perspective, I expect 
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social projection to be more dominant than self-stereotyping when a person is asked to 
characterize the self or his or her ingroup. Vice versa, I assume that an interdependent 
mindset with its more pronounced focus on the social context and other persons will 
trigger the reversed process. This person will interpret the world (and see the self) from 
a contextualist point of view. Here, I predict self-stereotyping to be the predominant 
process over social projection. 
The goal of this dissertation is to examine the effects of experimentally primed 
independent or interdependent mindsets for the primacy of social projection or self-
stereotyping. Here, I propose a model of socio-cognitive mindsets’ effects on the 
predominance of social projection or self-stereotyping (see Figure 2-1). 
 
Figure 2-1. Proposed model of socio-cognitive mindsets’ effects on the predominance of 
social projection or self-stereotyping. 
Taken together, I propose that not social class (along with either the availability or 
the lack of resources), not a minority-majority context (along with the perception of 
dominance vs. the perception of threat), and not a certain cultural background per se is a 
causal factor leading to a predominance of either social projection or self-stereotyping, 
but a commonality behind all of these domains: the socio-cognitive mindset which is 
active in the respective moment, accounting for a basic factor which influences the 
individual’s way of construing his or her world. The salience of and focus on one’s 
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socio-cognitive mindset may be predisposed due to chronically available cues present in 
everyday life, which in turn are shaped by one’s culture and/or one’s social class, or may 
be activated by other presently available situational stimuli.  
Prior findings that social projection is a process more common than self-
stereotyping may be due to the fact that research in this branch of social cognition has 
mostly been conducted in Western cultures (e.g., DiDonato et al., 2011; Krueger, 2007; 
Otten & Epstude, 2006; see section 1.1.3). With an independent socio-cognitive mindset 
chronically primed, research may not have taken all relevant variables into account, 
missing the effects of different socio-cognitive mindsets being the chronically primed 
standard in a certain country, region, or culture. 
In a series of experiments, the antecedents of social projection and self-stereotyping 
shall be disentangled in several steps. In a more recent article, van Veelen et al. (2015) 
mentioned the possibility that levels of social projection and self-stereotyping may vary 
depending on an independent or interdependent self-construal being prevalent. My 
experiments had been conducted prior to their article being published. Independently, I 
share their assumptions. 
2.1 Main Hypothesis 
Connecting research and considerations on social status and cross-cultural 
differences (see section 1.2) with Oyserman’s findings on the effective use of cultural 
priming (Oyserman & Lee, 2008; Oyserman et al., 2009), I assume that the priming of an 
interdependent mindset will cause a shift in focus towards the ingroup and will trigger a 
more pronounced occurrence of self-stereotyping compared to social projection. 
Conversely, moving participants’ focus towards themselves and their individual 
characteristics by priming an independent mindset, I expect participants to they react 
with an increase in social projection compared to self-stereotyping. 
Additionally, I expect that, in both cases, the degree of identification with one’s 
ingroup is expected to be high (i.e., significantly different from the scale midpoint; see 
below). This construct constitutes Latrofa and colleagues’ (2010) central mediating 
construct and is also listed as one of Krueger’s (1997) conditions for the occurrence of 
self-stereotyping. 
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2.2 Overview of Experiments 1 to 3 
In a first experiment, the effect of cultural priming on social projection and self-
stereotyping is to be established in the first place, employing a reaction-time-based 
paradigm. The active socio-cognitive mindset (independent vs. interdependent) is 
manipulated using the Pronoun Circling Task (Gardner, Gabriel, & Lee, 1999). 
Furthermore, boundary conditions of self-stereotyping will be considered. As stated 
above, it has been claimed that self-stereotyping is only expected on positive traits 
(Krueger, 2007). The validity of this demand seems to be limited since several research 
teams were able to show the occurrence of self-stereotyping independently of trait 
valence (e.g., Latrofa et al., 2010; Pickett et al., 2002; Simon & Hamilton, 1994). 
Nevertheless, I will account for possible effects of trait valence in the experiment.  
In a second experiment, a paradigm employing fictitious traits is used (based on 
Cadinu & Rothbart, 1996) to disentangle the processes of social projection and self-
stereotyping. The idea behind the use of fictitious traits is that—because of the stated 
novelty of the presented dimensions—participants could not access existing mental 
representations. Again, the Pronoun Circling Task is employed to manipulate the 
activation of socio-cognitive mindsets. 
In Experiment 3, a different priming procedure is employed. This time, instead of 
altering participants’ focus via the Pronoun Circling Task, I will try to achieve this 
indirectly by manipulating their perceived social status (Kraus, Horberg, Goetz, & 
Keltner, 2011). As described above, in accordance with Kraus et al. (2012), I expect to 
observe social projection in the experimental condition where a high social status has 
been primed, while self-stereotyping should arise if a low social status has been primed. 
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3 Part I: Consequences of a Priming of Socio-Cognitive Mindsets for 
Social Projection and Self-Stereotyping 
3.1 Experiment 1 
3.1.1 Introduction 
The aim of the first experiment was to establish the effect of different types of self-
construal on social projection and self-stereotyping in the first place. Specifically, I 
predicted that shifting a person’s focus toward his own person should lead to more 
social projection while self-stereotyping should be the stronger process if a person’s 
current focus is directed outwards and toward his or her ingroup. To this end, for the 
experimental procedure, a reaction-time paradigm was adopted from Otten and Epstude 
(2006) to allow for the two processes to be separated. An independent versus an 
interdependent self-construal was achieved by means of the Pronoun Circling Task 
(Gardner, Gabriel, & Lee, 1999). The target group in the reaction-time paradigm was the 
group of Germans whose characteristics demonstrated to be well-suited in matters of 
stereotypicality in a pretest.  
3.1.2 Method 
Pretest. For later use in the experiments, participants were asked to assess the 
stereotypicality of adjectives with respect to different target groups: the group of 
university students, the group of Germans, and the group of Europeans. The selected 
traits should meet two criteria. Firstly, the goal was to select a balanced number of 
traits, some of which should be stereotypical, some counter-stereotypical, and some 
neutral in stereotypicality for the respective group. Secondly, I wanted to balance 
stereotypical and counter-stereotypical traits in terms of their valence so that they 
consisted of an equal number of positive and negative items. 
For this pretest, N = 70 psychology students were recruited via a Facebook 
psychology group and an e-mailing list. Data were gathered using the online survey tool 
SoSci Survey (Leiner, 2014). For each of the groups (students, Germans, and Europeans), 
items were selected a priori: ten items which were believed to be stereotypical for the 
respective group and ten items which were believed to be counter-stereotypical. These 
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items were balance with respect to their valence. Furthermore, ten items were included 
which were believed to be neutral concerning their stereotypicality. On a 7-point Likert-
scale ranging from 1 (does not apply at all) to 7 (applies completely), participants were 
asked to indicate how typical they perceived each trait to be for the respective group. 
Based on the resulting mean scores of stereotypicality, for each group, two positive and 
two negative stereotypical items, as well as two positive and two negative counter-
stereotypical items, and four neutral items were selected. In Table 3-1, means of 
stereotypicality for the final selection of items in the different target groups are listed 
separately for stereotypical, counter-stereotypical, and neutral items. I decided to use 
the group of Germans as the target group in the first experiment, as the results showed 
some inconsistencies in the ratings for the groups of students and Europeans: For both 
the groups of students and Europeans, ratings for each group’s two most counter-
stereotypical positive items lay very close to or even above the scale mid-point of 4, 
MStudents = 3.75 and MEuropeans = 4.08. Hence, these items could not be described as clearly 
counter-stereotypical. Moreover, for Europeans, the mean of the two most stereotypical 
negative items lay very close to the scale mid-point, M = 4.27, and hence could not be 
interpreted as being clearly stereotypical for this group. 
Table 3-1 
Means of stereotypicality for the selected items in the group of Germans, students, and 
Europeans 
Germans Mean (positive items) Mean (negative items) 
stereotypical 5.69 5.27 
counter-stereotypical 2.94 3.08 
neutral (overall mean) 4.25 
Students Mean (positive items) Mean (negative items) 
stereotypical 5.13 5.34 
counter-stereotypical 3.75 2.58 
neutral (overall mean) 4.09 
Europeans Mean (positive items) Mean (negative items) 
stereotypical 5.37 4.27 
counter-stereotypical 4.08 2.65 
neutral (overall mean) 4.13 
 
For the group of Germans, means of stereotypicality were reasonably high for 
stereotypical items, Mpositive = 5.69, Mnegative = 5.27, and low for counter-stereotypical 
items, Mpositive = 2.94, Mnegative = 3.08. Additionally, four items neutral with respect to their 
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stereotypicality could be selected, Mneutral = 4.25. The selection of 12 items can be found 
in Table A1 in Appendix A. 
Participants. Participants in Experiment 1 were 112 students from the University of 
Mannheim majoring in various disciplines. The sample’s age ranged from 18 to 43 years 
M = 21.86, SD = 3.51, its gender distribution was 79 female to 33 male participants. The 
study was advertised in lectures as a study on social perception. Participants were paid 
4 Euro cash and a bar of chocolate for their voluntary participation. 12 participants were 
excluded from the final analysis for not having executed the priming procedure 
adequately or not being German native speakers, hence potentially having difficulties 
understanding all trait items used in the experiment. Analyses were conducted with 
N = 100 participants. 
Dependent variables. As a first measure of social projection and self-stereotyping, a 
method introduced by Smith, Coats, and Walling (1999) and refined by Otten and 
Epstude (2006) was used. Underlying the work of Smith and his colleagues is a 
connectionist network model of memory (see Aron, Aron, Tudor, & Nelson, 1991; Smith 
& Henry, 1996). The more frequently certain elements are activated in conjunction, the 
stronger the activation spreading between these entities and, accordingly, the more 
likely the activation of one element triggers the activation of a connected element. This 
reflects in shorter response times between the activation of the first element and the 
retrieval of the second element. Accordingly, overlapping mental representations of 
social and personal information are indicated by faster response latencies on those 
dimensions on which self- and ingroup evaluations match compared to the dimensions 
on which they do not match. At this stage, such faster response time latencies are not 
conclusive concerning the direction of the self-ingroup overlap. Hence, the idea behind 
Otten and Epstude’s refinement is the following: Given a person does not know for sure 
or is unwilling to decide whether a certain trait applies to the ingroup (vs. the self), that 
is, the ingroup (the self) is ill-defined. If he or she resolves this uncertainty by relying on 
the self (ingroup) representation and, thus, uses self (ingroup) defining traits to describe 
the ingroup (self), this would lead to shorter response latencies. Accordingly, this may 
be interpreted as an instance of social projection (self-stereotyping). Hence, on formerly 
ill-defined target dimensions, a match between ratings for self and ingroup should 
facilitate responses, which is reflected in shorter response latencies in matches 
compared to mismatches. 
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Furthermore, an additional measure to assess social projection and self-stereotyping 
was developed. For this purpose, the 12 items selected in the pretest, based on their 
stereotypicality concerning the group of Germans, were to be rated with regard to either 
the self or the ingroup: four items stereotypical for the ingroup, four counter-
stereotypical items, and four distractor items which were neutral concerning their 
stereotypicality and which were not considered in the analysis. I assumed that the items’ 
stereotypicality would lead to a smaller variance in the subjects’ ratings for the group 
than for the self. I expected the magnitude in difference between the variance in 
subjects’ ratings for the ingroup and for the self to depend on the priming as well as on 
the order of the ratings (i.e., the self or the ingroup being rated first). For a primed 
interdependent mindset and the ingroup being rated first, I expected the lower 
variability in ingroup ratings to be transferred to self-ratings, assuming self-
stereotyping to be the predominant process. Accordingly for the order ingroup–self, the 
magnitude in difference between standard deviations of ratings for the ingroup and the 
self should be smaller under the interdependence priming than under the independence 
priming: ΔMSD(IG-Self)interdependence < ΔMSD(IG-Self)independence . Analogously, for the 
independence priming and the self being rated first, the higher variability between 
subjects’ ratings for the self was assumed to be transferred to the ingroup, as I expected, 
here, social projection to be the predominant process. Hence for the order self-ingroup, 
the magnitude in difference between standard deviations of ratings for the self and the 
ingroup should be smaller under the independence priming than under the 
interdependence priming: ΔMSD(Self-IG)independence < ΔMSD(Self-IG)interdependence . 
Procedure. A 2 (Priming of an independent or an interdependent mindset) x 2 
(Target in the reaction-time paradigm) between-subjects design was employed. The 
experiment was run in a laboratory with a maximum of five participants in one session. 
The experimental software E-Prime (Psychology Software Tools, 2013) was used to 
present instructions and to record data. As has been described above, in this first 
experiment, a reaction-time paradigm was used (Smith et al., 1999; Otten & Epstude, 
2006), which was expected to allow for the separation of social projection and self-
stereotyping.  
At the beginning of each experimental session, participants were greeted, seated at 
single-workplace stalls, and asked turn their cell phones to airplane mode. After filling 
out the informed-consent sheets, they were asked to follow the instructions presented 
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on the computer screen by E-Prime. Here, they were informed that the goal of the study 
was to assess their perception of themselves and of a social group they belonged to. In a 
first step, subjects were asked for a rating of the group of Germans and themselves on 90 
adjectives (Otten & Epstude, 2006), which could be used to describe a person or a group 
(see Table A2 in Appendix A). Items were presented separately and consecutively along 
with a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (does not apply at all) to 5 (applies 
completely). Furthermore, the order of the rating (i.e. first the rating of the self, then the 
rating of the group of Germans or vice versa) was varied introducing an additional 
method factor.  
Next, participants were asked to complete the Pronoun Circling Task (Gardner et al., 
1999; Oyserman et al., 2009; see section 1.2.2). This manipulation is designed to induce 
an independent or an interdependent mindset by shifting participants’ current focus to 
either their own person or the group. Here, participants were handed out a short text of 
169 words which had been translated from an English version and which contained a 
short story describing a relaxing ambiance at the sea during sunset (Oyserman et al., 
2009). Participants were told that the text serves the purpose of helping them 
regenerate after the rather strenuous task they had been asked to perform beforehand. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: They received either a 
text in which exclusively singular or exclusively plural pronouns were used (I, my, me vs. 
we, our, us etc.) and were given the instruction to circle all occurring pronouns in the 
text. In this task, singular pronouns are expected to trigger an independent self-
construal while plural pronouns are to trigger an interdependent self-construal. Text 
and instructions are included in Appendix B1. There was no limitation concerning the 
time participants had to complete the task. They were just instructed to return their 
attention to the computer screen once they finished circling all occurring pronouns. The 
two priming conditions constituted the first between-subjects factor Priming. 
To distinguish between social projection and self-stereotyping, a second between-
subjects factor was introduced: the judgmental target during the following response-
time measurement. On the same 90 items which had to be rated on a 5-point Likert scale 
during the first part of the measurement, participants now were asked to give 
dichotomous answers: For half the participants, response latencies were measured for 
dichotomous ratings about the self, whereas for the other half, response latencies for the 
group of Germans were assessed. Again, on each screen, only one item was presented. 
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Subjects were instructed to use their left-hand index finger and press the key “S” on the 
keyboard if the trait applied to the target or to use their right-hand index finger and 
press the key “L” if it did not apply to the target. Participants were told to answer as 
quickly, but also as precisely as possible. After each answer, the next item appeared 
following an inter-trial interval of 500 ms. 
Now, a re-priming procedure was introduced, for it was expected that the effects of 
the first priming might have worn off after the rather long and strenuous reaction-time 
paradigm. This second priming procedure was similar to the first one except that a 
different text was presented, depicting an evening at the favorite restaurant. Aside of the 
text’s content, the task’s procedure and instructions were identical to the first one. This 
text is included in Appendix B2. Subsequently, participants were asked to complete the 
alternative measure to distinguish between social projection and self-stereotyping, by 
making an assessment of the self and the group of Germans (or vice versa) on a 7-point 
Likert scale from 1(does not apply at all) to 7 (applies completely) concerning the 12 
items selected in the pretest. 
In a last step, demographic characteristics were assessed: participants' gender, their 
age, native language, nationality, the subject they majored in, and their year of study. 
After they finished the study, participants were thanked for their participation in the 
experiment, were paid, and asked not to speak with other students about the study's 
contents. 
3.1.3 Results 
Reaction-time paradigm. In a first step, I coded the data of these first 5-point ratings 
of self and ingroup for both self-as-target and ingroup-as-target condition as follows: 
Analogous to Otten and Epstude (2006), ratings from 1 to 2 were summarized as “no” 
responses and ratings from 4 to 5 as “yes” responses. Responses at the midpoint of the 
scale were interpreted as neutral or ambiguous, respectively. Following the logic behind 
this research paradigm, only those reaction-times were kept in the analysis for which, in 
the previous 5-point ratings,  
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(a) participants were undecided concerning the target and for which  
(b) participants had a clear preference concerning the expected anchor2 . 
For example, if the target in the later response-time task was the group of Germans 
for which a participant was asked to make a dichotomous decision, the corresponding 
prior 5-point rating for the group of Germans had to have been at the scale midpoint, i.e., 
ill-defined. Hence, all response times for those items on which subjects had a clear 
preference in the previous 5-point rating for the target were excluded (i.e., if the 
response was 1, 2, 4, or 5). In addition, also those response latencies were dropped for 
which the corresponding item’s anchor rating in the previous 5-point rating had been at 
the scale midpoint. To stay with the example, if the participant had been asked if the 
respective trait applied to him or herself and if the following response was at the scale 
midpoint, the corresponding response time was excluded as well. Also, I excluded 
response times larger than two standard deviations from the grand mean and shorter 
than 300 ms (see Bargh & Chartrand, 2000).  
In a next step, I coded if there was a match or a mismatch between participants’ 
dichotomous target ratings and the anchor ratings on the 5-point scale. This way, for 
each item, if a participant had been undecided before, concerning the target, and—if 
forced to make a dichotomous decision—relied on information about the anchor, it 
would be possible to identify the direction of the inferential process. 
Response times were log (ln)-transformed (Fazio, 1991). All statistical analyses are 
based on these log-transformed means. For ease of interpretation, however, the 
untransformed means are reported. Since responses for matches vs. mismatches were 
expected to vary for different subjects and items, mixed-effects modeling was used in 
the analyses (Baayen, Davidson, & Bates, 2008). For this purpose, the R package “lme4” 
(Bates, Maechler, & Bolker, 2013; R Core Team, 2013) was employed. To test my 
predictions, I implemented the following model: 
                                  
                                                          
                                 
                                               
                                     
                                                        
2 Throughout the experiments, information which is expected to serve as a source of information in 
inferential judgments will be referred to as the “anchor” or “anchor information”. 
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with β0 as intercept, β1, β2, β3, β4, β5, β6, and β7 as regression weights, and e as 
residuals. In this model, since responses for matches vs. mismatches were expected to 
vary corresponding to different subjects and items, a random intercept and random 
slopes of Participant and Trait were defined, β0|Participant, β0|Trait, β1|Participant, and β1|Trait. 
Match was coded -1 for mismatches and +1 for matches. Target was coded -1 if the 
target was the group of Germans and +1 if the target was the self. Prime was coded -1 for 
the interdependence priming and +1 for the independence priming. 
Additionally, the order of the first ratings on the 5-point scale was included as a 
method factor in the model: either participants were instructed to first make an 
assessment of the group of Germans and afterwards of themselves or vice versa. For 
ease of interpretation the factor Order and its corresponding interaction terms are not 
shown in the model above. As this factor had no effect on the relevant 3-way interaction 
Match x Target x Prime, also it is not reported any further. 
The Match x Target x Prime 3-way interaction was significant, b = -0.111, SE = 0.052,  
t = -2.13, p = .033. However, a simple-slopes analysis revealed a pattern deviating from 
expectations (see Figure 3-1, p. 30). Furthermore, there was a significant main effect of 
Match, b = -0.070, SE = 0.022, t = -3.15, p = .002, indicating response times to be 
generally faster on matches than on mismatches. Also, the significant Match x Target 
interaction, b = -0.074, SE = 0.037, t = 2.04, p = .042, revealed that the match-mismatch 
response-time difference is especially pronounced for the ingroup being the target. The 
full results including random effects are included in Tables A3 a-d in Appendix A. 
For a primed independent self-construal, reaction times for matches were faster 
than for mismatches both when the self was the target, b = -0.086, SE = 0.030, t = -2.92, 
p = .004, and when the group of Germans was the target, b = -0.049, SE = 0.023, t = -2.12, 
p = .034. The nonsignificant Match x Target interaction, b = -0.037, SE = 0.037, t = -1.02, 
p = .308, indicates that, under the independence priming, self-ratings facilitate group-
ratings to the same extent as group-ratings facilitate self-ratings. For primed 
interdependent self-construal with the self as the target in the reaction-time task, the 
response-time difference between matches an mismatches was not significant, b = 0.004, 
SE = 0.029, t = 0.15, p =.879, indicating that self-stereotyping was not a relevant process 
in this condition. For the ingroup as target, reaction times for matches were faster than 
for mismatches, b = -0.070, SE = 0.022, t = -3.15, p = .002. For this priming condition, the 
Match x Target interaction reached significance, b = 0.074, SE = 0.036, t = 2.06, p = .039, 
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indicating that reaction-time differences of matches and mismatches were significantly 
larger if the group of Germans was the target compared to if the self was the target. 
 
 
Figure 3-1. Response latencies in the reaction-time task. Significance values of the 
simple-slopes analyses for the relevant interaction Match x Target x Prime are shown 
above for each pair of response latencies. Faster response-times for matches than for 
mismatches indicate the occurrence of social projection (where the ingroup is the 
target) or self-stereotyping (where the self is the target). 
Next, frequencies of matches and of mismatches were examined for those items on 
which the later target was not defined in the first rating task. I expected that, given the 
hypothesized effect, more matches than mismatches should have occurred in the 
following conditions: for a primed independent mindset if the group of Germans was the 
target and for primed interdependent mindset if the self was the target. An analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) was calculated with Target and Priming as independent variables. For 
the dependent variable, a new variable was computed: Because only those items were 
entered in the analysis that were (a) ill-defined with regard to the target and (b) defined 
with regard to the anchor, the number of data points varied between participants. 
Hence, the number of matches also depended on the number of items that fulfilled the 
outlined conditions. For this, the number of matches was divided by the total number of 
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the Target x Priming interaction was not significant3, F(1,96) < 1, p = .541, ηp2 = .004. 
Descriptive statistics and the full results are listed in Tables A4 a and b in Appendix A. 
Stereotypicality measure.  In the analysis of this stereotypicality measure, standard 
deviations were calculated across subjects for ratings on each of the eight (counter-) 
stereotypical items, separately for the two priming conditions and the two targets. These 
item-wise standard deviations, then, were averaged for each condition. Results are 
shown in Table 3-2. 
Table 3-2 
Means of standard deviations (MSD) for the analysis of the stereotypicality measure, 
averaged separately for Priming and Order conditions 
Priming Order 
Independent mindset Self first Ingroup first 
MSD (self) 1.35 1.33 
MSD (ingroup) 1.12 1.10 
Interdependent mindset Self first Ingroup first 
MSD (self) 1.24 1.27 
MSD (ingroup) 1.19 1.08 
 
Due to the loss of distribution properties in the process of averaging these standard 
deviations, it was not possible to make inferential statistical decisions concerning the 
magnitude of the differences between standard deviation means of ratings for the self 
and for the ingroup. Hence, no critical differences could be calculated and data could 
only be inspected descriptively. An initial comparison of standard deviation means for 
the self and the ingroup indicated that, in general, self ratings showed a larger variance 
than ingroup ratings—independent of the priming and the variation of the order of 
ratings. These differences between standard deviation means for the self and the 
ingroup ranged from only 0.05 SDs for the self first condition and 0.19 SDs for the 
ingroup first condition of the interdependence priming to 0.23 SDs for both Order 
conditions of the independence priming. 
Firstly, I hypothesized that, for the ingroup being assessed first, the magnitude in 
difference between standard deviation means of ratings for the ingroup and the self 
                                                        
3 Throughout this text, ηp2 refers to the partial Eta square parameter. 
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should be smaller under the interdependence priming than under the independence 
priming—given that self-stereotyping, here, is the predominant process. Although, for 
the ingroup first condition, the magnitude in differences between standard deviation 
means actually was smaller under the interdependence priming (1.27-1.08 = 0.19) than 
under the independence priming (1.33-1.10 = 0.23), this difference of 0.04 SDs was 
negligible taking into account the large 7-point rating scale. 
My second hypothesis concerning this stereotypicality measure was that, for the self 
being assessed first, the magnitude in difference between standard deviation means of 
ratings for the self and the ingroup should be smaller under the independence priming 
than under the interdependence priming—assuming social projection being the 
stronger process in this condition causing subjects to project their individual 
characteristics to the ingroup. However, the magnitude in differences between standard 
deviation means turned out to be even larger under the independence priming 
(1.35-1.12 = 0.23) than under the interdependence priming (1.24-1.19 = 0.05). Notably, 
means of standard deviations (MSD) did not diverge much between both priming 
conditions, except for self ratings in the self first condition. Here, means of standard 
deviations were larger under the independence priming (MSD =1.35) than under the 
interdependence priming (MSD = 1.24). 
3.1.4 Discussion 
In this first experiment, I tried to show that social projection is the predominant 
process after an independent mindset has been primed. For an interdependence 
priming, self-stereotyping should have been prevalent. However, these hypotheses could 
not be confirmed. Results in the reaction-time based measure (Otten & Epstude, 2006) 
showed that, for a primed independent mindset, instead of social projection being the 
predominant process, social projection and self stereotyping occurred to the same 
extent. In contrast, for a primed interdependent mindset, social projection was found to 
be stronger than self-stereotyping. Additionally, frequencies of matches and of 
mismatches were examined. I expected more matches than mismatches to occur for a 
primed independent mindset if the group of Germans was the target and for primed 
interdependent mindset if the self was the target. But also here, the expected differences 
in frequency could not be detected. 
Experiment 1 33 
 
 
Although the differences between the means of standard deviations in the 
stereotypicality measure could not be analyzed using inferential statistical methods, 
descriptive analyses indicate that, also for this measure, hypotheses could not be 
confirmed. An initial comparison of standard deviation means for the self and the 
ingroup revealed that, independent of primings and the order of ratings, means of 
standard deviations were larger for self ratings than for ingroup ratings. This may be 
interpreted as evidence that the basic assumptions for the validity of this measure were 
appropriate: Stereotypicality of the traits led to smaller variance in ratings for the 
ingroup while the subjects’ individual characteristics caused a larger variance in ratings 
for the self. However, while it was expected that self-stereotyping would lead to the 
attribution of group stereotypes to the self more pronouncedly after an interdependent 
mindset had been primed and the ingroup had been rated first, the smaller variance in 
ingroup ratings was not transferred to the self. In this condition, differences between 
standard deviation means were nearly identical to those under an independence 
priming. Also my second prediction in this paradigm could not be confirmed: I expected 
social projection to arise after an independent mindset had been primed and the self had 
been rated first, leading participants to project their individual characteristics—which 
were indicated by larger means of standard deviations—to the ingroup. For the ingroup, 
means of standard deviations should have increased as a consequence. Hence, the 
differences between standard deviation means should have been smaller under an 
independent mindset than under an interdependent mindset. Instead, differences 
between standard deviation means turned out to be even larger under the independence 
priming. Interestingly, the smallest difference between standard deviation means for the 
ingroup and the self could be observed in the self first condition after the priming of an 
interdependent mindset. Here, variance in ingroup ratings was 0.11 SDs higher than in 
the ingroup first condition. This difference suggests an instance of social projection 
having occurred: characteristics of the self are projected to the ingroup, as indicated by 
the larger variance in ingroup ratings compared to all other conditions.  
To sum up, results in the stereotypicality measure did not support the hypotheses. 
However, the comparison of standard deviation means for the ingroup and the self in the 
self first condition under an interdependent mindset priming suggested that, here, social 
projection occurred. The presence of social projection and the absence of self-
stereotyping after an interdependent mindset had been primed, however, is contrary to 
34 Experiment 1 
 
 
expectations and cannot be explained at this point. Yet, the inability to calculate critical 
differences for the means of standard deviations left descriptive inspections and the 
conclusions drawn from these to be to some degree arbitrary and inconclusive. Hence, 
the interpretation of social projection occurring under an interdependent mindset might 
seem adequate on the descriptive level, but should nonetheless be regarded with 
caution. 
At this point it was unclear how results in this first experiment could be interpreted. 
Since in both measures results either did not support or were even contrary to my 
hypotheses, as the priming procedure did not affect the occurrence of social projection 
and self-stereotyping in the predicted way, one interpretation could be that these 
hypotheses were incorrect. But it was also possible, that the Pronoun Circling Task, 
which was employed as the priming procedure in this first experiment, might not have 
induced the intended focus shift in participants. However, since this task had been 
proven to successfully induce independent or interdependent mindsets in past research 
(Gardner et al., 1999; Oyserman et al., 2009), the Pronoun Circling Task was employed 
once more in the second experiment. 
Another possible reason for the absence of the expected effects in the reaction-time 
based paradigm could be that the measure itself has methodological shortcomings. One 
inherent problem in this paradigm is that, for each participant, matches and mismatches 
form on different items. Hence, for each subject, a greatly variable number of matches 
and mismatches did form. Such unequal cell occupation is not without problems 
concerning statistical analyses. For this reason, a different paradigm was employed in 
the next experiment. Also, the stereotypicality measure was dropped, as it does not 
allow analyses using inferential statistical methods.  
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3.2 Experiment 2 
3.2.1 Introduction 
In my second experiment, I tried once more to demonstrate that a focus shift 
towards the self should enhance projective tendencies while a shift towards the group 
should lead to a more pronounced effect of self-stereotyping. Again, I tried to achieve 
this shift in focus by employing the Pronoun Circling Task (Gardner et al., 1999). 
However, a different experimental paradigm was applied in the efforts of disentangling 
social projection and self-stereotyping: a modification of a paradigm employed by 
Cadinu and Rothbart (1996).  
3.2.2 Method 
Participants. In Experiment 2, participants were 135 students from the University of 
Mannheim majoring in different subjects. Age ranged from 18 to 46 years, M = 22.68, 
SD = 4.60, 66 % of the participants were female. Again, the study was advertised as a 
study on social perception in lectures and using leaflets. Participants were paid 3 Euro 
cash and got a bar of chocolate for their voluntary participation. 34 participants were 
excluded from the final analysis, for not having executed the priming procedure 
correctly or having participated in the first experiment, hence being familiar with the 
priming procedure. Also, participants were excluded if they were no native German 
speakers, for they might have attributed their lack of understanding of the fictitious trait 
dimensions, referred to in the paradigm, to a language deficit. This, in turn, could have 
distracted participants or could have triggered other processes. Analyses were 
conducted with N = 101 participants. 
Dependent Variables. When someone is asked to assess the self and one of his 
ingroups on certain traits, it usually cannot be determined whether a resulting overlap 
in these assessments is the result of a projective process or actually one of self-
stereotyping, that is, if a person ascribes his or her own characteristics to the group or 
characteristics of the group to her or himself. Cadinu and Rothbart (1996) engaged this 
problem by employing information on dimensions unknown to their participants. 
Fictitious trait dimensions were used to ensure that participants could not use pre-
existing knowledge for the assessment of either the self or the ingroup and, this way, to 
control the source of information available to participants. Analogously to a Minimal 
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Group Paradigm (Tajfel, 1970), in which participants have no other information about 
the other participants except for their group membership, I refer to the present 
paradigm as Minimal Traits Paradigm since, to participants, only those information 
about the fictitious dimensions was available which they received during the 
experiment. A variation of Cadinu and Rothbart's (1996) original paradigm was 
employed. In the present experiment, participants first took part in six fictitious 
cognitive and perceptual tests to allegedly determine their score on these dimensions. 
They were told that recently a number of studies had been conducted at German 
universities considering both the conditions and consequences of newly identified 
characteristics of information processing which would allegedly be assessed by the tests. 
In fact, these tests did not measure any particular characteristics but merely consisted of 
easy solvable tasks to make participants believe that indeed real traits were assessed. 
Among others, participants were given a Stroop-like task where they were asked to 
remember the color in which certain color-words were written; or they were shown a 
slide with large letters which in turn were made out of small letters and they, next, were 
asked, e.g., how often they saw a large letter which consisted of small “F”s. Full 
instructions and a description of all tasks are included in Appendix C1.  
After these “tests”, in the self-as-anchor condition, participants were given feedback 
in the form of a profile diagram and were asked to assess the group of Germans on the 
same dimensions. In the group-as-anchor condition, participants were given bogus 
information which, they were told, indicated how the group of Germans had scored so 
far and which allegedly had been calculated from data collected so far in the course of 
this and previous studies. Then, to supposedly validate test results, this group of 
participants was asked to guess how they thought they themselves had scored in the 
tests. In fact however, all participants were given the same profile plot of the alleged 
scoring on the fictitious trait dimensions. Ratings were to be made on an 11-point scale 
ranging from -5 (not at all) to +5 (very much). 
Figure 3-2 shows the profile diagram presented to participants. In addition to their 
own “results” or those of the group of Germans, respectively (red line), a second line was 
included to offer an alternative source of information (gray line), in case participants 
wanted to avoid using information from the first option: If subjects were asked for an 
assessment of the group of Germans, the second line was labeled “a randomly selected 
former participant”. Instead, if subjects were to indicate how they themselves scored on 
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the fictitious trait dimensions, they were told that the second line indicated the results of 
another central-European country. In the course of creating the profile diagram, the 
anchor and alternative lines had been calculated to be uncorrelated, r = -.03. In this 
paradigm, a second, mirror-imaged version of the profile plot was included as a 
between-participants counter-balance factor, to control for the possibility that the 
specific pattern of the profile plot might influence participants’ responses. 
 
Figure 3-2. Profile plot of alleged scoring in the fictitious tests of the Minimal Traits 
Paradigm, showing an anchor line (their own results or the results collected so far from 
the group of Germans, respectively; red line) and an alternative line (profile of a 
randomly selected former participant vs. profile of another central European country; 
gray line). 
Compared to the original paradigm (Cadinu & Rothbart, 1996), the paradigm 
employed in the present experiment was slightly altered. Instead of twelve dimensions 
allegedly measured by six tests, only six dimensions were to be assessed by only four 
tests in the original paradigm. With the employment of twelve dimensions, more data 
points were available for the later analysis and the execution of six tests for the 
assessment of twelve dimensions was more plausible. Another deviation from the 
original paradigm was the presentation of all information in a singular profile diagram 
without including a description of the dimensions. Instead, Cadinu and Rothbart (1996) 
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showed information about only one dimension at a time. Following a short description 
of the dimension, they presented the participant's or the group's score, respectively, and 
asked participants to make an assessment of the respective target. In addition, 
participants were then asked how desirable they thought the respective dimension to 
be. Since, in the adapted paradigm used in the present study, no descriptions of the 
dimensions were given and, hence, dimensions should not differ in perceived valence, it 
was thought unnecessary to ask for ratings of desirability. 
According to some researchers, identification with the respective group is a 
necessary precondition for the occurrence of self-stereotyping (e.g., Brown & Turner, 
1981) as well as for social projection (Krueger, 2007): “Once some specific social 
identification is salient, a person assigns to self and others the common, typical or 
representative characteristics that define the group as a whole. [Thus, they come to] 
perceive themselves as relatively interchangeable with other ingroup members” (Brown 
& Turner, 1981, p. 39). Hence, to confirm that, for participants in this experiment, the 
group of Germans indeed was a relevant category for self-categorization, identification 
with this group was measured with four items (e.g., “I identify with the group of 
Germans.”, see Table A-3 in Appendix A for a full list). These questions were also 
answered on 11-point scales ranging from -5 (does not apply at all) to +5 (applies 
completely). 
Procedure.  A 2 (Priming of an independent or an interdependent mindset) x 2 
(Anchor in the Minimal Traits Paradigm) between-subjects design was employed. Again, 
the maximum number of participants during one lab session was five. After participants 
were welcomed and seated, they started executing the fictitious tests of the Minimal 
Traits Paradigm. As in Experiment 1, the experimental software E-Prime (Psychology 
Software Tools, 2013) was used to present instructions and to record data. After 
completion of the fictitious tests, participants were primed with an independent or an 
interdependent mindset by means of the Pronoun Circling Task (Gardner et al., 1999). 
The task itself was identical to Experiment 1, concerning both instructions and text. 
Following the priming procedure, back on the screen, participants were shown the 
profile diagram with the anchor and alternative information and were asked to assess 
either the self or the group of Germans, depending on the experimental condition. After 
this, identification with the ingroup was measured and demographic data were assessed. 
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After finishing the study, subjects were thanked for their participation in the 
experiment, were paid, and asked for secrecy concerning the study's contents. 
If an independent mindset had been primed, participants were expected to rely 
more pronouncedly on information about the self when asked for an assessment of the 
group of Germans (social projection). Vice versa for a primed interdependent mindset, 
participants were expected to use the information indicating the German average to a 
larger extent when they were asked to make predictions about their own test results 
(self-stereotyping).  
3.2.3 Results 
Identification. The items of identification with the ingroup formed a reliable scale, 
Cronbach’s α = .77. The general level of identification was relatively high, M = 1.99, 
SD = 1.80, on an 11-point scale from -5 to +5, and differed significantly from the scale 
midpoint of 0, t(100) = 11.15, p < .001. An ANOVA revealed no effect of priming on 
identification, F(1,99) = 1.03, p = .312, ηp2 = .010.  
Minimal Traits Paradigm. To determine if the priming had an effect on the 
occurrence of social projection and self-stereotyping, first, multiple regressions were 
calculated for each subject separately with the anchor information and the values of the 
alternative profile as independent variables while subjects’ target ratings served as the 
dependent variable. In a multiple regression analysis, the effect of one predictor on the 
criterion is tested while keeping all other predictors constant (Eid, Gollwitzer, & Schmitt, 
2013). This way, b-values were calculated for each subject individually. These 
parameters indicated the predictive value of the information presented to participants 
in the anchor profile (b1) and the alternative profile (b2), respectively controlling for 
each other (see Krueger & Stanke, 2001). Each b value was then included as a dependent 
variable in analyses of variance.  
In a first step, to check if the Priming x Anchor target interaction depended of the 
version of the profile plot (mirror-imaged or not), it was included as a method factor in a 
2 (Priming) x 2 (Anchor) x 2 (Profile) ANOVA. Here, the b1 parameter, which had been 
calculated before, served as the dependent variable—the parameter indicating how 
strongly participants relied on information from the anchor line when being asked to 
make an assessment of the respective target. Since there was no effect of Profile on the 
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Priming x Anchor target interaction, F(1,91) = 0.50, p = .483, η² = .005, data were 
collapsed across profiles. In a subsequent 2 (Priming) x 2 (Anchor) ANOVA, effects on b1 
were examined. It revealed a significant Prime x Anchor 2-way interaction, 
F(1,95) = 5.84, p = .018, η² = .058, as depicted in Figure 3-3. There were no significant 
main effects of Anchor or Prime, both F’s < 1. 
 
Figure 3-3. 2-way interaction (Priming x Anchor) for regression coefficient b1 indicating 
the extent to which participants relied on information about the anchor (information 
about the self vs. information about the group) when being asked to make an 
assessment of the respective target, controlling for information from the profile’s 
alternative line. 
For the independence priming, simple effects analysis indicated that b1 values in the 
self-as-anchor condition and the ingroup-as-anchor condition did not to differ 
significantly, F(1,95) = 2.19, p = .142, η² = .023, while for the interdependence priming, 
this difference was marginally significant, F(1,95) = 3.80, p = .054, η² = .038. For the self-
as-anchor condition, the difference between primings was significant, F(1,95) = 3.97, 
p = .049, η² = .040, while for the ingroup-as-anchor condition, it was not significant, 
F(1,95) = 1.98, p = .163, η² = .020.  
Next, to assess if the degree of identification with the ingroup influenced social 
projection and self-stereotyping, Identification was included in a regression analysis 
Independent mindset Interdependent mindset 
Anchor: Self 0,30 0,48 
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with b1 values as criterion and Priming, Anchor, Identification, and their interactions as 
predictors. Though the Priming x Anchor target interaction here just marginally reached 
significance, b = -0.054, SE = 0.029, t = -1.851, p = .067, there was a significant main 
effect of Identification, b = 0.055, SE = 0.017, t = 3.290 p = .001. Furthermore, there was a 
significant effect of the Priming x Identification term, b = -0.039, SE = 0.017, t = -2.371, 
p = .020. Next, for a moderation analysis, data were coded for a high degree of 
identification with the ingroup (SD = +1) or a low degree of identification (SD = -1), 
respectively. For a low degree of identification, marginally significant effects of Priming, 
b = 0.076, SE = 0.041, t = 1.85, p = .067, and of the interaction Priming x Anchor were 
found, b = -0.054, SE = 0.029, t = -1.858, p = .066. A simple slopes analysis revealed a 
significant difference between priming conditions if the self was the anchor, b = 0.240, 
SE = 0.110, t = 2.182, p = .032. For a high degree of identification, there was a significant 
effect of the Priming x Anchor interaction, b = -0.054, SE = 0.029, t = -1.858, p = .066. 
Here, a significant slope could be found between priming conditions if the group of 
Germans was the anchor, b = -0.261, SE = 0.113, t = -2.299, p = .024. 
For regression coefficient b2, Anchor had a significant main effect in an ANOVA 
implementing Anchor and Priming as independent variables, F(1,95) = 15.82, p < .001, 
η² = .143. b2 parameters were higher in the self-as-anchor condition, M = 0.33, SD = 0.18, 
than in the group-as-anchor condition, M = 0.16, SD = 0.23. No significant effects of 
Priming or the interaction Priming x Anchor were detected, Fs < 1. Furthermore, in a 
regression analysis with b2 values as criterion and Priming, Anchor, Identification, and 
their interactions as predictors, no significant effects of Identification and corresponding 
interaction terms were detected, all p’s > .10. 
3.2.4 Discussion 
Results, again, were contrary to my hypotheses. If an independent mindset had been 
primed, the difference between b1 values was not significant, indicating that social 
projection and self-stereotyping occurred to the same extent. However, for a primed 
interdependent mindset, b1 values were higher in the self-as-anchor condition, a pattern 
which suggests that social projection, here, is the predominant process.  
The significant main effect of Anchor in the ANOVA examining regression coefficient 
b2 implies that, compared to participants in the group-as-anchor condition, participants 
in the self-as-anchor condition relied more heavily on the alternative source of 
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information which was labeled as indicating results of a “randomly selected former 
participant”. Possibly, information about “another central-European country” has not 
been perceived as being a source of information as adequate and valid for the self as 
information about a “randomly selected former participant” might be for the group of 
Germans. To infer inform about another country (i.e., the outgroup) to the self is as 
implausible as to infer information about the self to the outgroup (see Krueger & Dawes, 
2008, for a discussion). 
Another interesting fact is that, under the independent priming, the use of the 
anchor as the source of information did not differ significantly either if information 
about the self or about the group had been presented. That implies that there is no 
egocentric bias under the independent, but only under interdependent priming. This 
deviates from previous research (e.g., Krueger & Stanke, 2001) where an egocentric bias 
had been found: Here, information about another group member was not used when 
participants were asked to make a statement concerning the group. 
The significant main effect of Identification with the ingroup in the regression 
analysis of Priming, Anchor, Identification, and their interactions on b1 values indicates 
that that the extent on how much subjects relied on anchor information increases with 
their level of identification, a finding which is in accordance with prior research (e.g., 
Brown & Turner, 1981; Krueger, 2007). In addition, among subjects who indicated lower 
levels of identification with their ingroup, a marginal significant main effect of Priming 
was found: After the interdependence priming, those subjects relied on anchor 
information generally to a larger extent than subjects who were primed with an 
independent mindset, independent of the type of anchor being presented. That is, after 
the interdependence priming, the anchor becomes a more relevant source of 
information. Results of the simple slopes analysis indicate that this effect is especially 
pronounced for subjects who received bogus information about themselves: After the 
interdependence priming, those information were used to a larger extent than after the 
independence priming. This finding implies that here, social projection is the 
predominant process, just as the results in the primary analysis indicates. For higher 
degrees of identification with the ingroup, information about the group of Germans is 
used to a larger degree after the priming of an independent vs. interdependent mindset, 
that is, the independence priming caused participants to rely more extensively on group 
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information (self-stereotyping). Both findings for the analysis including levels of 
identification with the ingroup were contrary to the initial hypothesis. 
At this point, the question arose if there could have been a problem with the priming 
procedure employed in these first two experiments. It might have been the case that the 
Pronoun Circling Task for some reason did not cause the hypothesized shift in focus, that 
is, it may not have induced socio-cognitive mindsets as expected. To assess if the 
observed effects might have been due to an ineffective priming procedure, a different 
priming procedure, which was expected to alter participants’ perceived social status, 
was employed in the next experiment. By manipulating participants’ perceived social 
status, another approach for the inducement of a certain mindset could be engaged, 
which yields at another range of the construct. 
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3.3 Experiment 3 
3.3.1 Introduction 
Since the hypothesized effects could not be found in the first two experiments, now a 
different priming procedure was employed. Instead of altering participants’ focus via the 
Pronoun Circling Task, I tried to achieve this indirectly by manipulating their perceived 
social status. According to Kraus and colleagues (Kraus et al., 2012), diminished 
resources and lower rank enhance lower-class individuals’ contextualist tendencies, that 
is, a focus on external social forces and other persons who influence the individual’s life 
(i.e., an interdependent mindset). The opposite is claimed to be the case for upper-class 
individuals. Here, the availability of resources and an elevated rank create a context 
which emphasizes personal freedom and gives rise to an individualistic (i.e., an 
independent) mindset. This mindset, in turn, leads a person to focus more on his or her 
own goals, emotions, and motivations (see also Markus & Kitayama, 1991, 2010; Snibbe 
& Markus, 2005; see section 1.2.1.1). Hence, I expected to observe social projection in 
the experimental condition where high social status is primed, while self-stereotyping 
should arise if a low social status has been primed. 
Since the expected effects, once more, were not found in the last experiment and to 
rule out the possibility that this was due to the variation of the Minimal Traits Paradigm 
which had been applied, now I employed the original version of the paradigm as 
introduced by Cadinu and Rothbart (1996)4.  
3.3.2 Method 
Participants. 124 students from the University of Mannheim majoring in different 
subjects participated in Experiment 3. The age range was 18 to 40 years, M = 21.59, 
SD = 3.43, 71 % of the participants were female. As in the previous studies, the 
experiment was advertised as a study on social perception in lectures and using leaflets. 
Participants were paid 2.50 Euro cash and a bar of chocolate for participating in the 
study. 18 participants were excluded from the final analysis for being non-native 
German speakers or being born outside of Germany. These two preconditions were of 
                                                        
4 At this point, I would like to express my gratitude to Mara Cadinu for providing me with the original 
material and additional information necessary for employing this paradigm. 
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importance with regards to participants’ identification with the group of Germans. 
Analyses were conducted with N = 106 participants. 
Dependent Variables.  In this third experiment, a variation of the Minimal Traits 
Paradigm was employed which tried to emulate the version originally introduced by 
Cadinu and Rothbart (1996). Here, just like in the adapted paradigm in Experiment 2, 
participants first have to go through a series of fictitious tests which are similar to the 
ones employed before. They are told that the tests are designed to determine their 
performance in the areas of perception, memory and spatial awareness. In contrast to 
the adaptation of the paradigm from the previous experiment, only four instead of six 
tests are to be executed to determine performance on only six instead of twelve 
dimensions. Since tests were designed to be executed via paper and pencil, they had to 
be slightly modified to make testing with the computer both possible and plausible. Yet, 
they remained similar to the original material. Full instructions and a description of the 
tasks are included in Appendix C2. Another modification is that, after the “tests”, instead 
of presenting a profile diagram with the anchor information, in this original paradigm, 
this information is presented for each dimension consecutively: After a short description 
of each dimension (e.g., “Field orientation in problem-solving: The tendency to rely on 
relational information present in the problem context. High scores on the Field 
Orientation Scale indicate good problem-solving strategies.”), participants receive bogus 
results on how they scored on the respective dimension (vs. information about how the 
group of Germans has scored so far) and were then asked to assess the group of 
Germans on the same dimension (vs. guess how they think they themselves have scored 
on the dimension). In fact however, all participants are given the same false feedback on 
how they or the group of Germans “scored” on the fictitious trait dimensions. Ratings are 
made on a 9-point scale ranging from 1 (low values) to 9 (high values), by pressing the 
corresponding key on the keyboard. Following the assessment of the target, participants 
were instructed to indicate how desirable they thought it would be to get a higher score 
on the respective dimension. Again, the scale ranged from 1 (not desirable) to 9 (very 
desirable) and ratings were to be given by pressing the corresponding key. 
To assess the currently active mindset directly, the Wezwe Task was employed 
(Davis & Brock, 1975; Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg, 2000; Marx, Stapel, & Muller, 
2005). In this, participants are given a series of sentences which, they are told, are 
written in the language “Wezwe” spoken by only few ethnic groups in New Guinea. 
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Several words in the text are underlined. Participants are instructed to try to determine 
which German pronouns correspond to the underlined foreign pronouns. There are 
eleven sentences, containing a total of 15 alleged pronouns. Subjects are told to choose 
from a list of German personal and possessive pronouns: ich, mein, du, dein, er, sein, sie, 
ihr, wir, unser, ihr, euer (I, my, you, your, he, his, she, her, we, our, they, their). It was 
assumed that the currently active mindset would be reflected in their choice of 
pronouns, producing a higher proportion of singular pronouns (vs. plural pronouns) if 
an independent (vs. interdependent) mindset has been primed compared to the 
condition where an interdependent (vs. independent) mindset has been primed. Full 
instructions as well as the text allegedly written in Wezwe are included in Appendix C3. 
Identification with the group of Germans was measured with the same four items as 
in Experiment 2 which, however, were to be answered on 9-point scales ranging from 
1 (does not apply at all) to 9 (applies completely).  
Procedure.  Like in the last experiment, a 2 (Priming of a high or low perceived social 
status) x 2 (Anchor in the Minimal Traits Paradigm) between-subjects design was 
employed. The study was conducted in a research lab at the University of Mannheim 
with a maximum number of participants during one lab session of five. As before, the 
experimental software E-Prime (Psychology Software Tools, 2013) was used to present 
instructions and to record data. First, participants were instructed to complete the 
fictitious tests of the Minimal Traits Paradigm. To achieve a variation in participants’ 
perceived social status, in this experiment, the Social Ladder Task (Kraus, Horberg, 
Goetz, & Keltner, 2011; Piff et al., 2010) was employed. Here, participants are shown a 
ladder with eight rungs and are instructed to interpret this ladder as representing social 
differences in Germany. They are then assigned to either a low or high relative social 
class rank position, based on the following instructions by Kraus and colleagues (2011):  
Please compare yourself to the people at the very bottom (top) of the ladder. 
People like these are the worst (best) off: They have the lowest (highest) incomes, 
lowest (highest) educational opportunities and the least (most) respected 
professions. Now, imagine for a moment in which way you differ from these 
persons in relation to your own income, your educational background and your 
profession. Where would you place yourself on this ladder, relative to the people 
at the bottom (top) of the ladder? (p. 1383) 
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Next, participants are asked to place themselves on the ladder relative to the person 
at the very top or at the very bottom (1 = bottom rung, 8 = top rung). Due to this 
manipulation, I expected an assimilation effect to occur: For participants asked to 
compare themselves to a person at the very top of the ladder (high-status condition), the 
priming was expected to induce an independent mindset. Vice versa, if subjects are 
asked to compare themselves to a person at the very bottom of the ladder (low-status 
condition), an interdependent mindset is expected to arise. This social status rating also 
served as a first manipulation check. 
 Following this priming procedure, participants were given the anchor information 
with bogus scores of the alleged performance tests (i.e. information about either their 
own performance or about results the group of Germans has shown so far) and were 
asked to assess either the group of Germans’ score or to guess their own score, 
depending on the experimental condition. After the measurement of these dependent 
variables, participants were asked to complete the Wezwe translation task to allegedly 
determine in which way performance in the assessed domains affected their intuitive 
understanding of language. Finally, they were asked to answer the four questions 
regarding their level of identification with the ingroup and demographic data were 
assessed. After finishing the study, subjects were thanked for their participation in the 
experiment, were paid, and asked not to speak with potential future participants about 
the study's contents. 
 If participants had been primed to perceive their social status as being relatively 
high, they were expected to rely more pronouncedly on information about the self when 
they were asked for an assessment of the group of Germans (social projection) than 
participants in the low-status condition. Here, vice versa, participants were expected to 
make use of the information about the German average to a larger extent when they 
were asked to make predictions about their own test results (self-stereotyping) 
compared to participants in the high-status condition. Furthermore, in the Wezwe 
translation task, an increased use of singular pronouns and a diminished use of plural 
pronouns was expected after a high social status had been primed compared to the low-
status priming. 




Identification. As in the previous experiment, items measuring identification with the 
ingroup formed a reliable scale, Cronbach’s α = .79. The general level of identification 
was relatively high, M = 6.79, SD = 1.41, and differed significantly from the scale 
midpoint of 5, t(105) = 13.07, p < .001. Again, there was no effect of priming on 
identification, F(1,104) < 1, p = .473, ηp2 = .005. 
Social status rating. The social status rating following the status priming served as a 
manipulation check. An ANOVA revealed no significant effect of the status priming on 
status ratings, F(1,104) < 1, p = .733, ηp2 = .001. However, the status ratings’ mean, 
M = 5.11, SD = 1.13, differed significantly from the calculative scale midpoint of 4.5, 
t(105) = 5.58, p < .001, indicating that participants perceived their own social status to 
be relatively high, independent of the priming they had received. 
Minimal Traits Paradigm. Again, in a first step, multiple regressions were calculated 
for each subject separately. The information presented about the anchor (the self or the 
group of Germans) was used as one predictor. Unlike in Experiment 2, now there was no 
need to control for information from an alternative line in the profile plot. This is due to 
the slightly different design of the original version of the Minimal Traits Paradigm 
(Cadinu & Rothbart, 1996) employed in Experiment 3 in which the anchor information is 
presented to participants without providing alternative information. Yet, subjects’ 
desirability ratings were included as another predictor in the regression to control for 
the influence each dimension’s valence might have on target ratings, the criterion 
variable. In a subsequent 2 (Priming) x 2 (Anchor) ANOVA, the anchor information’s b1 
parameters were analyzed.  
Results indicated a significant main effect of Anchor, F(1,99) = 5.25, p = .024, 
ηp2 = .050. b1 parameters were larger in the group-as-anchor condition, M = 0.42, 
SD = 0.36, than in the self-as-anchor condition, M = 0.26, SD = 0.35. Furthermore, the 
Priming x Anchor interaction was marginally significant, F(1,99) = 2.82, p = .096, 
ηp2 = .028, see Figure 3-4.  




Figure 3-4. 2-way interaction (Prime x Anchor) for regression coefficient b1 indicating the 
extent to which participants relied on information about the anchor (information about 
the self vs. information about the group) when being asked to make an assessment of the 
respective target. 
For the high-status priming, simple effects analysis revealed that b1 parameters in 
the in the self-as-anchor and group-as-anchor condition differed significantly, 
F(1,99) = .81, p = .006, η² = .073, while for the low-status priming, this difference was not 
significant, F(1,99) = 0.19, p = .665, η² = .002. For the group-as-anchor condition, the 
difference of b1 parameters between primings was not significant, F(1,99) = 1.34, 
p = .250, η² = .013, as well as for the self-as-anchor condition, F(1,99) = 1.48, p = .226, 
η² = .015. 
As in Experiment 2, to analyze if the extent of identification with the ingroup 
influenced social projection and self-stereotyping, Identification was included in a 
regression analysis with b1 values as criterion and Priming, Anchor, Identification, and 
their interactions as predictors. Here, the Priming x Anchor target interaction only 
marginally reached significance, b = 0.063, SE = 0.035, t = 1.816, p = .072. There was no 
main effect of Identification, b = 0.001, SE = 0.025, t = 0.054, p = .957, also no other 
effects near significance could be detected, smallest p = .101. 
High status Low status 
Anchor: Self 0,21 0,33 
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Wezwe Task. For the analysis of this measure of the currently active mindset, 
participants’ translations of the pronouns in the Wezwe Task were counted, singular and 
plural pronouns separately. The translations consisted of considerable more singular, 
M = 9.21, SD = 2.50, than plural pronouns, M = 3.43, SD = 1.96. This difference, in part, is 
due to the fact that there were eight singular pronouns which could be used in the 
translation, but only six plural pronouns. This unequal 8-to-6 ratio increased further 
because two pronouns had to be excluded in both singular and plural because, in 
German, they indicate singular and plural at the same time: sie and ihre (she and her or 
they and their, respectively). But even taking into account this ratio of possible choices, 
there still is a large surplus of singular pronouns in the translation: While, after this 
exclusion, for each plural pronoun there were potentially 1.50 singular pronouns 
available (six singular and four plural pronouns), for each plural pronoun 2.69 singular 
pronouns were used in the translation on average.  
Due to the imbalance of potentially available singular and plural pronouns, pronoun 
categories were analyzed separately. In a 2 (Priming) x 2 (Anchor) ANOVA, for singular 
pronouns, there was neither a main effect of Priming, F(1,96) < 1, p = .673, ηp2 = .002, nor 
of Anchor, F(1,96) < 1, p = .895, ηp2 < .001, nor of the Priming x Anchor interaction, 
F(1,96) < 1, p = .577, ηp2 = .003. For plural pronouns, the factor Priming also had no 
significant effect, F(1,96) < 1, p = .724, ηp2 = .001, as well as the Priming x Anchor 
interaction, F(1,96) < 1, p = .699, ηp2 = .002. However, there was a significant main effect 
of Anchor, F(1,96) = 6.96, p = .010, ηp2 = .068, indicating that participants used more 
plural pronouns if they had been instructed to make an assessment of their own 
performance in the previous Minimal Traits Paradigm, MSelf = 3.94, SD = 2.11 vs. 
MGroup = 2.92, SD = 1.66. 
3.3.4 Discussion 
While it was expected that social projection is the predominant process after a high 
social status has been primed, self-stereotyping should have been prevalent after the 
low-status priming. Results, however, paint a different picture: After a low social status 
had been primed, both social projection and self-stereotyping occur to the same extent. 
In the high-status condition, participants attributed group characteristics more readily 
to the self than vice versa: self-stereotyping is the predominant process. These results 
are in conflict with previous research which indicated that low-status or stigmatized 
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individuals reacted with an increase in self-stereotyping after their status had been 
made salient and their group identity had been threatened (e.g., Cadinu et al., 2012; 
Latrofa et al., 2009; Latrofa et al., 2012; see also section 1.2.1). 
Also, the Wezwe Task (Davis & Brock, 1975; Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg, 2000; 
Marx et al., 2005), which had been employed as a direct way to assess the currently 
active socio-cognitive mindset, did not yield the expected results: apparently, the 
priming had no effect on this measure. This might be due to several factors. Firstly, the 
priming’s effects might have been depleted by the earlier Minimal Traits Paradigm. 
Secondly, this task could have been implemented at a point in time too late after subjects 
had received the priming so that its effects simply might have worn off, independent of 
another measure preceding this one. Finally, the Wezwe translation task might not be 
sensitive to a priming of perceived social-status as employed in this experiment. While 
it, at this point, is not possible to clarify if one of the first possibilities might be true, at 
least it seems unlikely that the third proposition applies. Results of the Minimal Traits 
Paradigm indicate that the priming did influence which source of information subjects 
preferred when being asked to make social judgments or judgments concerning the self, 
respectively. Though these effects were not in the expected direction, they at least 
indicated the presence of a connection between the social-status priming and the 
occurrence of social projection and self-stereotyping. Furthermore, as can be seen from 
the results in Experiment 2, variations in primed socio-cognitive mindsets can be 
detected with the Minimal Traits Paradigm as well. And since the Wezwe Task has been 
demonstrated before to be sensitive for the detection of the currently active socio-
cognitive mindset, too (Marx et al., 2005; here called a personal vs. collective self-
construal orientation), it is not implausible to infer that this measure is suitable for the 
detection of variations in perceived social status as well. 
By now, for a third time in the course of my experiments, a pattern has emerged 
which is contrary to the predicted pattern. In this instance, a primed high social status 
was associated with self-stereotyping. At least two approaches of explanation for the 
absence of the a priori hypothesized patterns seem plausible. The first one will be 
presented here while the second will be pointed out in detail in the following section. 
The first approach yields at the priming procedure. In previous research employing 
the Social Ladder Task (Kraus et al., 2011; Piff et al., 2010) as well as in the present 
study, an assimilation effect was obviously expected to occur: When participants had 
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been asked to compare themselves to a person of high status, they should have adapted 
to high-status individuals’ solipsistic tendencies. In contrast, the comparison with a 
person of low status should have led participants to relate to low-status individuals’ 
contextualist social cognitive tendencies. This assumption of assimilative predominance, 
however, is dependent on other factors and does not apply necessarily in any case. 
Mussweiler (2001, 2003) described preconditions determining the occurrence of an 
assimilation effect or the oppositional contrast effect. He assumes that, in most cases, 
people compare themselves to a certain standard by testing the initial hypothesis that 
their standing along the judgmental dimension is indeed similar to that of the 
comparison standard. According to Mussweiler and Strack’s Selective Accessibility 
Model (Mussweiler & Strack, 2000), as a consequence of this initial evaluation, a person 
generates evidence supporting this first assumption of similarity. This process, in turn, 
increases the accessibility of evidence in support of the assumption which, then, causes 
it to be more likely used in later self-evaluations (Trope & Liberman, 1996). Hence, self-
evaluative consequences should depend on the hypothesis which a person has at the 
beginning of a comparison process. Mussweiler (2001) states that before engaging in the 
more elaborate process of further hypothesis testing, the hypothesis which is to be 
tested has to be generated in the first place. If the initial assessment of similarity 
indicates a similarity to the standard, a person is likely to test this hypothesis of 
similarity by generating consistent information. However, if the initial similarity 
assessment leads a person to assume dissimilarity, he or she is likely to continue testing 
for dissimilarity. 
Following Mussweiler’s (2001) reasoning and considering that participants in this 
experiment were all university students, they will probably tend to perceive their own 
social status as being relatively high by default. Hence, for participants who are asked to 
position themselves on a scale compared to high-status individuals, an assimilation 
effect might indeed occur: An initial assessment of similarity would result in perceived 
similarity which, in turn, would lead to further assimilative processes. However, if 
participants from a university student sample are asked to position themselves in 
relation to low-status individuals, to whom an initial similarity judgment will most likely 
result in a perceived dissimilarity, this could trigger the impulse to distance themselves 
from a low-status position. This might explain why status ratings in the Social Ladder 
Task did not differ between both priming conditions. Subjects primed with a high social 
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status might have assimilated to a high social status while subjects in the low-status 
condition might have contrasted away from the low-status position and towards a high 
social status as well.  
Yet, these considerations do not explain the pattern found in the Minimal Traits 
Paradigm. If the priming procedure would have effectively led to the same extent of 
perceived social status in both conditions, this should have reflected in a pattern which 
does not differ extensively between these groups. Instead, results indicate that, of all 
conditions, participants who had been asked to compare themselves with a person of 
high social standing react to this priming with an increase in self-stereotyping. Vice 
versa, according to my hypotheses, self-stereotyping was expected to occur for subjects 
who perceived themselves to possess a low social status. However, in this low-status 
condition, both social projection and self-stereotyping occur to the same extent. The 
post-hoc explanation described in the previous paragraph does not cover this 
observation, for here, no group perceiving their own social standing as being low would 
exist. Furthermore, to produce the effects found in the high-status condition based on 
this alternative explanation, a contrast effect would have had to occur just in the priming 
condition where subjects had been asked to compare themselves to persons of high 
status. This assumption, however, lacks a theoretical basis. Another fact contradicting 
the post-hoc explanation is that the Social Ladder Task has proven effective in the past 
in producing the predicted assimilation effects (e.g., Kraus et al., 2011; Piff et al., 2010). 
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3.4 Discussion of Part I 
It was expected that a shift in focus towards the self and its characteristics should 
have enhanced individualistic, egocentric tendencies, hereby leading a person to project 
his or her own characteristics to other persons or his or her ingroup (social projection). 
That is, after an independent mindset had been induced, I expected participants to use 
information about the self to a larger extent as a source of information when they were 
asked to make an assessment of the group of Germans (compared to the priming of an 
interdependent mindset). On the other hand, it was predicted that a focus shift toward 
the ingroup and its characteristics (i.e., the induction of an interdependent mindset) 
would make information about this group more available and enhance a person’s 
contextualist tendencies. This, in turn, should increase the readiness to attribute 
information about the group to the self (self-stereotyping). Accordingly, after the 
induction of an interdependent mindset a person should feel inclined to use information 
about his or her social group more readily as a source to answer questions regarding the 
self. 
In Experiment 1, results contradict these initial hypotheses. For a primed 
independent mindset, data suggest that social projection and self stereotyping occur to 
the same extent, instead of social projection being the predominant process. In contrast, 
for a primed interdependent mindset, social projection was observed while there was no 
clear indication of self-stereotyping, as indicated by response times which were 
similarly fast for matches and mismatches.  
The second experiment replicated the effects reported for Experiment 1: After the 
induction of an independent mindset, b1 parameters indicating the strength of the 
relationship between the judgmental anchor and the target did not differ significantly, 
regardless of the self or the ingroup being the anchor. This indicated social projection 
and self-stereotyping, again, to occur to the same extent. However, if an interdependent 
mindset had been primed, b1 parameters were significantly higher in the self-as-anchor 
condition, a pattern which suggests that, here, social projection is the predominant 
process.  
Lastly, in Experiment 3, results differed from those in the first two experiments, but 
were contrary to my initial hypotheses nonetheless. When participants in the high-status 
condition received information about the ingroup and were asked to estimate their 
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individual results in the previous fictitious tests, they relied on this information more 
pronouncedly than participants who received information about their own 
characteristics and were asked to make an assumption about their ingroup. This pattern 
indicates that self-stereotyping was predominant after the priming of a high social 
status. In contrast, after a low social status had been primed, the nonsignificant 
difference between b1 parameters from both Anchor conditions indicates that, here, both 
processes did not differ in strength.  
After the predicted results could not be obtained after three experiments, alternative 
explanations were explored. Apparently, both priming procedures effectively influenced 
the occurrence of social projection and self-stereotyping—however not in the expected 
way. Notably, while results in each experiment were contrary to my initial hypotheses, 
these contradictions emerged in different ways. While, in Experiments 1 and 2, it was an 
increased degree of social projection after the interdependence priming which 
especially stood out in the results, in Experiment 3, the occurrence of self-stereotyping 
after the independence priming—in this case, in the form of the high-status priming—
was the part which contradicted my hypotheses the most.  
After the Pronoun Circling Task produced rather “ironic” effects in Experiments 1 
and 2, similar effects could be observed after the use of the Social Ladder Task. While 
unexpected and contradictory effects in my first two experiments were most 
pronounced in the interdependence priming condition where social projection was 
found to be the predominant process, in Experiment 3, the most noticeable observation 
stems from the independence priming condition where self-stereotyping turned out to 
be prevalent. Concerning the research paradigms, results from both the reaction-time 
based paradigm implemented in Experiment 1 and results from the Minimal Traits 
Paradigm showed the contrary effects. This observation may be interpreted as 
countering concerns of invalidity in measurement. 
On the basis of these ironic effects, an alternative explanation is being proposed in 
the following section of this thesis, which takes implications of Optimal Distinctiveness 
Theory (Brewer, 1991) into consideration. With this alternative approach I will try to 
reconcile the results of the first three experiments. 
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4 Part II: Ironic Effects Following the Induction of Socio-cognitive 
Mindsets 
4.1 Optimal Distinctiveness Theory 
According to Brewer (1991), social psychologists have become “increasingly ‘self’-
centered” (p. 475) in a way that they focused insufficiently on the importance of group 
membership in connection to individual functioning. While this view might have been 
partially adequate in the early 1990s, social psychology has gained momentum in this 
area with, for example, the further exploration of and the ongoing emphasis on the 
domain of social cognition. Brewer herself met her concerns by developing Optimal 
Distinctiveness Theory (ODT; Brewer, 1991). It posits that human beings are 
characterized by two opposing needs that direct the relationship between self-concept 
and membership in a social group. One need is a need for inclusion, for assimilation, and 
for belonging which motivates an immersion in one’s ingroup to a certain degree. The 
other need is a need for differentiation from others, for expressing one’s individuality, 
which works in opposition to the need for inclusion. 
Following Leonardelli, Pickett, and Brewer (2010), the needs for inclusion and 
differentiation may induce relevant changes in self concept, similar to how other 
motivations influence the way in which individuals view themselves. A central statement 
in SCT, following the distinction between a personal self and a social self, is that the 
categorization of the self as a group member brings about a shift from defining the self in 
terms of its individual traits to a definition of the self in terms of traits and attributes 
which are prototypical of the ingroup (Turner et al., 1987). Hence, ingroup members 
high in prototypicality generally experience feelings of high ingroup inclusion (Oakes, 
Haslam, & Turner, 1998). Accordingly, one way to satisfy the need for inclusion is for 
individuals to alter the self to be more consistent with the ingroup prototype. This can 
be achieved, for example, by changing one’s behavioral patterns, one’s appearance (e.g., 
by following an informal or a formal dress code specific to the group), or by adopting 
attitudes or beliefs which are specific to or typical of the group. Also, prototypicality can 
be increased by attributing traits which are stereotypical of the ingroup to the self (self-
stereotyping; see section 1.1.2). Since prototypicality comprises a shift towards the 
ingroup’s prototype as well as a shift away from the outgroup’s prototype, it can also 
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serve the need for differentiation. In a series of studies, Pickett, Bonner, and Coleman 
(2002) found support for these assumptions. 
Brewer’s ODT (1991) puts a strong emphasis on group processes, stating that an 
individual seeks an individually different optimal level of distinctiveness by serving the 
need for inclusion within a certain group as well as the need for differentiation from 
other groups. Yet, these two opposing drives or motives can also be comprised in a more 
general sense. Especially, the need for differentiation may be seen as a striving for 
individuality (Brewer & Roccas, 2001).  
Inclusion and differentiation motives vary depending on the current level of 
satiation or deprivation, just like any other need or drive. As opposing drives, the 
motives of inclusion and differentiation hold each other in check. The more an individual 
feels part of a social group, the more the need for inclusion is satisfied, but also the more 
the level of activation of the differentiation motive increases (Brewer & Roccas, 2001). 
Conversely, as a person moves towards a disconnection from a social group, the need for 
differentiation is diminished, but the level of activation of the need for inclusion rises. As 
a result of these two needs antagonizing each other, optimal distinctiveness can be 
understood as a dynamic equilibrium, as it is not necessarily fixed due to variations and 
changes in contextual properties which interact with the activation of inclusion and 
differentiation motives. Accordingly, an individual may seek to achieve an optimal level 
of distinctiveness between a personal identity and an identity as a group member (as 
depicted in Figure 4-1). 
 
Figure 4-1. The (individually different) point of equilibrium of optimal distinctiveness on 
the dimension personal vs. group identity depends on the current degree of activation of 
the needs for differentiation and inclusion. 
As stated by Leonardelli et al. (2010), a common misunderstanding of the ODT 
model is that optimal distinctiveness was a property of some groups rather than others, 





Need for differentiation Need for inclusion 
Equilibrium (individual level 
of optimal distinctiveness) 
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optimal groups. Instead, they emphasize that optimal distinctiveness is highly context 
specific. Following this reasoning, it may be assumed that both needs and the resulting 
individually preferred level of distinctiveness may not only be specific to a certain 
situational context, but may also be shaped by the individual’s culture. Hereby, I suggest 
that socio-cognitive mindsets are in direct connection to this level of distinctiveness, 
that is, a person’s individually preferred level of distinctiveness is proposed to depend 
on the currently active socio-cognitive mindset. This way, identity motives shape a 
preferred level of optimal distinctiveness which is unique to each individual while 
sharing commonalities within a certain culture.  
As described above, while I had hypothesized that after the priming of an 
independent socio-cognitive mindset social projection is the predominant process, I 
expected self-stereotyping to exceed social projection after the priming of an 
interdependent mindset. However, results from the experiments showed rather the 
opposite pattern: In the first two experiments, which employed the Pronoun Circling 
Task as the priming procedure, both processes occurred to the same extent after an 
independent mindset had been primed. After the priming of an interdependent mindset, 
social projection was the stronger process. In Experiment 3, in the condition in which a 
perceived high social status and, hence, an independent mindset had been primed, self-
stereotyping instead of social projection was found to be the predominant process. In 
the condition in which a low social status was supposed to be primed, both processes 
occurred to the same extent. 
As a possible post-hoc explanation, I propose that the priming via the Pronoun 
Circling Task, which had been employed in Experiments 1 and 2, as well as the priming 
via the Social Ladder Task in Experiment 3 could have had paradox effects. As described 
in the current section, in dependence on Optimal Distinctiveness Theory (Brewer, 1991; 
Brewer & Roccas, 2001), it may be assumed that individuals seek an optimal balance 
between their personal identities and their identities as group members. In Western 
cultures, an independent self-concept is the chronically primed standard (e.g., Markus 
& Kitayama, 1991; see section 1.2.2). Here, the average point of equilibrium is set at a 
position towards the dimension of a personal identity (see Figure 4-2 a, p. 59). By 
priming participants employing the Pronoun Circling Task or the Social Ladder Task, 
some kind of reactant response may have inadvertently been triggered. Both primings 
are expected to induce a shift in participants’ momentarily active socio-cognitive 
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mindsets towards a more independent or a more interdependent processing mode. This, 
however, may have shifted participants’ equilibrium along the dimension personal vs. 
social identity towards an undesirable position (for an illustration, see Figure 4-2 b).  
 
 
Figure 4-2a. In Western societies, the point of equilibrium, on average, is set towards the 
pole of a personal identity by default. The intended effects of the employed priming 
methods (Pronoun Circling Task; Social Ladder Task) are indicated by dotted arrows.  
b. Proposed reactant reactions as a means to compensate the shift in equilibrium caused 
by the employed primings, as indicated by dashed arrows. 
In Experiments 1 and 2, in an attempt to restore their preferred balance, subjects in 
the interdependence condition of the Pronoun Circling Task could have tried to 
compensate this shift towards their group identity by putting their individual selves into 
focus. Due to the resulting heightened accessibility of information about the self, this 
information would be used when being asked to describe the ingroup (social projection 
stronger than self-stereotyping). Vice versa, after the independence priming both 
processes occurred in equal intensity. Apart from the “standard” processing mode in 
Western cultures (social projection, see section 2), participants reacted with self-
stereotyping as a means to counteract the shift in balance caused by the priming: For 
participants who grew up and live in an individualistic society and for whom the 
aforementioned equilibrium is set somewhere in direction of the individuality pole by 
default, the priming of an independent socio-cognitive mindset via the Pronoun Circling 
Task might not have caused a particularly large increase in perceived individuality. The 
resulting need for differentiation might not have been as large as the need for 
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individuation in case of the interdependence priming. Accordingly, social projection and 
self-stereotyping did not differ significantly in the independence priming condition. 
Concerning Experiment 3, observed effects are not easily explainable on a basis of 
ODT. As discussed in section 3.3, assuming that an assimilative process did take place in 
the independence condition of the priming as expected, this should have caused 
participants to perceive their own status to be high. Hence, I had originally expected 
participants to have their focus shifted towards an egocentric position. Accordingly, I 
had expected them to react with an increase in social projection. In this condition, 
however, self-stereotyping was the dominant process. Assuming the here postulated, in 
ODT terms, undesirable increase in perceived individuality occurred after this priming 
had been employed, this, again, may have induced a reactant reaction. To explain the 
predominance of self-stereotyping in the high-status condition, a stronger reactant 
reaction would have had to take place than proposed in Experiments 1 and 2. One might 
speculate that a “direct” priming of socio-cognitive mindsets via the Pronoun Circling 
Task may have different effects than an “indirect” approach via the Social Ladder Task. 
Members of the upper class have long been stereotyped in ways that speak to a lack of 
social esteem, e.g., as “greedy”, “condescending”, or “posh” (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 
2002). Accordingly, for a student sample, the assimilation to and the identification with 
a high social status might be undesirable if this identification included the activation of 
corresponding unfavorable upper-class stereotypes. However, if the identification with a 
high social status was unattractive for participants in the first place, this would violate 
Experiment 3’s basic assumption that an initial similarity judgment will cause an 
assimilation effect to occur (Mussweiler, 2001). Bearing in mind that I could not be sure 
that in both priming conditions an assimilation process arose (see section 3.3.4), a test of 
my new ODT-derived hypothesis will focus on priming via Pronoun Circling Task, 
comparable to Experiments 1 and 2. 
Indications for this new hypothesis could be observed not only in the primary 
measures of prior experiments. In my first experiment’s stereotypicality measure (see 
section 3.1.4), as a confirmation of basic assumptions, stereotypicality of the traits led to 
smaller variance in ratings for the ingroup while the subjects’ individual characteristics 
resulted in a larger variance in ratings for the self. However, after an interdependent 
mindset had been primed, the difference between standard deviation means (MSD self vs. 
MSD ingroup) amounted to only 0.05 in the self first condition and to 0.19 in the ingroup 
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first condition. Standard deviation means in ingroup ratings were 0.11 SDs higher in the 
self first than in the ingroup first condition. Although only on a descriptive level, these 
results suggest that an instance of social projection occurred. 
Accounting for the reported paradoxical results from prior experiments, I tried to 
make them directly visible in a final experiment. While Part I of this thesis pursued a 
cognitive approach toward social projection and self-stereotyping, the second part seeks 
to confirm a motivational explanation of social projection and self-stereotyping as a 
means to regulate an imbalance caused by the priming of socio-cognitive mindsets. 
4.2 Alternative Hypotheses 
Based on Optimal Distinctiveness Theory, I hypothesize that the priming of socio-
cognitive mindsets via the Pronoun Circling Task will shift the preferred equilibrium 
each individual seeks along the dimension personal vs. social self in an undesired way. 
The individual will then try to compensate this imbalance by engaging in counter-
reactions: After the independence priming and the subsequent increase in perceived 
individuality, participants are expected to react similarly to prior experiments and show 
self-stereotyping and social projection to the same extent. Vice versa, the 
interdependence priming is expected to cause participants to counter the emphasis on a 
group identity by emphasizing their individuality. The center of attention, as a result, 
would be shifted to the self. If participants, then, will be asked to make an assessment of 
the ingroup, they are expected to use their own characteristics as a source of 
information and engage in social projection.  
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4.3 Experiment 4 
4.3.1 Introduction 
In addition to a replication of the paradoxical effects found in precedent experiments 
and in order to provide evidence for my alternative hypotheses, two new measures were 
employed in Experiment 4. The first one served to assess the degree of participants’ 
conformity concerning social influence. Taking considerations from Optimal 
Distinctiveness Theory into account, it was expected that participants were less 
susceptible to alleged estimations of prior subjects in a letter-counting exercise if they 
have been primed with an interdependent mindset compared to an independent 
mindset. The priming of an interdependent mindset is expected to shift participants’ 
preferred equilibrium towards the social self in an undesired way. As a counter-reaction, 
the individual is expected to accentuate his or her personal identity, characteristics, and 
estimations and will rely less pronouncedly to the given alleged estimations of prior 
subjects.  
With the second measure, I attempted to compare the accessibility of self-related 
knowledge across the two priming conditions via a reaction-time based measure. If the 
hypothesized process of restoring one’s individuality after the priming of an 
interdependent mindset was the cause for the observed effects in Experiment 1 and 2, 
information about the self should be more accessible in this condition, as here the focus 
will have been reactantly shifted towards the self. This should result in shorter response 
latencies when participants are asked to make dichotomous assessments on 
characteristics for the self after the priming of an interdependent mindset, compared to 
a condition in which an independent mindset has been primed. 
4.3.2 Method 
Participants. In Experiment 4, participants were 162 students from the University of 
Mannheim who majored in various disciplines. The sample’s age ranged from 18 to 40 
years, M = 21.92, SD = 3.91, and comprised 66% female participants. The study was 
advertised both in lectures and via e-mail as a study on social perception. Participants 
were paid 4 Euro cash and a bar of chocolate for their participation. In total, 14 
participants were excluded from the final analysis because they did not execute the 
priming procedure correctly, were no German native speakers, or had participated in 
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recent experiments with similar experimental paradigms. Analyses were conducted with 
N = 146 participants. 
Dependent Variables. In order to provide evidence for the ironic priming effect, a 
conformity task was employed which is an adaptation from van Cappellen and 
colleagues (van Cappellen, Corneille, Cols, & Saroglou, 2011; Castelli, Vanzetto, Sherman, 
& Arcuri, 2001). In this task, participants are asked to make an estimation of the number 
of the letter “a” appearing on a computer screen. Overall, there are 16 screens for which 
the number of “a”s varied from 148 to 1127. Each screen appears for only four seconds 
to avoid the application of counting strategies (e.g., by counting the numbers of “a”s per 
line and multiplying it by the number of lines). After each screen, participants are asked 
to enter their estimates directly in the experimental software. On the top of eight of the 
16 screens, three estimates for the number of letters are given, which deviate 20, 25, and 
30%, respectively, above (on four screens) or below (on four screens) the actual number 
of “a”s. Participants are told that the estimates had been provided by other participants, 
who have taken part in a pretest. Already in the introduction, participants are told that 
they can decide for themselves whether to use this information in their estimation or 
not. In addition to these eight screens, eight screens with no estimates are intermixed. 
These were added to increase the salience of peer estimates, but also to obtain a 
baseline of accuracy for each subject. This way, it is possible to examine if the Pronoun 
Circling Task might affect participants’ accuracy in any way. Full instructions are 
included in Appendix C4. 
To further test my hypotheses derived from Optimal Distinctiveness Theory, a 
reaction-time based measure was created to assess the accessibility of information 
about the self. In this, participants are shown 60 adjectives consecutively and are asked 
to use the keyboard to make a dichotomous assessment if the respective adjectives 
apply to them or not. The list of 60 items comprised 20 positive, 20 negative, and 20 
neutral items, and was selected from a set of items used by Otten and Epstude (2006). 
This task’s instructions and the list of items are included in Appendix C5. I hypothesized 
that subjects who are urged to identify with their ingroup strive to restore this balance 
by highlighting their individuality and vice versa. Accordingly, information about a 
person’s own characteristics should be more accessible if an interdependent mindset 
has been primed. This should result in shorter response latencies, compared to the 
priming condition where an independent mindset has been primed. 
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Identification with the ingroup was measured with the same items as in 
Experiments 2 and 3, but—as a replication of Experiment 2—were to be answered on an 
11-point scale ranging from -5 (does not apply at all) to +5 (applies completely) . 
Procedure.  A 2 (Priming of an independent or an interdependent mindset) x 
2 (Anchor in the Minimal Traits Paradigm) between-subjects design was employed. 
Again, the maximum number of participants during one lab session was five. The 
experiment started with the fictitious tests of the Minimal Traits Paradigm. For a 
replication of the ironic effects found in previous experiments, the alternative version of 
the Minimal Traits Paradigm from Experiment 2 was employed instead of the original 
version of Cadinu and Rothbart (1996). I chose this alternative version due to the 
implementation of the Pronoun Circling Task in this experiment. Hence, for a full 
replication, priming procedure and experimental paradigm should match. The 
alternative version of the Minimal Traits Paradigm has been described in detail in 
Experiment 2 (see section 3.2.2).  
Next, participants were primed by means of the Pronoun Circling Task. Instructions 
and the text were the same as in Experiments 1 and 2 (Gardner et al., 1999). Employing 
this priming procedure, participants’ focus was attempted to be shifted to either their 
own person or the group which, in turn, was expected to cause the hypothesized 
paradoxical reaction. Following the priming procedure, participants completed the 
conformity task to allegedly assess the speed of their visual perception and their visual 
accuracy. All in all, they were shown eight screens with bogus estimates of “prior 
participant’s estimates from the pretest” on the top of each screen, as well as eight 
screens without such social estimates. Each screen was shown for only four seconds, 
then participants were asked to enter the number of letters “a” they estimated to have 
seen. 
 Now, as an additional method factor, the order of the next two measures was varied: 
Constituting the factor Order, participants were either asked to execute the reaction-
time based measure first and then the Minimal Traits Paradigm, or vice versa. The 
reason for this variation of order was that after the measurement of two dependent 
variables—the conformity task and the reaction-time based paradigm or the Minimal 
Traits Paradigm, respectively—the priming effect might have worn off and no longer 
work for the last measure. In the beginning of the reaction-time based measure, 
participants were told that they now would be asked to give estimates concerning 
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personal characteristics and whether these characteristics tend to apply to them or not. 
They were asked to use the “S” key to indicate that the trait applies to them, and to use 
the “L” key to indicate its rejection. Being told to use each hand’s index or middle finger 
to enter a response, they started the measurement by pressing one of the buttons. After 
an answer was given, an inter-stimulus interval of 500 ms was employed before the next 
trait was shown. This procedure was repeated for all 60 traits. 
The Minimal Traits Paradigm’s procedure was identical to Experiment 2. 
Participants were told that, based on the tests executed at the beginning of the 
experiment, a profile of their personal information processing style had been created 
(self-as-anchor condition) or that—due to the study “having been conducted at various 
universities for some time now”—a preliminary profile of the average German person 
had been created (group-as-anchor condition). They were shown the profile diagram’s 
twelve dimensions with the anchor and alternative information being identical in both 
experimental conditions. Next, participants were either asked to assess the group of 
Germans on the respective dimensions (self-as-anchor condition) or they were asked to 
allegedly validate the test results by estimating how they think they themselves scored 
in the tests (group-as-anchor condition).  
Finally, they were asked to answer the four questions regarding their level of 
identification with the ingroup, and demographic data were assessed. After finishing the 
study, subjects were thanked for their participation in the experiment, were paid, and 
were asked for secrecy concerning the study's contents. 
4.3.3 Results 
Identification. Items employed for the assessment of identification with the ingroup 
formed a reliable scale (Cronbach’s α = .88). The general level of identification was 
relatively high (M = 8.13, SD = 2.17, on an 11-point scale) and it differed significantly 
from the scale midpoint of 6, t(145)= 11.88, p < .001. Just as in previous experiments, 
there was neither an effect of Priming on identification, F(1,142) = 0.43, p = .512, 
ηp2 = .003, nor of the judgmental Anchor in the Minimal Traits Paradigm, F(1,142) = 0.05, 
p = .943, ηp2 < .001, nor of their interaction, F(1,142) = 0.71, p = .400, ηp2 = .005. 
Conformity task. To assess the degree of conformity, which—according to my new 
hypotheses based on Optimal Distinctiveness Theory—was expected to vary in 
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correspondence to a manipulation of socio-cognitive mindsets, participants’ estimates of 
the letter “a” in the conformity task (van Cappellen et al., 2011, Castelli et al., 2001) were 
analyzed separately for screens with or without the alleged estimates by prior subjects. I 
expected that participants primed with an independent mindset—who had their focus 
shifted towards their own person, pronouncing their individuality—would react in this 
task by relying to these estimates to a higher degree than participants whose focus of 
attention was directed towards the group, hereby restoring the shifted balance on the 
continuum personal vs. group identity. Participants who received the interdependence 
priming were expected to restore said balance by relying on social estimates to a lower 
degree, hereby promoting their individuality. To this end, for each participant and for 
each of the eight screens with social estimates, average absolute values of proportional 
difference scores were calculated: 
                 
    
              
       
      
              
       
      
              




Estimx indicates the estimate a subject made on screen x; PersonA, PersonB, PersonC 
indicate the social estimates which were presented to subjects on top of eight of the 
screens. Next, these eight difference scores were averaged for each participant. Smaller 
scores indicating more conformity, the averaged scores served as the dependent 
variable in a one-way ANOVA for the factor Priming. Results indicated no significant 
effect, F(1,144) = 0.10, p = .749, ηp2 = .001.  
Furthermore, to examine if the accuracy of participants’ estimation was influenced 
by the type of screen (with or without social estimates) and the priming they received, 
an additional accuracy score was calculated separately for screens with or without social 
estimates. This accuracy score indicated each participant’s deviation from the actual 
count of letters on each type of screen. For this purpose, accuracy scores were calculated 
for each screen: 
                   
                  
           
   
Again, Estimx indicates each participant’s estimate for the number of the letter “a” on 
screen x, whereas ActualCount refers to the actual number of letters shown on each 
screen. These accuracy scores, too, were averaged for each participant and for the type 
of screen (with or without social estimates), resulting in two mean scores for each 
participant. These were entered in a 2 (type of screen) x 2 (Priming) mixed ANOVA with 
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the first factor varying within and the second factor varying between participants. If 
participants who have been primed with an interdependent mindset would refrain from 
using information given by social estimates (i.e., accuracy on slides with social estimates 
would be poorer than on slides without them), this would be evidence for the “ironic” 
effect proposed above. However, results just show a significant main effect of the within 
factor, F(1,144) = 30.37, p < .001, ηp2 = .174, indicating higher accuracy on slides with 
social estimates than on slides which showed only the letters “a”, see Figure 4-3. The 
effects of Priming and the interaction of Priming and type of slide were not significant, all 
Fs < 1. 
 
Figure 4-3.  Accuracy of participants’ estimation on slides including social estimates 
(“social” slides) and slides without this information (“non-social” slides), depending on 
the primed socio-cognitive mindset (independent vs. interdependent). 
Minimal Traits Paradigm. Since a modified version of the Minimal Traits Paradigm 
was employed, just as in Experiment 2, multiple regressions were calculated for each 
subject separately in a first step. Subjects’ target ratings served as the dependent 
variable, while the information from the anchor line (b1) and the information from the 
alternative line (b2) in the profile plot were entered as independent variables. In a 
2 (Priming) x 2 (Anchor) ANOVA, effects on b1 were examined, the parameter indicating 
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information given in the alternative line of the profile plot5. The ANOVA revealed neither 
main effects nor an effect of the Priming x Anchor 2-way interaction, all Fs < 1. In a next 
step, to check for an effect of Order—i.e., participants either were first asked to execute 
the reaction-time based measure, then the Minimal Traits Paradigm or vice versa—a 
2 (Priming) x 2 (Anchor) x 2 (Order) ANOVA was conducted which did not show any 
effects of the Order factor, all F’s < 1. 
Just as in Experiment 2, for regression coefficient b2 there was a significant main 
effect of Anchor in an ANOVA implementing Anchor and Priming as independent 
variables6, F(1,127) = 29.80, p < .001, η² = .190. b2 parameters were higher in the self-as-
anchor condition (M = 0.33, SD = 0.29) than in the group-as-anchor condition (M = 0.06, 
SD = 0.27). Also for the b2 parameter, there was not effect of Order on the interaction 
Anchor x Priming, F(1,123) = 2.01, p = .159, η² = .016. 
Accessibility of information about the self. A reaction-time based measure was 
employed as a means to assess the accessibility of information about the self. Reaction 
times were logarithmized and averaged across the 60 traits for which participants had 
been asked to assess if the trait applied to them. A one-way ANOVA with Priming as the 
independent variable was calculated, which revealed a marginal significant effect of the 
priming, F(1,144) = 2.79, p = .097, η² = .019. Response latencies were shorter if 
participants had been primed with an independent mindset, M = 1075 ms, than with an 
interdependent mindset, M = 1166 ms. Also for this measure, there was no effect of the 
order—participants executing either this reaction-time based measure first or the 
Minimal Traits Paradigm—as indicated by the nonsignificant Prime x Order interaction, 
F(1,142) = 1.52, p = .219, η² = .011.  
Furthermore, effects of trait valence and subjects’ responses were taken into 
account because “yes” responses are typically faster than “no” responses (e.g., Latrofa, 
2008; Otten & Epstude, 2006). Since responses varied across subjects and items, linear 
mixed-effects modeling was chosen for the analyses, like in Experiment 1. Again, the R 
                                                        
5 In an initial step, I had tested for effects of the version of the profile (mirror-imaged or not) which 
participants were shown as a source of information. A 2 (Priming) x 2 (Anchor) x 2 (Profile) ANOVA did 
not show an effect of profile for the target interaction Priming x Anchor, F(1,123) = 0.72, p = .399, 
η² = .006. Hence, data were collapsed across profile versions. 
6 Also for regression coefficient b2 the interaction Priming x Anchor x Profile was not significant, F(1,123) = 
0.677, p = .412, η² = .005, and data were analyzed collectively across both profile versions. 
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package “lme4” (Bates et al., 2013; R Core Team, 2013) was employed. The following 
model7 was implemented: 
                                        
                                                             
         
                                       
                                                  
                                        
with β0 as intercept, β1, β2, β3, β4, β5, β6, and β7 as regression weights, and e as 
residuals. Priming was coded -1 for the interdependence priming and +1 for the 
independence priming. Response was coded -1 for “no” responses and +1 for “yes” 
responses. Valence was coded -1 for negative trait valence and +1 for positive trait 
valence. For Response, random-slopes effects of Participant and Trait were defined since 
participants’ responses on traits were expected to vary both across subjects and items. 
Significant main effects resulted for Valence, b = -0.040, SE = 0.014, t = -2.93, p = .003, 
and Response, b = -0.050, SE = 0.013, t = -3.90, p < .001. Response latencies were shorter 
for positive than for negative items, Mpos = 1045 ms vs. Mneg = 1180 ms, and shorter for 
“yes” than for “no” responses, Myes = 1069 ms vs. Mno = 1215 ms. Furthermore, a 
significant Response x Valence interaction indicated that reaction times were fastest for 
positive items which applied to participants and negative items which did not apply to 
participants, b = -0.073, SE = 0.012, t = -6.28, p < .001. Additionally, an interaction of 
Priming and Valence was found, b = 0.022, SE = 0.011, t = 1.97, p = .049. Responses were 
especially fast if participants had been primed with an independent mindset and if trait 
valence was positive compared to if trait valence was negative. For the interdependence 
priming, response latencies did not differ depending on trait valence. Full results 
including random effects can be found in Tables A5 a-d in Appendix A. 
  
                                                        
7 In first step, also Order had been included as an additional factor. As in the prior ANOVA, Order had no 
effects on other relevant variables or interactions. 




In this fourth experiment, I attempted to explain the ironic effects found throughout 
Experiments 1 to 3 and tried to find evidence for my new hypotheses based on Optimal 
Distinctiveness Theory. Here, I assumed that primings of socio-cognitive mindsets cause 
an imbalance along the continuum of distinctiveness–inclusion and, this way, lead to an 
effect opposite to the one originally proposed: Subjects primed with an independent 
mindset are urged to focus on themselves and their individuality. This process, then, was 
expected to trigger a reactant reaction causing participants to attribute group 
characteristics to the self more pronouncedly as a means to reestablish the equilibrium. 
Similarly, if participants were primed with an interdependent mindset, this was also 
expected to shift optimal distinctiveness out of balance, overemphasizing participants’ 
social identity. As a result, participants were expected to put their individuality more 
into focus which would lead them to project their own characteristics to their ingroup to 
a larger extent: Participants might be motivated to see themselves as the center and 
tend to construe their surroundings from their own point of view. Accordingly, this 
priming condition was also expected to go along with a better accessibility of 
information about the self. 
However, in two of the measures’ results, there was no effect of priming. In the 
conformity measure, it was expected that participants primed with an independent 
mindset react with increased conformity to social estimates compared to participants 
primed with an interdependent mindset. Yet, the priming procedure had no significant 
effect on levels of conformity. Furthermore, I tested if the type of screen (with or 
without social estimates) and the priming participants’ received influenced accuracy of 
estimation. It would have been interesting to observe if participants primed with an 
interdependent mindset deliberately neglected the use of social estimates in the process 
of their own estimation, resulting in lower accuracy compared to the independence 
priming. But also here, there was no effect of priming, but merely an effect of the type of 
screen: Accuracy was higher on slides with social estimates than on slides lacking these 
estimates. Typically it is logical to follow a majority’s estimation, especially since—in 
this case—the alleged prior subjects’ estimates did not deviate noticeably from the 
actual number of letters on the screen. Hence, participants had no reason to doubt the 
estimates’ validity.  
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As in the conformity measure, also results in Minimal Traits Paradigm did not show 
the expected effects. Replicating results from earlier experiments, there was an effect of 
Anchor for the b2 parameter, indicating that participants in the self-as-anchor condition 
relied more pronouncedly on the alternative source of information in the profile plot 
than participants in the group-as-anchor condition. This, again, might indicate that this 
condition’s source (“randomly selected former participant”) was perceived to be a more 
adequate and more valid source of information than the labeling “another central-
European country” in the group-as-anchor condition. Yet, the absence of priming effects 
for the b1 parameter was rather unexpected, for both priming and paradigm were 
identical to those employed in Experiment 2 where the ironic effects had been found.  
Ultimately, in the measure assessing the accessibility of information about the self, 
response latencies were expected to be shorter for participants who had been primed 
with an interdependent mindset compared to those primed with an independent 
mindset: I hypothesized that the interdependence priming, which had been 
implemented to shift participants’ focus towards the group, might lead participants to 
emphasize their individuality. Hence, in this instance, information about the self should 
be more accessible as should have been indicated by shorter response latencies in an 
assessment of personal characteristics. Indeed, a marginal significant effect of priming 
was found. Response latencies, however, were shorter if an independent mindset had 
been induced beforehand. These results could be seen as first-time indication for my 
initial hypothesis, which did not consider possible ironic effects. Furthermore, responses 
were faster for positive than for negative items and faster for “yes” than for “no” 
responses. These two factors’ interaction indicated, in addition, that reaction times were 
fastest for positive items which applied to participants and negative items which did not 
apply to participants. These findings are not unknown in the domain of decision making 
(e.g., Latrofa, 2008; Otten & Epstude, 2006).  
To sum up, none of the measures I employed in this experiment showed the 
expected ironic effects which had been found in three prior experiments. In two of these 
measures, no effect of priming was found whatsoever while the task designed to assess 
accessibility of information about the self indicated a pattern which actually had been 
expected according to my initial hypothesis in the first three experiments. All in all, one 
possibility is that the new hypothesis is not correct. Still, it remains unclear why the 
priming did not show any effects at all in the conformity task as well as in the Minimal 
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Traits Paradigm, but, in the task assessing accessibility of information about the self, 
caused response latencies to be shorter for participants primed with an independent 
mindset compared to those primed with an interdependent mindset. This is remarkable 
given that this experiment, for the most part, was a replication of Experiment 2, 
employing the same priming and its research paradigm being the alternative version of 
the Minimal Traits Paradigm.  
Two explanations for these results come to mind: On the one hand, priming effects 
might have been weakened or undone by the conformity task itself, which was placed in 
order prior to the other measures. This possibility is suggested by the fact that the 
research design in Experiment 4 was the same as in Experiment 2, with the exception 
that the measurement of the Minimal Traits Paradigm was preceded by the conformity 
task. While the priming was intended to alter participants’ currently active socio-
cognitive mindsets, the conformity task’s employment of multiple social estimates might 
have influenced the active socio-cognitive mindset as well. In retrospect, a re-priming of 
socio-cognitive mindsets after the conformity task appears to be sensible, similar to the 
re-priming already introduced in Experiment 1.  
On the other hand, in this experiment, the priming for some reason might simply not 
have worked at all. Bearing in mind that already in the conformity task no effect of the 
priming had been detected, this explanation seems plausible as well. Considering that 
also in the Minimal Traits Paradigm no effect of the priming was detected and that the 
effect detected in the reaction-time based measure was only marginal significant, the 
latter finding might also have been a chance finding. Multiple analyses of the priming’s 
effects on multiple dependent variables have been conducted in this experiment, 
increasing the probability of erroneously rejecting the null hypothesis. This explanation 
is strengthened by the fact that no effect of Order (Minimal Traits Paradigm or reaction-
time based measure first) has been found in this experiment, leaving it unclear why the 
priming should have had an effect in the reaction-time task, but in none of the other 
measures. 
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5 General Discussion 
5.1 Overview 
The purpose of this dissertation was to investigate the role of socio-cognitive 
mindsets in the activation of cognitive inferential processes. My hypotheses were 
inspired by research on social class which stated this construct to be an important 
influential factor in shaping basic psychological principles (see section 1.2.1.1). It has 
been reasoned that an individual’s social class is a context which is anchored in the 
material foundation of social life as well as in a person’s distinct construal of his or her 
class rank (Kraus et al., 2012). Hence, social class can be seen a core aspect of how 
someone thinks of the self and also how someone relates to the social world (see also 
Piff et al., 2010; Stellar et al., 2012). In a literature review, Kraus and colleagues (2012) 
stated that an individualistic mindset led to an orientation towards the environment 
causing a person to focus more strongly on his or her own goals, emotions, and 
motivations. In contrast, contextualist tendencies are characterized by a focus on 
external social forces and other persons who influence the individual’s life. These 
propositions first led me to investigate a relation of socio-cognitive mindsets and 
cognitive inferential processes.  
Similar observations have been made in connection with the minority or majority 
status of groups (see section 1.2.1.2). In the respective literature, high-status group 
members, on several occasions, reacted with an increase in social projection. For 
example, Latrofa and colleagues considered this observation to be the result of an 
“egocentric cognitive strategy” (Latrofa et al., 2010, p. 919). For low-status group 
members, instead, the overlap between the self and the ingroup is explained to derive 
from a group-based cognitive strategy that deduces ingroup characteristics to construe 
one’s self-image. This way, the consideration of gender differences in terms of status 
differences implicates the prediction that men will be motivated to augment their 
personal identity to emphasize their personal tribute to the high status of their group, 
while women might enhance their social identity to defend themselves from the 
perceived threat against their low-status group or their individual selves (Lorenzi-
Cioldi, 1991, 2006). 
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Aside from research on social status, also cross-cultural psychological research 
revealed similar observations concerning socio-cognitive mindsets’ influence on 
cognitive inferential processes. Some cultures have been found to place a more 
pronounced emphasis on the importance of the individual self and others to stress the 
significance of society over the individual (e.g., Choi et al., 1999; Cross et al., 2011; see 
section 1.2.2). Within mainly collectivistic cultures, individuals are expected to fit into 
society, to serve the common good and are seen as fundamentally connected through 
relationships; the individualistic view, on the other hand, puts the focus on the 
individual and states that societies exist to promote the well-being of individuals. 
However, some researchers do not consider culture to produce fixed and unchangeable 
ways of thinking and of arranging one’s social world (e.g., Oyserman et al., 2009). 
Instead, they proposed that cultures differ with respect to the chronically accessible 
mindset which in turn largely influences whether an individualistic or collectivistic 
mindset will be cued at a particular moment. Oyserman and colleagues (2009) used a 
priming method to induce an individualistic or a collectivistic mindset. They observed 
that the priming of the latter caused context-bound processing to improve, presumably 
because it focused attention on the connection among the tasks’ items and the 
relationship between objects and their surroundings. Conversely, after the priming with 
an individualistic mindset, a disjoined processing was facilitated. 
Based on these propositions, I assumed that the currently active mode of self-
construal constitutes a fundamental factor which influences the construction of personal 
experience and behavior and which determines the direction of inferential socio-
cognitive processes: Socio-cognitive mindsets were proposed to account for a basic 
factor which influences the individual’s way of construing his or her world. Based on this 
central assumption, I hypothesized that an independent mindset with its distinctive 
focus on the individual causes a person to interpret its world from the individual’s point 
of view, and I expected social projection to be more dominant than self-stereotyping 
when a person is asked to characterize the self or his or her ingroup. On the contrary, I 
assumed that an interdependent mindset with its more pronounced focus on the social 
context and other persons will trigger the reversed process. A person primed with an 
interdependent mindset was expected to interpret the world (and hence see the self) 
from a contextualist point of view. This way, self-stereotyping should have been the 
predominant process over social projection. 
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The proposed effects of the two modes of self-construal on social projection and self-
stereotyping had to be established in the first part of this dissertation’s empirical 
section. To this end, for the first experimental procedure, a reaction-time paradigm was 
adopted from Otten and Epstude (2006) to allow for the two processes to be separated, 
which is based on a connectionist network model of memory (see Aron et al., 1991; 
Smith & Henry, 1996). Accordingly, overlapping mental representations of social and 
personal information are indicated by faster response latencies on those dimensions on 
which self- and ingroup evaluations match compared to those dimensions on which they 
do not match (see section 3.1.2 for a detailed description). An independent versus an 
interdependent mode of self-construal was expected to be achieved by means of the 
Pronoun Circling Task (Gardner et al., 1999). Target group in the reaction-time paradigm 
was the group of Germans in general whose characteristics were shown to be well-
suited in matters of stereotypicality in a pretest. In this first experiment, my hypotheses 
could not be confirmed. Results showed that, for a primed independent mindset, instead 
of social projection being the predominant process, social projection and self 
stereotyping occurred to the same extent. In contrast, for a primed interdependent 
mindset, social projection was found to be stronger than self-stereotyping. After the 
analysis of this first experiment, it was unclear how its results could be interpreted. For 
reasons of concerns for methodological shortcomings, a different paradigm was 
employed in the second experiment. 
In Experiment 2, I tried once more to demonstrate that the hypothesized effects of 
different socio-cognitive mindsets on the directionality of inferential processes can be 
produced. Once more employing the Pronoun Circling Task, a different experimental 
paradigm was applied in the efforts of disentangling social projection and self-
stereotyping: a modification of a paradigm employed by Cadinu and Rothbart (1996) 
which I referred to as a Minimal Traits Paradigm, since, to participants, only those 
information about fictitious trait dimensions was available which they received during 
the experiment. Here, participants first took part in six fictitious cognitive and 
perceptual tests to allegedly determine their score on these dimensions. They were 
subsequently given false feedback on their results in the alleged tests, as a means to 
control the content and source of information available to them: in the self-as-anchor 
condition, participants were given feedback in the form of a profile diagram and were 
asked to assess the group of Germans on the same dimensions. In the group-as-anchor 
76 General Discussion 
 
 
condition, participants were given bogus information which, they were told, indicated 
how the group of Germans had scored and were then asked to guess how they thought 
they themselves had scored in the tests. However, also in this second experiment, results 
were contrary to my hypotheses, indicating that social projection and self-stereotyping 
occurred to the same extent after an independent mindset had been primed. For a 
primed interdependent mindset, a pattern emerged which suggested that social 
projection was the predominant process. This now repeatedly found effect led me to 
question the validity of the priming procedure employed in both Experiment 1 and 2. 
The Pronoun Circling Task might not have caused the hypothesized shift in focus, that is, 
it may not have induced socio-cognitive mindsets as expected. To rule out the possibility 
of an ineffective priming procedure being the cause of the observed effects, a different 
priming procedure was employed in the next experiment. 
In Experiment 3, I tried to achieve a change of the active socio-cognitive mindset 
indirectly by manipulating participant’s perceived social status against the background 
of Kraus and colleagues’ literature review (Kraus et al., 2012). According to these 
researchers, diminished resources and a lower societal rank enhance lower-class 
individuals’ contextualist tendencies and induce a focus on external social forces and 
other persons who influence the individual’s life, respectively (i.e., an interdependent 
mindset). Oppositely, for upper-class individuals, the availability of resources and an 
elevated rank was described to create a context which emphasizes personal freedom 
and to give rise to an individualistic (i.e., an independent) mindset. To achieve a 
variation in participants’ perceived social status, the Social Ladder Task (Kraus et al., 
2011; Piff et al., 2010) was employed in my third experiment. In addition, to rule out the 
possibility that the repeated failure to produce the expected effects was due to the 
variation of the Minimal Traits Paradigm which had been used, here, I employed the 
original version of the paradigm as introduced by Cadinu and Rothbart (1996). Yet, also 
in this third experiment, results diverged from expectations: After a low social status 
had been primed, both social projection and self-stereotyping occurred to the same 
extent. In the high-status condition, participants attributed group characteristics more 
readily to the self than vice versa: self-stereotyping was the predominant process. 
To broadly summarize the first part of this thesis, results could not be obtained as 
predicted after three experiments. Although not in the expected way, both priming 
procedures did effectively influence the occurrence of social projection and self-
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stereotyping. Remarkably, while results in all three experiments were contrary to initial 
hypotheses, these contradictions emerged in different ways. In Experiments 1 and 2 an 
increased degree of social projection after the interdependence priming especially stood 
out in the results. In Experiment 3, however, the occurrence of self-stereotyping after 
the independence priming was most noteworthy. Concerning research paradigms, 
results from the reaction-time based paradigm implemented in Experiment 1 as well as 
results from the two versions of the Minimal Traits Paradigm implemented in 
Experiments 2 and 3 showed effects contrary to my hypotheses, in one way or the other. 
This may be interpreted as countering concerns of a fundamental invalidity in 
measurement. 
An alternative explanation was proposed in the second section of this thesis which 
took implications of Optimal Distinctiveness Theory (ODT; Brewer, 1991) into 
consideration. Hereby I tried to explain the results from the first section and made 
allowance for the ironic effects which were observed. ODT posits that human beings can 
be characterized by two divergent needs which influence the relationship between their 
self-concept and their membership in a social group: a need for inclusion or assimilation, 
and a need for differentiation or individuality. ODT strongly emphasizes group 
processes, stating that an individual seeks an optimal level of distinctiveness by serving 
the need for inclusion within a certain group as well as the need for differentiation from 
other groups. However, the need for differentiation may also be seen as a striving for 
individuality in general (Brewer & Roccas, 2001). Just as any other need, inclusion and 
differentiation motives vary depending on the current level of satiation or deprivation, 
and they counterbalance each other. The more an individual feels part of a social group, 
the more the need for inclusion is satisfied, but also the more the level of activation of 
the differentiation motive increases. Vice versa, as a person moves towards a separation 
from a social group, the need for differentiation is diminished, but the level of activation 
of the need for inclusion rises. Accordingly, optimal distinctiveness can be understood as 
a dynamic equilibrium, which is not necessarily fixed due to variations and changes in 
contextual properties which interact with the activation of inclusion and differentiation 
motives: an individual seeks to achieve an optimal level of distinctiveness between a 
personal identity and an identity as a group member (for a more detailed account of 
ODT see section 4.1). 
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I suggested that the socio-cognitive mindsets directly connect to this level of 
distinctiveness, that is, I proposed that a person’s individually preferred level of 
distinctiveness may depend on the currently active socio-cognitive mindset. As 
described above, in all experiments in part one, effects opposite to my hypothesis were 
observed. As a possible post-hoc explanation in part two of this thesis, I proposed that 
by priming participants by means of the Pronoun Circling Task or the Social Ladder Task 
reactant responses may inadvertently have been triggered. The shift in participants’ 
momentarily active socio-cognitive mindsets towards a more independent or a more 
interdependent processing mode, which was intended by both priming methods, was 
suggested to have shifted participants’ equilibrium along the dimension personal vs. 
social identity towards an undesirable position. In an attempt to restore subjects’ 
preferred balance, hence, they might have engaged in corresponding counter-reactions. 
In a final experiment, the Minimal Traits Paradigm was employed once more two 
replicate the paradoxical results detected in prior experiments. After the independence 
priming and the subsequent shift towards individuality, participants were expected to 
engage in self-stereotyping and describe themselves in terms of their ingroup as a 
means to satisfy their need for belonging. Vice versa, the interdependence priming was 
expected to cause participants to counter the emphasis on a group identity by giving 
priority to their individuality. In addition, to make the paradoxical effects directly 
visible, two new measures were employed. The first one was designed to assess the 
degree of participants’ conformity concerning social influences (an adaptation from van 
Cappellen et al., 2011). I expected participants being less susceptible to alleged 
estimations of prior subjects in an estimation task if they had been primed beforehand 
with an interdependent mindset compared to an independent mindset, accentuating 
their personal identity, characteristics, and estimations. With a second measure, I 
attempted to compare the accessibility of self-related knowledge across the two priming 
conditions via a reaction-time based measure (see section 4.3.2). Because participants’ 
focus was hypothesized to have been reactantly shifted towards the self after the 
priming of an interdependent mindset, here, information about the self was expected to 
be more easily accessible compared to the independence condition, resulting in shorter 
response latencies when participants were asked to make dichotomous assessments on 
characteristics for the self. As a priming method, the Pronoun Circling Task was 
employed once again.  
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Unfortunately, the priming did not yield the expected effects. In the conformity 
measure, the priming procedure had no significant effect on levels of conformity. Also 
results in Minimal Traits Paradigm did not show an effect of the priming. This was 
rather unexpected, for both priming and paradigm were the same as those employed in 
Experiment 2 where the ironic effects had been found. Ultimately, in the measure 
assessing the accessibility of information about the self, a marginal significant effect of 
priming was found—however, response latencies were shorter if an independent 
mindset had been induced beforehand. This could be seen as first-time evidence for the 
initial hypothesis, which did not consider ironic effects. One explanation for this 
combination of results may be that priming effects might have been weakened or 
undone by the conformity task itself, which was placed prior to the other measures. This 
possibility was suggested by the fact that the research design employed in Experiment 4 
was the same as in Experiment 2, with the exception that the measurement of the 
Minimal Traits Paradigm was preceded by the conformity task. It might be the case that 
the conformity task’s employment of multiple social estimates might have influenced the 
active socio-cognitive mindset in a way similar to the Pronoun Circling Task. Another 
explanation might be that this priming for some reason might not have worked at all. 
Bearing in mind that already in the conformity task no effect of the priming had been 
detected, also this explanation seems plausible. Considering that also in the Minimal 
Traits Paradigm no effect of the priming could be detected and that the effect detected in 
the reaction-time based measure was only marginal significant, the latter finding might 
also have been a chance finding, an artifact produced by the analyses of the priming’s 
effects on multiple dependent variables. 
To broadly summarize the empirical parts of this thesis, while my initial hypotheses 
could not be confirmed in the course of three experiments, several indications for an 
ironic effect of the priming of socio-cognitive mindsets (e.g., via the Pronoun Circling 
Task or the Social Ladder Task) were found. In dependence on Optimal Distinctiveness 
Theory (Brewer, 1991; Brewer & Roccas, 2001), I hence assumed that by priming 
participants employing either of both priming methods, I may have inadvertently 
triggered a kind of reactant response after the balance of a personal optimal equilibrium 
on the continuum of a personal vs. an identity as a group member had been disturbed. 
As a means to restore this equilibrium, participants might have engaged in reactions 
contrary to those first hypothesized, accentuating their individual or group identity. 
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Considerations on this new hypothesis, unfortunately, could not be resolved satisfyingly 
in a final fourth experiment of this thesis, and possible causes remain unclear. 
5.2 Limitations of the Presented Experiments  
In this line of research, it was assumed that the activation of different socio-cognitive 
mindsets is directly related to the predominance of different inferential processes. 
During the course of my first three experiments, I originally expected that the priming of 
an independent mindset would elicit social projection while the priming of an 
interdependent mindset would cause self-stereotyping to be the stronger process. 
However, results in these first experiments could not confirm my initial hypotheses as 
patterns were paradox in a way that they, in part, were contrary to my expectations. 
These findings I explained by means of research on Optimal Distinctiveness Theory and 
its implications that the priming could have unbalanced an individually favorable 
equilibrium on the dimension personal vs. social identity. In a final experiment, I tried to 
replicate the findings of the first experiments and to make the paradox effects directly 
visible. However, this experiment failed to yield the proposed effects which appear to be 
unstable. As described before, it remains unclear why the effects of prior experiments 
could not be replicated although both the same priming and the same experimental 
paradigm were employed as in Experiment 2. 
The present thesis relies on prior research on social projection and self-stereotyping 
which takes implications of Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and Self 
Categorization Theory (Turner et al., 1987) into account. These emphasize the 
importance of a person’s social identity for their self-concept. Accordingly, identification 
with the ingroup constitutes Latrofa and colleagues’ (2010) central mediating construct 
and is also listed as one of Krueger’s (1997) conditions for the occurrence of self-
stereotyping. In all my experiments in which the degree of identification with the 
ingroup was measured, identification levels were high, that is, significantly different 
from the scale midpoint. In each case, the degree of identification did not vary across 
experimental conditions. Continuing Krueger’s list of conditions for the occurrence of 
self-stereotyping, salience of social categories was ensured in three of four experiments 
by explicating the comparative categories of both ingroup and outgroup. In Experiments 
2 to 4, these categories were made salient by introducing a profile plot with values of the 
group of Germans vs. those of another central European country. Additionally, in 
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Experiment 3, participants were shown a ladder representing social differences in 
Germany and were asked to compare themselves with either people at the very bottom 
or the top of the ladder. Accordingly, both the Minimal Traits Paradigm and the Social 
Ladder Task fulfilled the requirement of making the relevant social categories salient.  
Another requirement proposed by Krueger (2007) is that attributes, for which self-
stereotyping is to be observed, should be of relevance, meaning, and should be 
evaluatively charged. This was the case for the reaction time paradigm employed in 
Experiment 1. Here, participants were asked for a rating of the group of Germans and 
themselves on a list of 90 adjectives (Otten & Epstude, 2006), which can be used to 
describe a person or a group. As these adjectives are in everyday use, Krueger’s 
requirement can be regarded as being met. However, in Experiments 2 to 4, in order to 
make use of the Minimal Traits Paradigm’s features, traits employed here, had to be 
fictitious. This way, it was ensured that participants could not use pre-existing 
knowledge for the assessment of either the self or the ingroup. Accordingly, items lacked 
meaning and evaluative charge. Yet, items should still have been considered by 
participants as being of relevance as the fictitious dimensions were introduced as being 
important for information processing. 
A shortcoming can be seen in the omission to assess subjects’ socio-economic status 
or their perceived societal standing in all experiments. In Experiment 3, I tried to 
actively manipulate the latter as a means to induce an independent or an 
interdependent and expected to observe social projection after the priming of a high 
social status, while self-stereotyping should have arisen after a low social status had 
been primed. Accordingly, the construct of social status is seen to be of considerable 
influence. Yet, only in Experiment 3, this variable was assessed, although only as a 
manipulation check. It may have been useful in the other experiments as well to 
determine if participants’ social status interfered with the priming, which may have 
been the case if randomization was unsuccessful and there was an imbalance in priming 
conditions.  
It may have been the case that the direct priming of socio-cognitive mindsets (here 
via the Pronoun Circling Task or the Social Ladder Task) was “too strong” in a sense that 
it was incompatible with participants’ chronically primed standard. This way, both 
primings may retrospectively have caused participants to engage in a reactant counter-
reaction as described in detail in the second part of this thesis. In everyday life, 
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participants may have grown accustomed to the socio-cognitive mindset which is 
predominant in their respective culture (above, I defined the term “culture” as extending 
beyond cultural contexts across countries or hemispheres to intra-societal systems as 
well: social strata, or minority-majority group contexts). Instead, if one were to succeed 
in avoiding a reactant reaction, I would expect my original hypotheses to apply: an 
independent socio-cognitive mindset being prone to elicit social projection and an 
interdependent mindset to favor self-stereotyping. Aside of experimental research, 
support for these hypotheses may be found in quasi-experimental research (see below). 
Despite the limitations discussed, the present line of research provides first evidence 
that the activation of different socio-cognitive mindsets is indeed directly related to the 
predominance of different inferential processes. Although my initial hypotheses could 
not be confirmed, results to this point successfully indicate that the manipulation of 
socio-cognitive mindsets in general influences the predominance of social projection or 
self-stereotyping.  
5.3 Future Research 
In this dissertation, socio-cognitive mindsets were proposed to account for a basic 
factor which influences the individual’s way of construing his or her world. As described 
and discussed before, in the first part of this thesis resulting patterns were paradox in a 
way that they, partially, were contrary to my expectations. While I examined in Part II 
whether these proposed reactant results can be provoked directly, future research 
should further investigate if the originally proposed effect can be found. If it should not 
be possible to induce socio-cognitive mindsets directly without causing a reactant 
response, research could focus on quasi-experimental studies investigating the 
proposed effects in a “natural” environment where the situational priming is expected to 
be omnipresent. For example, research could further consider the effects of the 
membership in a high vs. a low social class for social projection and self-stereotyping. 
While Kraus and colleagues’ (Kraus et al., 2012) research offers a theoretical view of 
how social class may shape basic psychological processes and describes social class as a 
core aspect of how someone thinks of the self and how someone relates to the social 
world, the effect of social class on socio-cognitive inferential processes is yet to be 
determined (see section 1.2.1.1). Similar research ought to be conducted in the area of 
cross-cultural psychology. I expect that for people who are raised in an individualistic 
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culture (e.g. the USA, see Oyserman & Lee, 2008) and who are confronted with 
respective stimuli in everyday life, social projection is the predominant process. In the 
same way, I predict that for people from collectivistic cultures (e.g., Hong Kong or Korea) 
self-stereotyping is the more natural process and predominant over social projection.  
In the field of research on minority-majority contexts, Latrofa and colleagues 
(Latrofa et al., 2009, 2010) examined the process of self-stereotyping focusing on 
relative ingroup status, using gender groups. They found that low-status group members 
(women) more easily engage in a process of self-stereotyping than high-status group 
members (men). For high-status group members, results showed that the observed self-
ingroup overlap was due to social projection (see section 1.2.1.2). Additionally, other 
socially disadvantaged groups should continue to be included and focused on in the 
future. In spite of large advances in recent decades, there still is a lot of discrimination 
present in Western societies against homosexuals, not to speak of a lot of other 
countries where discrimination extends to severe punishments for homosexuality, to the 
point of prison or even death sentence. Accordingly, in respective research on minority-
majority context, homosexuals could be included as a minority or low-status group, and 
heterosexuals as a majority or high-status group. While it has been demonstrated that 
homosexuals tend to self-stereotype in similar ways compared to other low-status group 
members (e.g., Fasoli et al., 2018), research focusing on this minority group with respect 
to socio-cognitive inferential processes is still scarce. 
In addition to an effort to produce the originally proposed effect in a natural 
environment, it should be further investigated whether the primings used in this thesis 
are able to trigger a reactant reaction in the manner described in Part 2. In a first step, 
an experiment similar to Experiment 4 should be conducted in order to detect the effects 
found repeatedly in Part 1 and to make this reactant reaction directly visible. Careful 
consideration should be put to the possibility that priming effects might have been 
weakened or undone by the conformity task itself which, in Experiment 4, was placed in 
order prior to the other measures. This was the only difference in research design 
between Experiments 4 and 2, where paradox effects had been produced. Accordingly, 
for example, a re-priming of socio-cognitive mindsets after the conformity task could be 
introduced. Furthermore, results might have been due to unknown external factors 
which could not be accounted for in this last experiment via, for example, the 
assessment of demographics (see section 4.3.4). 
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The topic of priming methods should be another subject of investigation. Special 
effort should be put on the question if priming via the Social Ladder Task and priming 
via the Pronoun Circling Task do indeed influence the same construct. Basically, this 
recommendation for further research takes into consideration the very foundation of 
this thesis and its hypotheses: Is there really a common construct of socio-cognitive 
mindsets underlying research focusing on cultural mindsets and those focusing on social 
status and social class? As my deduction in the theoretical part of this dissertation states, 
I expect this to be the case. On the one hand social class has been found to shape basic 
psychological processes, with lower-class members focusing more pronouncedly on 
external social forces and higher-class members focusing on their respective goals, 
emotions, and motivations (e.g., Kraus et al., 2012). On the other hand, similar 
observations have been made with respect toward minority-majority group contexts: for 
example, low-status group members have been found to identify more strongly with 
their own group than high-status group members do (Latrofa et al., 2010; Latrofa et al., 
2012). For high-status group members, a more pronounced tendency for social 
projection was found than for low-status group members, which was considered to be 
the result of an egocentric cognitive strategy for high-status group members (see also 
Cadinu & Rothbart, 1996; Krueger, 2003). Finally, in cultural psychology, it has been 
shown that in some cultures an individualistic focus tends to be predominant, while in 
other cultures the focus lies on a more collectivistic processing (e.g., Kitayama et al., 
1990; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Oyserman & Lee, 2008). Bearing these commonalities 
in mind, the existence of a common global construct of socio-cognitive mindsets appears 
plausible, despite of my last experiment’s results. 
Finally, it remains to be hoped that in future research new valid and reliable 
measures for the disentanglement of social projection and self-stereotyping will be 
available. While research paradigms currently in use appear promising, there still are 
methodological issues to settle. There have been several approaches to achieve the 
disentanglement of social projection and self-stereotyping in past research. As discussed 
in section 3.1.4, the reaction-time based paradigm in Experiment 1 has methodological 
shortcomings. When employing the Social Ladder Task, experiences from Experiment 3 
suggest that it is imperative to carefully consider participants’ social status in order to 
induce an assimilation effect: asking participants to compare themselves to a person of 
high status, they should have adapted to high-status individuals’ solipsistic tendencies. 
General Discussion 85 
 
 
Vice versa, the comparison with a person of low status should have led participants to 
relate to low-status individuals’ contextualist social cognitive tendencies (see also Piff et 
al., 2010). However, given the assumption that—subjects in this case all being university 
students—they will probably have tended to perceive their own social status as being 
relatively high by default. As a result, if such subjects are primed with a high social 
status, they might have assimilated to a high social status while subjects in the low-
status condition might have contrasted away from the low-status position and towards a 
high social status as well (see section 3.3.4). The Minimal Traits Paradigm which was 
employed in two of this thesis’ experiments, to this author, still appears most promising, 
as here fictitious trait dimensions are used to ensure that participants cannot use pre-
existing knowledge for the assessment of either the self or the ingroup and, this way, the 
source of information available to participants can be controlled. 
5.4 Conclusion 
The current research addressed the question how the priming of socio-cognitive 
mindsets influences the predominance of cognitive inferential processes. In the progress 
of this research, my initial hypotheses could not be confirmed, but the effects found in 
the first part of this thesis gave rise to a possible and promising alternative hypothesis. 
Although a final experiment was not able to demonstrate the effects found in the 
previous three experiments, these three experiments provided first evidence of a 
possible reactant effect taking place after the use of different priming methods of socio-
cognitive mindsets. 
Although partially different in reasoning, the presented research is in line with prior 
research on cultural mindsets in a broader sense—on differences in social status on the 
one hand, as influenced by majority-minority status relations, social class, or 
socioeconomic status, and on cross-cultural differences on the other hand—and 
research on the directionality issue of cognitive inferential processes. It is a first step in 
demonstrating that socio-cognitive mindsets effectively influence the predominance of 
social projection and self-stereotyping. Although future research still needs to examine 
the effects produced by respective priming procedures more closely, the alternative 
hypothesis offered in the second part of my dissertation may provide a promising 
solution. In this regard, the search for priming procedures which clearly produce or 
clearly do not produce a reactant effect appears to be of importance.  
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Research on the effects of socio-cognitive mindsets on the direction of cognitive 
inferential processes (social projection or self-stereotyping), as conducted in this thesis, 
is far from being concluded and needs to be continued. Along with the introduction of 
Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) and especially Self-Categorization Theory 
(Turner et al., 1987) the notion of an intrinsic connection of group and self has become 
topic of innumerable research programs. One cannot neglect the importance of the 
interplay of group membership and individual functioning. Appropriately, the two 
cognitive inferential processes examined in this dissertation, which let the individual 
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This doctoral thesis is concerned with the question how the priming of socio-
cognitive mindsets influences the predominance of cognitive inferential processes. 
Incorporating research on social-status differences on the one hand and on cross-
cultural differences on the other hand, it takes a new perspective on the directionality 
issue of cognitive inferential processes. Based on previous research in these areas, it is 
assumed that the currently active mode of self-construal constitutes a fundamental 
factor which influences the construction of personal experience and behavior and which 
determines the direction of inferential socio-cognitive processes: Socio-cognitive 
mindsets are proposed to account for a basic factor which influences the individual’s 
way of construing his or her world. It was hypothesized that an experimentally induced 
independent mindset with its distinctive focus on the individual would cause a person to 
interpret his or her world from the individual’s point of view. Accordingly, in this 
instance, social projection was expected to be more dominant than self-stereotyping. On 
the other hand, it was suggested that the priming of an interdependent mindset with its 
more pronounced focus on social context and on other persons would trigger the 
reversed process. Here, self-stereotyping was expected to be the predominant process 
over social projection. 
After these initial hypotheses could not be confirmed in the course of three 
experiments, an alternative hypothesis was suggested in an attempt to explain the 
contrary but largely consistent results. In the second part of this thesis, implications of 
Optimal Distinctiveness Theory (Brewer, 1991) were taken into account. A person’s 
individually preferred level of distinctiveness was suggested to depend on the currently 
active socio-cognitive mindset. As a post-hoc explanation, it was proposed that, via the 
employed priming methods, reactant responses may inadvertently have been triggered: 
participants’ preferred equilibrium may have been shifted undesirably along the 
dimension personal vs. social identity. As a result, participants may have engaged in 
corresponding compensating counter-reactions. The final experiment was an attempt to 
replicate previously obtained paradox effects and to make them directly visible. 
Although this last experiment did not yield the expected results, the line of research 
presented in this doctoral thesis is a first but nonetheless promising step in 
demonstrating that socio-cognitive mindsets effectively influence the predominance of 
social projection and self-stereotyping.  
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Table A1 
Traits used in the stereotypicality measure in Experiment 1 
 positive traits negative traits 
stereotypical 
pflichtbewusst [dutiful] statusorientiert [status oriented] 
fleißig [diligent] unzufrieden [discontented] 
counter-stereotypical 
temperamentvoll [vivacious] langsam [slow] 
rebellisch [rebellious] unbedacht [imprudent] 
Traits neutral concerning 
stereotypicality 
umgänglich [agreeable] fröhlich [cheerful] 
groß [large] dankbar [grateful] 




List of 90 traits used in the reaction time measure in Experiment 1, derived from  
Otten & Epstude (2006) 
abhängig [dependent] gierig [greedy] primitiv [primitive] 
aggressiv [aggressive] glücklich [happy] rational [rational] 
aktiv [active] grob [rough] reizbar [irritable] 
albern [silly] groß [great] roh [raw] 
ängstlich [anxious] gründlich [thorough] romantisch [romantic] 
arrogant [arrogant] hektisch [hectic] sachlich [objective] 
attraktiv [attractive] herzlich [cordially] schwach [weak] 
belastbar [resilient] hilflos [helpless] selbstbewusst [self-conscious] 
besorgt [worried] hilfsbereit [helpful] selbstlos [selfless] 
clever [clever] intelligent [intelligent] sensibel [sensitive] 
dankbar [grateful] kalt [cold] sentimental [sentimental] 
dick [thick] klein [small] sicher [sure] 
direkt [direct] kleinlich [petty] sinnlich [sensual] 
dominant [dominant] konsequent [consistent] sozial [social] 
dünn [thin] kreativ [creative] sparsam [thrifty] 
egoistisch [selfish] kritisch [critical] sportlich [athletic] 
ehrgeizig [ambitious] langweilig [boring] stark [strong] 
ehrlich [honest] laut [loud] stur [stubborn] 
eigensinnig [headstrong] lieb [kind] tolerant [tolerant] 
eitel [vain] loyal [loyal] träge [lazy] 
emotional [emotional] lustig [funny] treu [faithful] 
empfindlich [sensitive] modern [modern] umsichtig [prudent] 
faul [lazy] nachlässig [careless] undiszipliniert [undisciplined] 
flexibel [flexible] nervös [nervous] unhöflich [rude] 
freundlich [friendly] nett [nice] verletzlich [vulnerable] 
furchtlos [fearless] neugierig [curious] vielseitig [versatile] 
geduldig [patient] objektiv [objective] vorsichtig [cautious] 
genau [exact] offen [open] warm [warm] 
gerecht [fair] ordentlich [tidy] weinerlich [whiny] 
gesellig [sociable] passiv [passive] zielstrebig [determined] 
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Tables A3 a-d 
Results of linear mixed-effects modeling in Experiment 1 
 
Table A3 a: Model fit 
AIC BIC logLik deviance df.resid 
1289.0 1414.2 -621.5 1243.0 1686 
 
 
Table A3 b: Scaled residuals 
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max 
-2.4419 -0.6986 -0.1283 0.6288 3.7031 
 
 
Table A3 c: Random effects 
Groups Name Variance Std.Dev. Corr 
Participant (Intercept) 3.818e-02 0.195399  
 Match 1.889e-04 0.013745 -0.19 
Trait (Intercept) 6.428e-05 0.008018  
 Match 1.971e-03 0.044399 -1.00 
Residual  1.067e-01 0.326722  
Note. Number of observations: 1709, groups: Participant, 100; Trait, 90 
 
Table A3 d: Fixed effects 
 b SE t χ² df p (χ²) 
(Intercept) 6.985 0.056 116.44 13558.72 1 < .001 
Match -0.070 0.022 -3.15 9.90 1 .002 
Target -0.018 0.089 -0.20 0.04 1 .842 
Prime 0.037 0.085 0.44 0.19 1 .661 
Order 0.083 0.087 0.95 0.90 1 .344 
Match x Target 0.074 0.037 2.04 4.14 1 .042 
Match x Prime 0.021 0.031 0.66 0.44 1 .506 
Target x Prime -0.096 0.126 -0.76 0.58 1 .445 
Match x Order -0.017 0.033 -0.50 0.25 1 .618 
Target x Order -0.095 0.124 -0.76 0.58 1 .446 
Prime x Order -0.037 0.120 -0.30 0.09 1 .761 
Match x Target x Prime -0.111 0.052 -2.13 4.56 1 .033 
Match x Target x Order -0.049 0.051 -0.97 0.94 1 .333 
Match x Prime x Order 0.028 0.046 0.62 0.38 1 .536 
Target x Prime x Order 0.191 0.173 1.10 1.22 1 .270 
Match x Target x Prime x Order 0.075 0.072 1.04 1.09 1 .297 
Note. The relevant 3-way interaction is printed in bold font.  
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Tables A4 a + b 
Table A4 a 
Descriptive statistics for the number of matches divided by the total number of matches 
and mismatches, as a means to set matches into proportion for each participant 
(Experiment 1 ) 
Priming Target M SD n 
Independence 
priming 
Self 0.5726 0.15248 26 
 Ingroup 0.6278 0.18560 26 
Interdependence 
priming 
Self 0.5857 0.17763 25 
 Inroup 0.5988 0.16521 23 
 
 
Table A4 b 
Results of the 2 (Priming) x 2 (Target) ANOVA for the number of matches divided by the 







F p Partial ηp2 
Corrected Model 0.043 a 3 0.014 0.495 .687 .015 
Constant 35.457 1 35.457 1215.544 .000 .927 
Prime 0.002 1 0.002 0.054 .816 .001 
Target 0.029 1 0.029 0.996 .321 .010 
Prime x Target 0.011 1 0.011 0.377 .541 .004 
Error 2.800 96 0.029    
Sum 38.392 100     
Corrected Sum 2.844 99     
Note. a R2 = .015 (fitted R2 = -.016)     
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Tables A5 a-d 
Results of linear mixed-effects modeling in Experiment 4 
 
Table A5 a: Model fit 
AIC BIC logLik deviance df.resid 
3512.3    3611.0   -1741.1    3482.3      5305 
 
 
Table A5 b: Scaled residuals 
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max 
-3.2105 -0.6349 -0.1634 0.4577 6.7902 
 
 
Table A5 c: Random effects 
Groups Name Variance Std.Dev. Corr 
Participant (Intercept) 0.043427 0.20839  
 Response 0.002119 0.04604 -0.12 
Item (Intercept) 0.004726 0.06875  
 Response 0.002618 0.05117 -0.04 
Residual  0.100924 0.31769  
Note. Number of observations: 5320, groups:  Participant, 133; Item, 40 
 
Table A5 d: Fixed effects 
 b SE t χ² df p (χ²) 
(Intercept) 6.959 0.029 244.13 59600.82 1 < .001 
Priming 0.046 0.038 1.23 1.51 1 .219 
Response -0.050 0.013 -3.90 15.21 1 < .001 
Valence -0.040 0.014 -2.93 8.60 1 .003 
Priming x Response -0.019 0.014 -1.40 1.97 1 .160 
Priming x Valence 0.022 0.011 1.97 3.87 1 .049 
Response x Valence -0.073 0.012 -6.28 39.50 1 < .001 
Priming x Response x Valence -0.003 0.011 -0.27 0.07 1 .788 
 
  




List of identification items used in Experiments 2 to 4 
Ich fühle mich der Gruppe der Deutschen zugehörig.  
[I feel like belonging to the group of Germans.] 
Ich bin gerne deutsch. [I like being German.] 
Manchmal bedaure ich, deutsch zu sein. (-) [Sometimes I regret being German. (-) ] 
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B1 Pronoun Circling Task 
Instructions and texts used in Experiments 1 (first priming), 2, and 4. 
Studien haben gezeigt, dass die Leistungsfähigkeit von Menschen, die zuvor eine 
anstrengende und Konzentration erfordernde Aufgabe durchgeführt haben, je nach 
Aufgabentyp stark reduziert sein kann. Um Ihnen daher eine kleine Ruhepause zu 
gönnen und Sie auf den folgenden Teil der Studie vorzubereiten, bearbeiten Sie nun bitte 
die folgende Sprachaufgabe. Lesen Sie dazu bitte die folgende Naturbeschreibung und 
umkringeln Sie dabei mit einem Stift alle vorkommenden Pronomen (z.B. ich, mein, 
mir, mich). 
[Studies have shown that the performance of people who have previously performed an 
exhausting task requiring concentration can be greatly reduced depending on the type of 
task. Therefore, to give you a little rest and to prepare you for the next part of the study, 
please execute the following language task. Please read the following description of 




Ich liebe es, den Sonnenuntergang über dem 
See zu beobachten. Jede Nacht im Sommer 
fahre ich mit meinem Auto über den Strand in 
der Nähe meines Hauses, wo ich mich 
entspannen und beobachten kann, wie die 
Abendsonne Farben auf die Leinwand des 
Himmels malt. Ich finde es schön, meine Hände 
in den kühlen Sand zu stecken und die goldene 
Feuerkugel zu sehen, wie sie im Wasser 
versinkt. Die Hitze, die mein Gesicht eben noch 
erwärmt hat, lässt langsam nach und ich fühle 
eine kühle Brise auf meiner Haut. Die hellen 
Farben im Himmel über mir schmerzen in 
meinen Augen, aber die Szene ist zu schön, um 
den Blick abzuwenden. Langsam verblasst das 
Licht vollständig und ich bin in zunehmende 
Dunkelheit gehüllt. Während ich aufstehe, 
klopfe ich den Sand von meinem Körper ab 
und denke mir, wie glücklich ich mich schätzen 
darf, so einen wunderschönen Ort jeden Tag 
erleben zu dürfen. Die Nacht ruht auf mir und 
ich kehre nach Hause zurück, um 
einzuschlafen und auf einen neuen Tag zu 
warten. 
Interdependence priming 
Wir lieben es, den Sonnenuntergang über dem 
See zu beobachten. Jede Nacht im Sommer 
fahren wir mit unserem Auto über den Strand 
in der Nähe unseres Hauses, wo wir uns 
entspannen und beobachten können, wie die 
Abendsonne Farben auf die Leinwand des 
Himmels malt. Wir finden es schön, unsere 
Hände in den kühlen Sand zu stecken und die 
goldene Feuerkugel zu sehen, wie sie im 
Wasser versinkt. Die Hitze, die unsere 
Gesichter eben noch erwärmt hat, lässt 
langsam nach und wir fühlen eine kühle Brise 
auf unserer Haut. Die hellen Farben im Himmel 
über uns schmerzen in unseren Augen, aber 
die Szene ist zu schön, um den Blick 
abzuwenden. Langsam verblasst das Licht 
vollständig und wir sind in zunehmende 
Dunkelheit gehüllt. Während wir aufstehen, 
klopfen wir den Sand von unseren Körpern ab 
und denken uns, wie glücklich wir uns 
schätzen dürfen, so einen wunderschönen Ort 
jeden Tag erleben zu dürfen. Die Nacht ruht 
auf uns und wir kehren nach Hause zurück, um 
einzuschlafen und auf einen neuen Tag zu 
warten. 





I love to watch the sunset across the lake. Each 
night during the summer, I drive my car over 
to the beach near my house where I relax my 
body and watch the colors paint the canvas in 
the sky. I like to bury my hands in the cool 
sand and stare into the golden ball of fire as it 
sinks into the water. The heat that warmed my 
face slowly fades away and leaves my body 
with a cool chill. The bright colors in the sky 
above me hurt my eyes but the scene is too 
beautiful to look away. Slowly, the light fades 
completely and I am immersed into the 
growing darkness. As I get up, I brush the sand 
off my body and think to myself, how fortunate 
I am to experience such a beautiful site every 
day. The night rests upon me and I return 
home to fall asleep to wait for a new day. 
Interdependence priming 
We love to watch the sunset across the lake. 
Each night during the summer, we drive our 
car over to the beach near our house where we 
relax our bodies and watch the colors paint the 
canvas in the sky. We like to bury our hands in 
the cool sand and stare into the golden ball of 
fire as it sinks into the water. The heat that 
warmed our faces slowly fades away and 
leaves our bodies with a cool chill. The bright 
colors in the sky above us hurt our eyes but the 
scene is too beautiful to look away. Slowly, the 
light fades completely and we are immersed 
into the growing darkness. As we get up, we 
brush the sand off my bodies and think to 
ourselves, how fortunate we are to experience 
such a beautiful site every day. The night rests 
upon us and we return home to fall asleep to 
wait for a new day. 
 
 
Wenn Sie mit dieser Aufgabe fertig sind, drehen Sie bitte das Blatt wieder um und 
wenden sich erneut dem Computerbildschirm zu. Drücken Sie dort ENTER, um mit der 
Studie fortzufahren. 
[Once you finished this task, please turn the paper around and turn towards the 
computer screen. Then press ENTER to proceed with the study.] 
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B2 Pronoun Circling Task (re-priming) 
Instructions and texts used in Experiment 1 for re-priming. 
 
Bitte bearbeiten Sie nun auch diese zweite Aufgabe nach demselben Muster wie bei der 
ersten Aufgabe: Lesen Sie bitte die folgende Naturbeschreibung und umkringeln Sie 
dabei mit einem Kugelschreiber alle vorkommenden Pronomen (z.B. ich, mein, mir, 
mich). 
[Now, please execute this second task the same way as the first task: Please read the 





Ich gehe nicht sehr oft essen – aber wenn ich 
dann mal essen gehe, finde ich es schwierig, zu 
entscheiden, wohin ich will. Thailändisches, 
mexikanisches und indisches Essen sind ja 
sehr lecker, aber mein absolutes 
Lieblingsessen ist Chinesisch. Es gibt ein 
chinesisches Restaurant in der Nähe meines 
Hauses, in dem es das beste Essen gibt, das ich 
je gegessen habe. Wenn ich dort herein 
komme, strömt der Duft in meine Nase. Es ist 
ein süßer, würziger Geruch, der mich hungrig 
macht. Ich setze mich und bestelle das Essen. 
Alles auf der Speisekarte lacht mich an. Ich 
weiß: Egal, was ich bestellen werde, es wird 
mich begeistern. Die Platten sind so schön 
angerichtet, dass es mir fast Leid tut, davon zu 
essen. Der beste Teil der Mahlzeit ist der, wenn 
ich mir einen Nachtisch aussuchen kann. 
Nichts kann schief gehen, wenn ich in meinem 
Lieblingsrestaurant esse. 
Interdependence priming 
Wir gehen nicht sehr oft essen – aber wenn wir 
dann mal essen gehen, finden wir es schwierig, 
zu entscheiden, wohin wir wollen. 
Thailändisches, mexikanisches und indisches 
Essen sind ja sehr lecker, aber unser absolutes 
Lieblingsessen ist Chinesisch. Es gibt ein 
chinesisches Restaurant in der Nähe unseres 
Hauses, in dem es das beste Essen gibt, das wir 
je gegessen haben. Wenn wir dort herein 
kommen, strömt der Duft in unsere Nasen. Es 
ist ein süßer, würziger Geruch, der uns hungrig 
macht. Wir setzen uns und bestellen das Essen. 
Alles auf der Speisekarte lacht uns an. Ich 
weiß: Egal, was wir bestellen werden, es wird 
uns begeistern. Die Platten sind so schön 
angerichtet, dass es uns fast Leid tut, davon zu 
essen. Der beste Teil der Mahlzeit ist der, wenn 
wir uns einen Nachtisch aussuchen können. 
Nichts kann schief gehen, wenn wir in unserem 
Lieblingsrestaurant essen. 





I don’t go out to dinner very often, but when I 
do, I have a hard time choosing where I want 
to go. Thai food, Mexican food, and Indian food 
are all delicious, but my all time favorite is 
Chinese. There is a Chinese restaurant near my 
house that serves the best food I have ever 
eaten. When I enter, the aroma fills my 
nostrils. It’s a sweet and spicy smell and it 
makes me hungry. I sit down and order the 
food. Everything on the menu appeals to me. I 
know whatever I order will delight me. The 
plates are decorated so nicely, it almost makes 
me feel bad eating from them. The best part of 
the meal is when I get my choice of dessert. I 
can’t go wrong with anything I order at my 
favorite restaurant. 
Interdependence priming 
We don’t go out to dinner very often, but when 
we do, we have a hard time choosing where we 
want to go. Thai food, Mexican food, and Indian 
food are all delicious, but our all time favorite 
is Chinese. There is a Chinese restaurant near 
our house that serves the best food we have 
ever eaten. When we enter, the aroma fills our 
nostrils. It’s a sweet and spicy smell and it 
makes us hungry. We sit down and order the 
food. Everything on the menu appeals to us. 
We know whatever we order will delight us. 
The plates are decorated so nicely, it almost 
makes us feel bad eating from them. The best 
part of the meal is when we get our choice of 
dessert. We can’t go wrong with anything we 
order at our favorite restaurant. 
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B3 Social Ladder Task  
Instructions used in Experiment 3. 
In dieser Studie wird untersucht, in wie weit soziale Unterschiede sich in der 
Leistungsfähigkeit in den Bereichen Wahrnehmung, Gedächtnis und räumliches 
Vorstellungsvermögen widerspiegeln. Stellen Sie sich nun diese Leiter als eine 
Möglichkeit vor, mit der soziale Unterschiede in Deutschland dargestellt werden 
können: 
[In this study, we investigate to what extent social differences are reflected in the 
performance in the fields of perception, memory and spatial sense. Now imagine this 




Low-status condition High-status condition 
Bitte vergleichen Sie sich nun mit einer 
Person, die auf dieser Leiter auf der untersten 
Sprosse steht. Personen wie diesen geht es 
unter den Deutschen am schlechtesten: Sie 
haben das niedrigste Einkommen, die 
geringsten Bildungschancen und die am 
wenigsten angesehenen Berufe.  
Stellen Sie sich nun einen Moment lang vor, 
inwiefern Sie sich von diesen Personen in 
Bezug auf Ihr eigenes Einkommen, Ihren 
Bildungshintergrund und Ihren Beruf 
unterscheiden. 
Wo würden Sie sich selbst auf dieser Leiter 
einschätzen, relativ zu den Personen ganz 
UNTEN auf der Leiter? Bitte geben Sie im 
Textfeld die Zahl ein, die neben der von Ihnen 
gewählten Sprosse steht. 
Bitte vergleichen Sie sich nun mit einer 
Person, die auf dieser Leiter auf der obersten 
Sprosse steht. Personen wie diesen geht es 
unter den Deutschen am besten: Sie haben das 
höchste Einkommen, die höchsten 
Bildungschancen und die am meisten 
angesehenen Berufe.  
Stellen Sie sich nun einen Moment lang vor, 
inwiefern Sie sich von diesen Personen in 
Bezug auf Ihr eigenes Einkommen, Ihren 
Bildungshintergrund und Ihren Beruf 
unterscheiden. 
Wo würden Sie sich selbst auf dieser Leiter 
einschätzen, relativ zu den Personen ganz 
OBEN auf der Leiter? Bitte geben Sie im 
Textfeld die Zahl ein, die neben der von Ihnen 
gewählten Sprosse steht. 




Low-status condition High-status condition 
Please now compare yourself with a person 
standing on this ladder on the bottom rung. 
People like these are the worst off among 
Germans: they have the lowest income, the 
worst educational opportunities and the least 
respected professions. 
Now imagine for one moment in which way 
you differ from these persons concerning your 
own income, your educational background 
and your profession. 
Where would you place yourself on this 
ladder, relative to the people at the very 
BOTTOM of the ladder? In the text box, please 
enter the number that is next to the rung you 
selected. 
Please now compare yourself with a person 
standing on this ladder on the top rung. People 
like these are the best off among Germans: 
they have the highest income, the best 
educational opportunities and the most 
respected professions. 
Now imagine for one moment in which way 
you differ from these persons concerning your 
own income, your educational background 
and your profession. 
Where would you place yourself on this 
ladder, relative to the people at the very TOP 
of the ladder? In the text box, please enter the 
number that is next to the rung you selected. 
Note. Words highlighted in this table by italics were not highlighted in the experiment’s 
instructions. In this table, highlighting serves the better visibility and discrimination of 
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Appendix C: Description of Research Paradigms 
C1 Minimal Traits Paradigm: Alternative Version 
Instructions and tasks to be executed in the alternative version of the Minimal Traits 
Paradigm employed in Experiment 2 and 4; based on Otten & Epstude (2006). 
 
Task 1 
Mittels des nun folgenden ersten Tests soll erfasst werden, ob Sie basal oder fokal 
wahrnehmen und dabei eine distale oder proximale Fixationsstrategie anwenden. Sie 
werden im Folgenden einige Bilder sehen, in denen jeweils zwei unterschiedliche Motive 
wahrgenommen werden können. Entscheiden Sie bitte für jedes der Bilder, welches 
Motiv Sie zuerst wahrgenommen haben und worauf Sie sich konzentriert haben. 
[By means of the following first test we want to assess if you are a basic or focal 
perceiver and if you apply a distal or proximal fixation strategy. Below, you see some 
images in which two different motives can be perceived. Please decide on each of the 
images, which motive you perceive first and which part of the images you focused.] 
  
  







For each of these six images, two questions were asked: 
German 
Haben Sie zuerst den Mann oder die Frau gesehen? 
Haben Sie sich auf die Mitte des Bildes konzentriert oder eher auf die Seiten geachtet? 
Haben Sie zuerst den Hasen oder die Ente gesehen? 
Haben Sie sich auf die Mitte des Bildes konzentriert oder eher auf die Seiten geachtet? 
Haben Sie zuerst die Vase oder die Gesichter gesehen? 
Haben Sie sich auf die Mitte des Bildes konzentriert oder eher auf die Seiten geachtet? 
Haben Sie zuerst die Frau oder das Gesicht gesehen? 
Haben Sie sich auf die Mitte des Bildes konzentriert oder eher auf die Seiten geachtet? 
Haben Sie zuerst den Hasen oder die Ente gesehen? 
Haben Sie sich auf die Mitte des Bildes konzentriert oder eher auf die Seiten geachtet? 
Haben Sie zuerst die alte oder die junge Frau gesehen?  
Haben Sie sich auf die Mitte des Bildes konzentriert oder eher auf die Seiten geachtet? 
English 
Did you first see the man or the woman? 
Did you focus more on the center of the image or on the sides? 
Did you first see the hare or the duck? 
Did you focus more on the center of the image or on the sides? 
Did you first see the vase or the faces? 
Did you focus more on the center of the image or on the sides? 
Did you first see the woman or the faces? 
Did you focus more on the center of the image or on the sides? 
Did you first see the hare or the duck? 
Did you focus more on the center of the image or on the sides? 
Did you first see the old or the young woman? 
Did you focus more on the center of the image or on the sides? 
 




Vielen Dank! Mit dem nun folgenden zweiten Test soll erfasst werden, ob Sie 
Langwellen- oder Kurzwellenchromatiker sind und ob Sie illuminativ oder nuitiv 
kategorisieren. Sie werden nun einige Zahlen sehen, denen Sie Farben zuordnen sollen. 
Wählen Sie bitte jene Farbe aus, die Ihrem Gefühl nach am besten zu der Zahl passt. 
Drücken Sie die entsprechend zugeordnete Taste. 
[Thank you! The following second task shall test if you are a long-wave or short-wave 
chromatic and whether you categorize illuminatively or nuitively. You will now see some 
digits to which we ask you to assign colors. Please choose the color that fits best 
according to your feeling. Please press the corresponding button.] 
 
Numbers from 1 to 9 are shown on the screen, including a scale indicating the colors red, 
yellow, green, and blue.  
 
Task 3 
Mit dem folgenden Test wird erfasst, ob Sie kontrastiv oder impressiv wahrnehmen. In 
Kombination mit der vorherigen Aufgabe kann ebenfalls eine Aussage über Ihre 
rangiative oder derangiative Präferenz gemacht werden. Sie werden nun jeweils zwei 
Zahlen sehen, von denen immer eine größer dargestellt ist. Bitte drücken Sie möglichst 
schnell die Zahlentaste der Tastatur, die der größer dargestellten Zahl entspricht. 
[The following test will assess whether you perceive contrastively or impressively. In 
combination with the previous task, this is an indication whether you have a rangiative 
or a derangiative preference. You will now see two numbers, one of which is always 
larger in size than the other. Please press as quickly as possible the key on the keyboard 
that corresponds to the number larger in size.] 
 




Der folgende Test erfasst, ob Sie circulär oder triangulär verarbeiten. Zusätzlich soll 
ermittelt werden, ob Sie eher ipsilateral oder contralateral enkodieren. Es werden  
Ihnen gleich für jeweils 500 Millisekunden Dreiecke und Kreise auf dem Bildschirm 
dargeboten. Ihre Aufgabe besteht darin, die Leertaste so schnell wie möglich zu drücken, 
wenn zwei gleiche Formen aufeinander folgen. 
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[The following test assesses if you process circularly or triangularly. In addition, we 
want to determine whether you encode rather ipsilaterally or contralaterally. Now, for 
500 milliseconds each, triangles and circles are shown on the screen repeatedly. Your 





Vielen Dank! Jetzt möchten wir gerne erfassen, inwiefern Sie einen deskriptiven oder 
investigativen Verarbeitungsstil haben und ob Sie eher zum abduktiven oder 
veriduktiven Schlussfolgern neigen. Ihnen werden nun einzelne Sätze dargeboten, die 
Sie vervollständigen sollen. Dazu haben Sie jeweils zwei Möglichkeiten zur Auswahl. 
Nutzen Sie bitte die Buchstaben-Tasten "a" und "b" um Ihre Antworten zu geben. 
[Thank you! Now we want to assess if you possess a descriptive or investigative 
processing style, and if you are more prone to abductive or veriductive reasoning. Now 
you will be shown sentences which we ask you to complete. For this, you have two 
options to choose from. Please use the keys “a” and “b” to enter your answers.] 
 
German English 
Ein Marienkäfer ist... 
a) schwarz-rot. 
b) ein Insekt. 
A ladybug is... 
a) black and red.  
b) an insect. 
Der Elefant... 
a) lebt in Afrika oder Indien. 
b) ist das größte Landsäugetier. 
Elephants... 
a) live in Africa or India. 
b) are the largest mammals on land. 
Die Gezeiten sind... 
a) Ebbe und Flut. 
b) durch den Mond bedingt. 
The tide is... 
a) high or low. 
b) an effect of the moon. 
Eis ist... 
a) lecker.  
b) ein Aggregatzustand von Wasser. 
Ice [cream] is... 
a) delicious. 
b) a physical state of water. 




a) wird von Atlantik und Pazifik 
umschlossen.  
b) wurde von Kolumbus entdeckt. 
America... 
a) is surrounded by the Atlantic and the 
Pacific. 
b) was discovered by Columbus. 
Die Alpen... 
a) sind ein Gebirgszug in Europa.  
b)wurden von Hannibal mit seinen 
Elefanten überquert. 
The Alps... 
a) are a mountain range in Europe.  
b) were crossed by Hannibal with his 
elephants. 
Eine Nektarine... 
a) ist meist rot-gelb und hat eine glatte 
Haut.  
b) ist aus der Kreuzung von Pfirsich und 
Pflaume entstanden. 
A nectarine... 
a) is mostly red-yellow and has a smooth 
skin. 
b) originated as a hybrid of peach and 
plum. 
Die Polkappen... 
a) schmelzen.  
b) liegen an den Punkten der Erde, an 
denen die Sonneneinstrahlung am 
schwächsten ist. 
The polar ice caps... 
a) melt.  
b) lie at the points of the earth where the 
sunlight is weakest. 
Die Jahreszeiten... 
a) bestehen aus Frühling, Sommer, Herbst 
und Winter.  
b) unterscheiden sich auf der Nord- und 
Südhalbkugel. 
The seasons... 
a) are spring, summer, autumn and winter. 
b) differ on the Northern and Southern 
hemispheres. 
Eine Mondfinsternis... 
a) sieht man auf der Nachtseite der Erde.  
b) entsteht, wenn sich die Erde zwischen 
Mond und Sonne bewegt. 
A lunar eclipse… 
a) can be seen only on the night side of the 
earth. 
b) arises when the earth moves between 
the sun and moon.  
 
Test 6 
Es folgt nun ein Test, der Auskunft darüber geben soll, ob Sie eher kategorial oder eher 
funktional enkodieren. In Kombination mit der vorherigen Aufgabe kann ebenfalls 
ermittelt werden, ob Sie einen eher igenevatorischen oder einen eher 
nonigenevatorischen Verarbeitungsstil haben. Sie sehen nun eine Wortliste, die Sie sich 
bitte so gut wie möglich einprägen. Im Anschluss an die Darbietung entscheiden Sie bitte 
für eine Reihe von Wörtern, ob diese in der Liste dargeboten worden sind oder ob sie 
neue Wörter darstellen. 
[The following test provides information whether you encode more categorically or 
more functionally. In combination with the previous task it can be determined if you 
possess a rather igenevatoric or rather nonigenevatoric processing style. Now, you will 
see a list of words that you memorize up as good as possible. Following this 
presentation, you are asked to decide for a series of words whether these have been 
presented in the list before or whether they are new words.] 




Lernliste Rekognitionsliste Learning list Recognition list 
Spachtel Spachtel spatula spatula 
Hammer Feile hammer rasp 
Ratsche Zange ratchet pliers 
Schraubendreher Schraubendreher screwdriver screwdriver 
Bohrer Beil drill hatchet 
Wasserwaage Wasserwaage spirit level spirit level 
Esel Pferd donkey horse 
Schnabeltier Schnabeltier platypus platypus 
Specht Elster woodpecker magpie 
Dachs Dachs badger badger 
Ziege Schaf goat sheep 
Haubentaucher Haubentaucher great crested grebe great crested grebe 
Banane Banane banana banana 
Apfel Birne apple pear 
Guave Guave guava guava 
Ananas Orange pineapple orange 
Pflaume Pflaume plum plum 
Maracuja Litschi passion fruit lychee 
(New words are written in grey italics.) 
 
Vielen Dank für die Bearbeitung unserer Testaufgaben! Ihre Daten werden nun 
gespeichert – bitte haben Sie einen Moment Geduld! 
[Thank you for taking part in these tests! Your data are being saved—please be patient!] 
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C2 Minimal Traits Paradigm: Original Version  
Instructions and tasks to be executed in the original version of the Minimal Traits 
Paradigm (Otten & Epstude, 2006) employed in Experiment 3. 
 
Test 1 
In diesem ersten Test werden Ihnen 15 Sekunden lang einige große Buchstaben 
präsentiert, die wiederum aus vielen kleinen Buchstaben aufgebaut sind. Bitte 
versuchen Sie, sich diese Buchstaben, wie auch deren räumliche Anordnung zueinander, 
gut einzuprägen. Bei den im Anschluss folgenden Fragen können Sie bei Fragen mit 
mehreren Antwortmöglichkeiten mit den Pfeiltasten zwischen diesen Möglichkeiten 
wählen; mit Enter bestätigen Sie Ihre Auswahl. Bei offenen Fragen, bei denen nach 
einem Buchstaben gefragt wird, geben Sie bitte NUR den Buchstaben an, damit Ihre 
Antworten automatisiert ausgewertet werden können. 
[In this first test you are shown some large letters which are in turn made up of many 
small letters. These are shown for 15 seconds each. Please try to memorize these letters 
as well as their spatial relationship to each other. In the subsequent questions, you can 
use the arrow keys to move between the alternatives of possible answers. Please press 
Enter to confirm your selection. For open questions, where you are asked for a letter, 
please indicate only the letter, so that your responses can be analyzed automatically.] 
 
 




Wie oft haben Sie ein großes 'A' gesehen? 
- 1 mal 
- 2 mal 
How many times have you seen a large 'A'? 
- 1 time 
- 2 times 
Wie oft haben Sie einen großen Buchstaben 
gesehen, der aus kleinen 'F's aufgebaut war? 
- 1 mal 
- 2 mal 
How many times have you seen a large 
letter which was made up of small 'F's? 
- 1 time 
- 2 times 
Welcher große Buchstabe befand sich direkt 
unterhalb des großen Buchstabens 'C'? 
Which Large Letter was directly below the 
large letter 'C'? 
Welcher große Buchstabe befand sich ganz rechts 
unten auf dem Bildschirm? 
Which large letter was positioned on the 
very right bottom of the screen? 
Aus welchen kleinen Buchstaben war der große 
Buchstabe 'E' aufgebaut? 
- L 
- Q 




Wie oft haben Sie ein großes 'B' gesehen? 
- 1 mal 
- kein mal 
How many times did you see a large 'B'? 




Im nun folgenden zweiten Test werden Ihnen 15 Sekunden lang einige Wörter 
dargeboten, die in verschiedenen Farben geschrieben sind. Bitte prägen Sie sich die 
Wörter wie auch deren Farbe gut ein, um anschließend Fragen hierzu beantworten zu 
können.  
[In the subsequent second test, some words will be presented for 15 seconds which are 
written in different colors. Please memorize the words as well as their colors, so that 
you can answer questions later.] 
 




Wie viele Worte waren in schwarzer Farbe 
geschrieben? 
- 2 Wörter 
- 3 Wörter 
How many words were written in black 
color? 
- 2 words 
- 3 Words 
Und wie viele Worte waren in grüner Farbe 
geschrieben? 
- 2 Wörter 
- 3 Wörter 
And how many words were written in 
green color?  
- 2 words 
- 3 Words 
Wie oft kam das Wort ROT vor? 
- 1 mal 
- 2 mal 
How often did you see the word RED? 
- 1 time 
- 2 times 
Wie viele Farbwörter kamen vor, deren Farbe 
selbst aber nicht zu sehen war? 
- 2 Wörter 
- 3 Wörter 
How many color words did you see whose 
color itself was not visible? 
- 2 words 
- 3 Words 
Gab es überhaupt ein Farbwort, bei dem Farbe und 
Wort übereingestimmt haben? 
- ja 
-nein 
Was there a color word at all for which 
color and color word did match? 
- Yes 
-No 
Welches Farbwort kam NICHT zweimal vor? 
- schwarz 
- grün 
Which color word was not there twice? 
- black 
- green 
Leiden Sie an einer Rot-Grün-Schwäche? 
- ja 
-nein 







Vielen Dank! Im dritten Test sehen Sie 15 Sekunden lang eine Wortliste, die Sie sich bitte 
so gut wie möglich einprägen. Im Anschluss an die Darbietung entscheiden Sie bitte für 
eine Reihe von Wörtern, ob diese in der Liste dargeboten worden sind oder ob sie neue 
Wörter darstellen. 
[Thank you! In the third test, you see a list of words for 15 seconds which we ask you to 
memorize as good as possible. Following the presentation, please decide for a series of 
words whether these had been presented in the list before or whether they are new 
words.] 
 




Learning list Recognition list Learning list Recognition list 
Birke Birke birch birch 
Kastanie Buche chestnut beech 
Katze Katze cat cat 
Beil Beil hatchet hatchet 
Klemme Axt clamp ax 
Kaninchen Kaninchen rabbit rabbit 
Hammer Zange hammer pliers 
Schaufel Schaufel shovel shovel 
Schildkröte Echse turtle lizard 
Schere Schere scissors scissors 
Pinie Kiefer pine pine 
Zypresse Zypresse cypress cypress 
Weide Weide willow willow 
Kuh Schaf cow sheep 
Hund Hund dog dog 




Vielen Dank! Im folgenden letzten Test werden Ihnen 15 Sekunden lang einige 
Piktogramme präsentiert. Versuchen Sie bitte auch hier, sich diese so gut wie möglich 
einzuprägen. 
[Thank you ! In the following final test, you will be shown some pictograms for 15 
seconds. Also here, try to memorize them as good as possible.] 
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Ihnen werden nun Kombinationen aus Piktogrammen präsentiert. Bitte geben Sie für 
jede der Kombinationen an, ob sie aus Einzel-Piktogrammen besteht, die in der vorigen 
Zusammenstellung enthalten waren, oder ob mindestens eines der Bestandteile neu ist. 
[Now, you are presented combinations of pictograms. Please indicate for each of the 
combinations whether it consists of singular pictograms that were included in the 











Vielen Dank für die Bearbeitung unserer Testaufgaben! Ihre Daten werden nun 
gespeichert – bitte haben Sie einen Moment Geduld! 
[Thank you for taking part in these tests! Your data are being saved—please be patient!] 
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Vielen Dank für Ihre Einschätzung! Ihre Ergebnisse bei den anfänglichen Leistungstests 
wurden ausgewertet und Ihre Ausprägungen auf den sechs Dimensionen ermittelt. 
[Thank you for your assessment! Your results in the initial performance tests have been 
analyzed and your results on the six dimensions were calculated.] 
 
German  
Anchor: Group Anchor: Self 
Da die verschiedenen Leistungsbereiche 
mittlerweile gut erforscht sind, liegen bereits 
Durchschnittswerte für die Gruppe der 
Deutschen auf den jeweiligen Dimensionen 
vor.  
Ihnen wird nun gleich Ihre Ausprägung auf 
den jeweiligen Dimensionen nacheinander 
präsentiert. Da in dieser Studie unter anderem 
untersucht wird, welchen Einfluss Ihre 
Leistungsfähigkeit auf den verschiedenen 
Dimensionen auf Ihre Fähigkeit zur 
Fremdeinschätzung hat, werden Sie zusätzlich 
gebeten, eine Einschätzung darüber 
abzugeben, wie die Deutschen insgesamt im 
Mittel auf diesen Dimensionen abschneiden. 
Diese Werte werden Ihnen eine nach der 
anderen dargeboten und Sie werden gebeten, 
sich selbst entsprechend auf den Dimensionen 
einzuschätzen. Dies dient dazu, die 
Übereinstimmung Ihrer mithilfe des Tests 
ermittelten Werte mit der persönlichen 
Selbsteinschätzung zu überprüfen. 
Die Einschätzung einer Gruppe ist sicherlich 
keine ganz einfache Aufgabe. Es hat sich aber 
herausgestellt, dass Menschen recht gut darin 
sind, derlei soziale Urteile abzugeben. Wir 
sind auch nicht an richtigen oder falschen 
Antworten interessiert, sondern an Ihrer 
spontanen Meinung. 
Zusätzlich werden Sie noch gefragt, für wie 
wünschenswert Sie eine hohe Ausprägung auf 
der jeweiligen Skala halten. 
Zusätzlich werden Sie noch gefragt, für wie 
wünschenswert Sie eine hohe Ausprägung auf 
der jeweiligen Skala halten. 
Zur Einschätzung steht Ihnen eine Skala von 1 
(niedrige Werte) bis 9 (hohe Werte) zur 
Verfügung. Nutzen Sie bitte zur Beurteilung 




Zur Einschätzung steht Ihnen eine Skala von 1 
(niedrige Werte) bis 9 (hohe Werte) zur 
Verfügung. Nutzen Sie bitte zur Beurteilung 




Sie erhalten nun jeweils erst eine kurze 
Beschreibung einer Dimension. Auf dem 
nächsten Bildschirm erhalten Sie dann eine 
Rückmeldung, wie die Deutschen im Schnitt 
auf der jeweiligen Dimension abgeschnitten 
haben, und werden dann gebeten, sich selbst 
einzuschätzen. 
Sie erhalten nun jeweils erst eine kurze 
Beschreibung einer Dimension. Auf dem 
nächsten Bildschirm erhalten Sie dann eine 
Rückmeldung, wie Sie selbst auf der jeweiligen 
Dimension abgeschnitten haben, und werden 
dann gebeten, eine Einschätzung über die 
Deutschen abzugeben. 




Anchor: Group Anchor: Self 
Since these various types of performance have 
been well researched by now, average scores 
for the group of Germans on the respective 
dimensions are available. 
One after another, your score on each 
dimension will be presented to you. In this 
study, among other things, we examine which 
influence your performance on the various 
dimensions has on your ability to assess other 
people. Hence, you will next be asked to assess 
how the group of Germans scored on average 
on these dimensions. 
Now, these scores will be presented to you 
one after another and you will be asked to 
assess yourself on the same dimensions. This 
serves as a validity check. We want to verify if 
your score which we determined with the 
previous tests matches your personal self-
assessment. 
The assessment of a group is surely not an 
easy task. However, it has been found that 
people are quite good at making this kind of 
social judgments. Also, we are not interested 
in right or wrong answers, but rather in your 
spontaneous opinion. 
In addition, you will be asked, how desirable 
you think a high score on the respective scale 
to be. 
In addition, you will be asked, how desirable 
you think a high score on the respective scale 
to be. 
For your assessment, you may use a scale 
ranging from 1 (low values) to 9 (high values). 




For your assessment, you may use a scale 
ranging from 1 (low values) to 9 (high values). 




Now, you are first shown a brief description of 
a respective dimension. On the next screen, 
you will receive feedback on how the group of 
Germans scored on average on this dimension, 
and are then asked to assess yourself. 
Now, you are first shown a brief description of 
a respective dimension. On the next screen, 
you will receive feedback on how the group of 
Germans scored on average on this dimension, 
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Description of the six dimensions, followed by the questions asked after the presentation of 
each dimension’s description: 
German  
1.) Clustering bei Digital-Span-Aufgaben 
Spiegelt die Tendenz wider, Einzelelemente zu gruppieren, wenn einer Person eine Liste mit 
Einzelelementen (z.B. Ziffern) dargeboten wird und die Person gebeten wird, diese auswendig 
zu lernen. Hohe Werte auf dieser Skala deuten auf gute Leistungen bei Gedächtnis- und 
Wiedererkennungsaufgaben hin. 
2.) Parallele Informationsverarbeitung 
Die Tendenz, verschiedene Teile oder Aspekte eingehender Informationen parallel zu anderen 
Teilen oder Aspekten von Informationen zu verarbeiten. Hohe Werte auf dieser Skala weisen 
auf eine gute Verständnisleistung hin. 
3.) Ganzheitliche Orientierung in Bezug auf kreative Aufgaben 
Die Tendenz, kreative Aufgaben auf eine ganzheitliche anstatt auf eine analytische Weise zu 
beginnen. Hohe Werte auf dieser Skala weisen auf eine effiziente Strategie bei der Bearbeitung 
kreativer Aufgaben hin. 
4.) Kontext-Orientierung bei der Problemlösung 
Die Tendenz, sich auf Vergleichsinformationen zu verlassen, die im Kontext der 
Aufgabenstellung verfügbar sind. Hohe Werte auf dieser Skala deuten auf gute 
Problemlösefähigkeiten hin. 
5.) Lateralisierung von Hirnfunktionen beim Sprachverständnis 
Die Tendenz, dass die verschiedenen Hirnfunktionen jeweils auf eine der beiden Gehirnhälften 
konzentriert sind (im Gegensatz zu einer relativ gleichmäßigen Verteilung). Hohe Werte auf 
dieser Skala weisen auf einen effizienten und schnellen Verständnisprozess hin. 
6.) Modalitätsdominanz bei der synästhetischen Wahrnehmung 
Bezieht sich auf die gleichzeitige Wahrnehmung von Reizen auf verschiedenen Sinnesorganen. 
Hohe Werte auf der Skala deuten auf einen effizienten Wahrnehmungsprozess hin, da die 
Trennung zwischen den Sinneseindrücken aufrecht erhalten wird. 
 
Anchor: Group Anchor: Self 
Die durchschnittliche Ausprägung der 
Deutschen auf der Dimension [dimension]: 
Ihre Ausprägung auf der Dimension 
[dimension]: 
Was denken Sie, wie Sie selbst auf der 
Dimension [dimension] abgeschnitten haben? 
Was denken Sie, wie die Deutschen auf der 
Dimension [dimension] abgeschnitten haben? 
Geben Sie bitte an, wie wünschenswert es ist, 
einen hohen Wert auf der Dimension 
[dimension] zu haben. 
Geben Sie bitte an, wie wünschenswert es ist, 
einen hohen Wert auf der Dimension 
[dimension] zu haben. 
 




1.) Clustering in digital span recall 
The tendency to group items together when a person is presented with a list of numbers and 
asked to memorize it. High scores on the clustering scale indicate good performance in recall 
and recognition tasks. 
2.) Parallel information processing 
The tendency to process various parts or aspects of incoming information in parallel with other 
parts or aspect of information. High scores on the Parallel Processing Scale indicate good 
comprehension process. 
3.) Global orientation in design construction 
The tendency to start the construction of a design in a global rather than in an analytic way. 
High scores on the Global Orientation Scale indicate an efficient construction strategy. 
4.) Field orientation in problem-solving 
The tendency to rely on relational information present in the problem context. High scores on 
the Field Orientation Scale indicate good problem-solving strategy. 
5.) Lateralization of brain functions in language comprehension 
The tendency for brain functions to be highly distributed within one of the two cerebral 
hemispheres. High scores on the Lateralization Scale indicate an efficient and quick 
comprehension process. 
6.) Modality dominance in synesthetic perception 
Refers to the simultaneous perception of different sensory modalities. High scores on the 
Modality Dominance Scale indicate an efficient perception process because the correct 
distinction between the two sensory modalities is obtained. 
 
Anchor: Group Anchor: Self 
How the group of Germans scored on average 
on the dimension [dimension]: 
How you personally scored on the dimension 
[dimension]: 
How do you think you personally scored on 
this dimension? 
How do you think the group of Germans 
scored on average on this dimension? 
Please rate how socially desirable it is to have 
a high score on [dimension]. 
Please rate how socially desirable it is to have 
a high score on [dimension]. 
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C3 Wezwe Task  
Instructions and procedure of the Wezwe Task (Davis & Brock, 1975) employed in Experiment 3. 
Sprachpsychologen haben wiederholt gezeigt, dass Menschen oft in der Lage sind, fremde 
Sprachen zum Teil intuitiv zu verstehen. Die meisten Deutschen können recht gut 
abschätzen, was einzelne Wörter auf Italienisch, Spanisch und Französisch bedeuten. Uns 
interessiert hier jedoch, wie Menschen ganz intuitiv relativ unbekannte Sprachen 
übersetzen.  
Der Text auf der nächsten Seite ist auf Wezwe verfasst, einer Sprache, die von wenigen 
indigenen Volksgruppen in Neuseeland gesprochen wird. 
Im Text werden Sie eine Reihe unterstrichener Wörter vorfinden. Diese Wörter sind von 1 
bis 15 durchnummeriert. Auf Wezwe stellen diese Wörter Pronomen dar. Ihre Aufgabe ist 
es nun, den Text auf der nächsten Seite zu lesen und die deutsche Bedeutung der 
unterstrichenen Wörter anzugeben. Sie können bei der Übersetzung aus allen deutschen 







Nach jedem unterstrichenen Wort sehen Sie eine Zahl in Klammern. Unter dem Text können 
Sie dann angeben, welches deutsche Pronomen dem unterstrichenen Wort auf Wezwe 
entspricht. Versuchen Sie dabei, so schnell wie möglich zu arbeiten. Folgen Sie Ihrer 
Intuition und geben Sie das erste Pronomen an, das Ihnen einfällt. Denken Sie dabei nicht 
zu sehr über die Bedeutung der Worte nach. 
Todo de poi dele ban (1) numa te cloi san dem toi sel neldomo dan ko (2) cas im todo de 
oidemo dan. Beme de lo ban (3) seldemo ko jano cas. Te dem (4) de perdoiba ko (5) 
berbanoi. Te demi (6) sel cas doimo pan iri toi poban hili numoi son ban (7) perdoiba. Todo 
bois de bani (8) demai. Joi num jenoio bano (9) no jala membarjar koi (10) cas lano. Te sel 
demo pojan membaj er bano (11) don todo perdoiban. Oi, de deme hilie semoi bani (12) te 
dola inaidemo. De dolo hili (13) neldemoi membajar son! Soi tui. Ban (14) canto deme jan 
biri biri, deloi poba hin po koi (15) noi eme. 
1    9  
2   10  
3   11  
4   12  
5   13  
6   14  
7   15  






1. Pers.  ich, mein 
2. Pers. du, dein 





1. Pers.  wir, unser 
2. Pers. ihr, euer 
3. Pers. sie, ihr 




Language psychologists have shown repeatedly that people often are able to understand 
foreign languages intuitively in some cases. Most Germans can estimate quite well what 
singular words mean in Italian, Spanish, and French. However, we are interested in how 
people translate relatively unknown languages intuitively. 
The text on the next page is written in Wezwe, a language which is spoken by a few 
indigenous peoples in New Zealand. 
In this text, you will find words which are underlined. These words are numbered from 
1 to 15. In Wezwe these words represent pronouns. It is your task to read the text on 
the next page and specify the German meaning of the underlined words. In the 
translation, you can choose between all German personal and possessive pronouns, i.e., 







After each underlined word you see a number in parentheses. Below the text you can 
specify which German pronoun corresponds to the underlined word in Wezwe. Try to 
work as fast as possible. Follow your intuition and enter the first pronoun which you 
can think of. Do not overthink the meaning of the words. 
Todo de poi dele ban (1) numa te cloi san dem toi sel neldomo dan ko (2) cas im todo de 
oidemo dan. Beme de lo ban (3) seldemo ko jano cas. Te dem (4) de perdoiba ko (5) 
berbanoi. Te demi (6) sel cas doimo pan iri toi poban hili numoi son ban (7) perdoiba. 
Todo bois de bani (8) demai. Joi num jenoio bano (9) no jala membarjar koi (10) cas 
lano. Te sel demo pojan membaj er bano (11) don todo perdoiban. Oi, de deme hilie 
semoi bani (12) te dola inaidemo. De dolo hili (13) neldemoi membajar son! Soi tui. Ban 
(14) canto deme jan biri biri, deloi poba hin po koi (15) noi eme. 
1    9  
2   10  
3   11  
4   12  
5   13  
6   14  
7   15  






r 1. Pers.  ich, mein 
2. Pers. du, dein 





1. Pers.  wir, unser 
2. Pers. ihr, euer 
3. Pers. sie, ihr 
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C4 Conformity Measure  
Instructions and procedure of the conformity measure (van Cappellen et al., 2011) 
employed in Experiment 4. 
In einem weiteren Test ermitteln wir Ihre visuelle Wahrnehmungsgeschwindigkeit und  
-genauigkeit. Gleich wird Ihnen wiederholt 4 Sekunden lang eine unterschiedlich hohe 
Anzahl des Buchstabens „a“ gezeigt. Ihre Aufgabe ist es, jeweils eine Schätzung über die 
Anzahl der Buchstaben abzugeben.  
[In another test, we will determine your visual perception speed and accuracy. You will 
be repeatedly presented a screen each showing a variable number of the letter "a". Your 
task is to give an estimate of the number of letters shown on each screen.] 
In einigen Fällen werden Ihnen zusätzlich die Antworten von drei zufällig ausgewählten 
Teilnehmern an einer Voruntersuchung angezeigt. Es steht Ihnen frei, diese Information 
in Ihre Schätzungen mit einzubeziehen oder sie außer Acht zu lassen. 
[In some cases, the answers of three randomly selected former participants from a 
pretest are also displayed. You are free to include this information in your estimation or 
to ignore them.] 
Mit ENTER wird Ihnen die erste Seite mit Buchstaben gezeigt. 












In total, eight screens with the estimates of alleged participants from a pretest are shown, 
and eight screens without this “social” information. The actual number of letters “a” varies 
between 148 letters and 1,127 letters. 
 
  
Person 1:  158 
Person 2:  168 
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C5 Reaction-Timed Based Measure 
Instructions and procedure of the reaction-time based measure employed in Experiment 4. 
In einer nächsten Aufgabe werden Sie gebeten, Einschätzungen über verschiedene 
Eigenschaften abzugeben, d.h. ob diese Eigenschaften tendenziell auf Sie zutreffen oder 
ob sie dies nicht tun.  
[In the following task, you will be ask to make assessments concerning various personal 
characteristics, i.e., whether these characteristics tend to apply to you or if they do not.] 
Verwenden Sie für Ihre Angaben bitte die markierten Tasten ("S" für "ja" und "L" für 
"nein"). Bitte geben Sie Ihre Einschätzung bei dieser Reaktionszeitaufgabe so schnell, 
aber auch so präzise wie möglich ab! 
[For the assessment, please use to marked buttons ("S" for "yes" and "L" for "no"). In this 
reaction-time based task, please enter your assessments as quickly and as precise as 
possible!] 
Legen Sie nun bitte Ihre beiden Zeige- oder Mittelfinger auf die "S"- und "L"-Taste und 
drücken Sie eine dieser Taste, um zu beginnen! 
[Now, please place both your index or middle fingers on the "S" and "L" key and press 
one of these buttons to start the task!] 
 
positive traits negative traits neutral traits 
ehrlich [honest] abhängig [dependent] albern [silly] 
flexibel [flexible] aggressiv [aggressive] besorgt [worried] 
freundlich [friendly] ängstlich [anxious] direkt [direct] 
geduldig [patient] egoistisch [selfish] dünn [thin] 
gerecht [fair] eigensinnig [headstrong] ehrgeizig [ambitious] 
gesellig [sociable] eitel [vain] empfindlich [sensitive] 
glücklich [happy] faul [lazy] genau [exact] 
gründlich [thorough] hektisch [hectic] groß [great] 
herzlich [cordially] hilflos [helpless] klein [small] 
hilfsbereit [helpful] kalt [cold] modern [modern] 
intelligent [intelligent] kleinlich [petty] neugierig [curious] 
kreativ [creative] langweilig [boring] rational [rational] 
lustig [funny] nachlässig [careless] reizbar [irritable] 
nett [nice] nervös [nervous] sachlich [objective] 
offen [open] primitiv [primitive] sensibel [sensitive] 
selbstbewusst [self-conscious] schwach [weak] sentimental [sentimental] 
sinnlich [sensual] stur [stubborn] sparsam [thrifty] 
tolerant [tolerant] träge [languid] verletzlich [vulnerable] 
treu [faithful] undiszipliniert [undisciplined] vorsichtig [cautious] 
vielseitig [versatile] weinerlich [whiny] warm [warm] 
 
